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BACKGROUND: 'Wicked' is the term used to describe some of the most challenging and complex issues of our time, many of which threaten human health. Climate change, biodiversity loss, persisting poverty, the advancing obesity epidemic, and food insecurity are all examples of such wicked problems. However there is a strong body of evidence describing the solutions for addressing many of these problems. Given that much is known about how many of these problems could be addressed - and given the risks of not acting - what will it take to create the 'tipping point' needed for effective action? MAIN BODY: A recent (2015) court ruling in The Hague held that the Dutch government's stance on climate change was illegal, ordering them to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% within 5 years (by 2020), relative to 1990 levels. The case was filed on behalf of 886 Dutch citizens, suing the government for violating human rights and climate changes treaties by failing to take adequate action to prevent the harmful impacts of climate change. This judicial ruling has the potential to provide a way forward, inspiring other civil movements and creating a template from which to address other wicked problems. CONCLUSION: This judicial strategy to address the need to lower greenhouse gas emissions in the Netherlands is not a magic bullet, and requires a particular legal and institutional setting. However it has the potential to be a game-changer - providing an example of a strategy for achieving domestic regulatory change that is likely to be replicable in some countries elsewhere, and providing an example of a particularly 'wicked' (in the positive, street-slang sense of the word) strategy to address seemingly intractable and wicked problems.

Addressing the increasingly globalised determinants of many important problems affecting human health is a complex task requiring collective action. We suggest that part of the solution to addressing intractable global health issues indeed lies with the role of new legal instruments in the form of globally binding treaties, as described in the recent article of Nikogosian and Kickbusch. However, in addition to the use of international law to develop new treaties, another part of the solution may lie in innovative use of existing legal instruments. A 2015 court ruling in The Hague, which ordered the Dutch government to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% within five years, complements this perspective, suggesting a way forward for addressing global health problems that critically involves civil society and innovative use of existing domestic legal instruments.

It is increasingly recognised within public health scholarship that policy change depends on the nature of the power relations surrounding and embedded within decision-making spaces. It is only through sustained shifts in power in all its forms (visible, hidden and invisible) that previously excluded perspectives have influence in policy decisions. Further, consideration of the underlying neoliberal paradigm is essential for understanding how existing power dynamics and relations have emerged and are sustained. In their analysis of political and governance factors, Townsend et al have provided critical insight into future potential strategies for increasing attention to health concerns in trade policy. In this commentary we explore how incorporating theories of power more rigorously into similar political analyses, as well as more explicit critical consideration of the neoliberal political paradigm, can assist in analysing if and how strategies can effectively challenge existing power relations in ways that are necessary for transformative policy change.

AbstractTrade liberalisation is a driver of the rising burden of non‐communicable diseases in Asia through its role in facilitating the growth of the region's tobacco, alcohol and ultra‐processed foods industries while simultaneously restricting the capacities of governments to enact public health regulations. This highlights the need for greater coherence between health and trade policy in the region. Yet there has been little analysis of these topics with regard to Asia. What are the barriers and opportunities for enhancing trade and health policy coherence and strengthening governance capacities? How can health, in particular the prevention of non‐communicable diseases through curbing risk commodity markets, be positioned more centrally in trade policy? We draw upon a diversity of literature to outline seven key challenges to governing the health–trade nexus as it relates to risk commodities and non‐communicable diseases in Asia, and offer suggestions for strengthening capacities.

BACKGROUND: Trade and investment liberalization (trade liberalization) can promote or harm health. Undoubtedly it has contributed, although unevenly, to Asia's social and economic development over recent decades with resultant gains in life expectancy and living standards. In the absence of public health protections, however, it is also a significant upstream driver of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) including cardiovascular disease, cancer and diabetes through facilitating increased consumption of the 'risk commodities' tobacco, alcohol and ultra-processed foods, and by constraining access to NCD medicines. In this paper we describe the NCD burden in Asian countries, trends in risk commodity consumption and the processes by which trade liberalization has occurred in the region and contributed to these trends. We further establish pressing questions for future research on strengthening regulatory capacity to address trade liberalization impacts on risk commodity consumption and health. METHODS: A semi-structured search of scholarly databases, institutional websites and internet sources for academic and grey literature. Data for descriptive statistics were sourced from Euromonitor International, the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and the World Trade Organization. RESULTS: Consumption of tobacco, alcohol and ultra-processed foods was prevalent in the region and increasing in many countries. We find that trade liberalization can facilitate increased trade in goods, services and investments in ways that can promote risk commodity consumption, as well as constrain the available resources and capacities of governments to enact policies and programmes to mitigate such consumption. Intellectual property provisions of trade agreements may also constrain access to NCD medicines. Successive layers of the evolving global and regional trade regimes including structural adjustment, multilateral trade agreements, and preferential trade agreements have enabled transnational corporations that manufacture, market and distribute risk commodities to increasingly penetrate and promote consumption in Asian markets. CONCLUSIONS: Trade liberalization is a significant driver of the NCD epidemic in Asia. Increased participation in trade agreements requires countries to strengthen regulatory capacity to ensure adequate protections for public health. How best to achieve this through multilateral, regional and unilateral actions is a pressing question for ongoing research.

