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Intro -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Tables and figures -- Acknowledgements -- Glossary -- Introduction: Australia as a Pacific power? -- Part 1 Australia's evolving strategic interests in the Pacific Islands -- 1 From colonial concerns to benign neglect -- 2 From constructive commitment to partnership and engagement -- Part 2 The levers of Australian influence -- 3 Military intervention -- 4 Defence assistance -- 5 State-building assistance -- 6 Economic tools -- 7 Diplomacy -- Part 3 The limits on Australian influence -- 8 The geopolitical landscape -- 9 The evolving regional order -- Conclusion: Pacific partner in an 'arc of opportunity' -- Appendix: List of interviews -- Bibliography -- Index

Introduction to Asia-Pacific Security: Andrew Carr and Joanne Wallis, S. 1. - 1. Can The United States Share Power In The Asia-Pacific? : Brad Glosserman, S. 23. - 2. Is China an Asia-Pacific Great Power? : Lowell Dittmer, S. 41. - 3. India and Japan: Potential Members of the Great Power Club? : H. D. P. Envall and Ian Hall, S. 63. - 4. Are Middle Powers on a Collision Course in the Asia-Pacific? Andrew Carr, S. 83 . - 5. Why are Small States a Security Concern in the Asia-Pacific? : Joanne Wallis, S. 103 . - 6. Military modernization and arms-racing in the Asia-Pacific : Tim Huxley and Brendan Taylor, S. 123. - 7. Maritime Security: Will Asia's Next War Occur at Sea?: James Manicom, S. 147 . - 8. What Threats do Terrorism and Insurgency Pose in the Asia-Pacific?: Christopher Paul and Nick Nelson, S. 163. - 9. How Relevant are Internal and Non-Traditional Security Challenges in the Asia Pacific?: Alistair D. B. Cook, S. 183. - 10. How is the Cyber Revolution Changing Asia-Pacific National Security Concerns?: Rex B. Hughes, S. 201. - 11. Can Multilateralism and Security Communities Bring Security to the Asia-Pacific?: Mathew Davies, S.223. - 12. Is Human Security a Solution?: Sarah Teitt, S. 241 . - Conclusion: What is the Asia-Pacific's Likely Security Future?: Brenan Taylor and William T. Tow, S. 259

"Joanne Wallis is a lecturer in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. She has previously taught at the University of Cambridge, the University of Melbourne and Swinburne University. She completed her PhD in politics and international studies at the University of Cambridge in 2011. From January 2009 to January 2012 she was an honorary Fellow of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne. In 2006, she was a Fulbright Scholar at the Walker Institute of International and Area Studies at the University of South Carolina. She has also worked as a lawyer and has conducted research consultancies for Australian and international NGOs. Her research considers the role that constitution making plays in building states and nations in post-conflict societies, with a particular emphasis on the opportunities for engagement between liberal and local approaches to law, governance and development"--

What happens if international interveners feel emotions that they consider unsanctioned, unwanted and unprofessional? What if they enact and manage their emotions in ways that they – or others – deem unacceptable? If international interveners face anxiety about being 'too emotional' or not feeling or expressing the 'right' emotions, does this challenge their sense of identity? And what consequences could this have for peacebuilding and the conflict-affected population in which they were working? Building on the growing body of critical peace and conflict scholarship that has analysed international interveners at the micro-scale, this article analyses how individual interveners' emotional and embodied experiences influence their understanding and practice of peacebuilding. Based on a discourse analysis of the memoirs of 10 international interveners, this article identifies two primary interpretive repertoires that the interveners employed and argues that they generated two ideal-type subject positions: the intervener as objective, rational, technocratic 'expert' and the intervener as irrational, fallible, vulnerable 'human'. These subject positions determined the feeling rules that the interveners followed and the dilemmas they faced. This, in turn, affected how the interveners perceived the conflict-affected societies in which they were working, and how they understood and practised peacebuilding.

Australia faces an increasingly crowded and complex geopolitical environment in the South Pacific. While the most important external powers in the region have traditionally been Australia, New Zealand, the US and France, which have long worked together as partners, a number of new powers are increasingly active, most notably China, Russia, Indonesia, Japan and India. South Pacific states, particularly Papua New Guinea and Fiji, are emerging as regional powers to constrain Australian influence. South Pacific states are also becoming more active on the international stage, further taking them outside Australia's and their other traditional partners' sphere of influence. The complex geopolitics of the South Pacific have also generated shifts in the regional order. While the Pacific Islands Forum, of which Australia is a member, remains the pre-eminent regional political and security institution, South Pacific states have been empowered by their greater choice of non-traditional external partners, disenchanted with the Pacific Islands Forum and encouraged by an emboldened Fiji to create or strengthen alternative regional and subregional institutions and organisations that exclude Australia and their other traditional external partners. Given the proximity and strategic import of the South Pacific, Australia can't afford to be complacent about these geopolitical challenges and needs to be more aware of and focused on the region. The geopolitical environment in the South Pacific has important implications for us, particularly given our strategic interest in being the region's 'principal security partner' in order to ensure that no power hostile to Western interests establishes a strategic foothold in the region from which it could launch attacks on Australia or threaten allied access or our maritime approaches. There's a risk that China's growing regional activism could generate destabilising competition with the US in the South Pacific, which would have consequences for Australia, both as the region's near neighbour and because of flow-on effects on its security relationship with the US and economic relationship with China. While that's unlikely, the perception that external powers are competing for regional influence has opened up global opportunities for South Pacific states, as it has encouraged the belief that they can play competing great powers against each other. Consequently, South Pacific states appreciate that they have more choice as to which external power (or powers) they engage with. Some appear to be taking advantage of this in order to access aid, concessional loans, military support and international influence. The geopolitical environment in the South Pacific also has implications for Australia's strategic interest in ensuring stability, security and cohesion in the region. The influx of aid and investment from non-traditional external powers runs the risk of destabilising recipient states. This raises two main challenges for Australia. First, as the region's principal security partner with a strong sense of responsibility for the region, we're likely to feel obliged (and be expected by our partners, particularly the US) to respond to serious instability and conflict. Second, the increased presence and activism of non-traditional external powers, particularly China, raises questions about whether they would intervene to protect their interests and investments and, if so, how Australia would respond. Australians, and particularly the Australian Government, need to be more aware of and focused on the South Pacific. Our attention to the region has peaked at moments when the region was perceived to pose an imminent potential threat. Beyond those moments, our foreign and strategic policy in the region has been characterised by unclear, inconsistent and competing interests and intentions, which has reduced its effectiveness and undermined Australia's influence. If Australia is going to ensure that it's able to respond to the complex and crowded geopolitics of the South Pacific, it needs to prioritise the region in a clear, consistent and sustained way in its foreign and strategic policy planning

executive summary: This essay examines Australia's understanding of the concepts of the "Indo-Pacific" and "rules-based order" and analyzes how Australia pursues its geostrategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, particularly its increased emphasis on minilateralism. main argumentAustralia and other regional countries confront the threat that U.S.-China tension could escalate from competition to outright confrontation. To address this challenge, Australia should adopt a more "free and open" strategic and foreign policy by partnering with other middle powers and smaller states to create a new Indo-Pacific security order that seeks to rebalance regional power dynamics. This security order would be better guided by rules than by values, but given the limitations of the existing rules-based order, Australia should recognize problems with the current rules and work to make them attractive to smaller states. This may involve middle powers compromising some of their "shared values" and making sacrifices to their national interests (narrowly defined) in service of the overriding interest in preserving regional peace and security based on rules that are seen as legitimate and respect-worthy by many states, not just the most powerful ones. policy implications• Behind closed doors, middle powers are questioning whether the U.S. should continue to take the lead in securing order in the Indo-Pacific, and in fact do not necessarily trust that it is capable of doing so. Many Indo-Pacific states are wary of being caught between an activist China and an unpredictable U.S. and are reluctant to make a strategic choice. • Over the last two decades, Australia has demonstrated its capacity as a middle power by leading interventions in Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, and most recently by implementing its cross-government policy to "step up" its engagement in the Pacific Islands. Australia should draw confidence from these and other efforts. • Creating an Indo-Pacific security order negotiated and led by middle powers and small states will strain alliance relationships and strategic partnerships, and it will be challenged by Southeast Asian states' emphasis on ASEAN centrality and the preference of regional states for nonalignment and autonomy. This suggests that creating this order will require sustained diplomatic commitment and compromise and necessarily be an iterative process.

This article considers what treating individual international interveners engaged in peacebuilding work as referent objects can tell us about emplaced security. This is important because individual interveners are diverse, embodied agents who can impact the agency, peace and security of conflict-affected populations. It argues that applying an ontological security lens can provide a partial explanation for why interveners develop narratives and perform practices, including why they sometimes identify and behave in counterproductive, and even damaging, ways. The final section considers why an analytical focus on place is valuable, noting that place-based experiences and place-identities are formative of ontological security. It argues that treating interveners as a referent object provides opportunities to rethink the tendency to focus on home as the key site of emplacement in the ontological security literature. Building on this, it argues that examining the emplaced security of interveners invites us to examine the political nature and consequences of interveners' physical and ontological security-seeking narratives and practices, including their creation of the material and ideational structures of intervention spaces and places.