BACKGROUND: Industry involvement in alcohol policy is highly contentious. The Drink Free Days (DFD) campaign (2018- 2019) run by Public Health England (PHE), an executive agency of government, and Drinkaware, an industry-funded 'alcohol education charity' to encourage middle-aged drinkers to abstain from drinking on some days was criticised for perceived industry involvement. We examine the extent to which the DFD campaign was supported by local-authority Directors of Public Health (DPHs) in England - which have a statutory remit for promoting population health within their locality - and their reasons for this. METHODS: Our mixed-methods approach included a stakeholder mapping, online survey, and semi-structured interviews. The stakeholder mapping provided the basis for sampling survey and interview respondents. In total, 25 respondents completed the survey, and we conducted 21 interviews with DPHs and their local authority (LA) representatives. We examined survey responses, and coded free-text survey and interview responses to identify key themes. RESULTS: While some respondents supported the DFD campaign, others did not promote it, or actively opposed it, due mainly to concerns about conflicts of interest and the legitimacy of industry involvement in the campaign. These were considered to undermine PHE's independence and deflect attention from more important, evidence-based policy interventions such as alcohol pricing while conferring vicarious credibility on Drinkaware. We also found low levels of knowledge about alcohol-related harm, the effectiveness of different policies to address these and the policy-influencing strategies used by the alcohol industry. CONCLUSION: The findings highlight the dangers of industry partnership and potential conflicts of interest for government agencies and the ineffectiveness of the campaigns they run at local and national levels. They demonstrate the need for caution in engaging with industry-associated bodies at all levels of government and are thus of potential relevance to studies of other health-harming industries and policy contexts.

This article examines the Drink Free Days (DFD) campaign run by Public Health England and the industry funded alcohol education charity, Drinkaware, in eight English regions in 2018-2019. More specifically, it examines uses, and usefulness, of the campaign to the alcohol producers which fund Drinkaware. It draws on 36 semi-structured interviews with policy actors and a framing analysis of industry social media accounts and news coverage of the campaign. Industry-associated bodies such as Drinkaware have been identified as key components of alcohol industry strategies to influence policy and shape the regulatory contexts in which they operate in three ways. First, funding such bodies forms part of corporate social responsibility programmes which allow companies to position themselves as legitimate policy actors and 'part of the solution' to alcohol related harms. Second, reliance on industry funding incentivises governments to co-operate with industry actors and provides leverage in policy debates. Third, their programmes absorb policy bandwidth and deflect from more effective, evidence based interventions (e.g. on pricing and advertising) which affect industry sales and profits. This is particularly effective if the perception of independence from the industry is created. The analysis presented below suggests that the DFD was not used explicitly by the industry actors for public relations purposes. However, it was useful to their broader strategic aims. It reinforced the position of Drinkaware as a key policy actor and promoted the particular, industry-favoured understanding of alcohol harms and their solutions which it promotes. This is in keeping with the previous insights from international research literature on corporate political activity in health harming industries which finds that policy influence is often subtle, indirect and designed to embed organisations within the policy architecture. It suggests that government agencies should proceed with great caution in entering into such partnerships with industry associated bodies.

This article examines the Drink Free Days (DFD) campaign run by Public Health England and the industry funded alcohol education charity, Drinkaware, in eight English regions in 2018-2019. More specifically, it examines uses, and usefulness, of the campaign to the alcohol producers which fund Drinkaware. It draws on 36 semi-structured interviews with policy actors and a framing analysis of industry social media accounts and news coverage of the campaign. Industry-associated bodies such as Drinkaware have been identified as key components of alcohol industry strategies to influence policy and shape the regulatory contexts in which they operate in three ways. First, funding such bodies forms part of corporate social responsibility programmes which allow companies to position themselves as legitimate policy actors and 'part of the solution' to alcohol related harms. Second, reliance on industry funding incentivises governments to co-operate with industry actors and provides leverage in policy debates. Third, their programmes absorb policy bandwidth and deflect from more effective, evidence based interventions (e.g. on pricing and advertising) which affect industry sales and profits. This is particularly effective if the perception of independence from the industry is created. The analysis presented below suggests that the DFD was not used explicitly by the industry actors for public relations purposes. However, it was useful to their broader strategic aims. It reinforced the position of Drinkaware as a key policy actor and promoted the particular, industry-favoured understanding of alcohol harms and their solutions which it promotes. This is in keeping with the previous insights from international research literature on corporate political activity in health harming industries which finds that policy influence is often subtle, indirect and designed to embed organisations within the policy architecture. It suggests that government agencies should proceed with great caution in entering into such partnerships with industry associated bodies. ; This article is part of an evaluation commissioned and funded by Public Health England. The authors would like to thank Christopher Turner for his work in undertaking data collection in the early part of the study.

Experience shows that regulatory intervention can lead to substantial improvement in population health. The history of regulatory intervention in public health suggests that 'tipping points' necessary to catalyse regulatory change may be identified. We examine three areas in which governments have legislated to protect public health: sanitation, building standards, and vehicle emissions. We apply the lessons to regulatory reform addressing obesity and the chronic disease it causes.

Experience shows that regulatory intervention can lead to substantial improvement in population health. The history of regulatory intervention in public health suggests that 'tipping points' necessary to catalyse regulatory change may be identified. We examine three areas in which governments have legislated to protect public health: sanitation, building standards, and vehicle emissions. We apply the lessons to regulatory reform addressing obesity and the chronic disease it causes.

BACKGROUND: Public health concerns relating to international investment liberalization have centred on the potential for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)-related regulatory chill. However, the broader political and economic dimensions that shape the relationship between the international investment regime and non-communicable disease (NCD) policy development have been less well explored. This review aimed to synthesise the available evidence using a political economy approach, to understand why, how and under what conditions transnational corporations may use the international investment regime to promote NCD prevention policy non-decisions. MAIN BODY: Methods: Mechanisms explaining why/how the international investment regime may be used by transnational health-harmful commodity corporations (THCCs) to encourage NCD prevention policy non-decisions, including regulatory chill, were iteratively developed. Six databases and relevant grey literature was searched, and evidence was extracted, synthesized and mapped against the various proposed explanatory mechanisms. FINDINGS: Eighty-nine sources were included. THCCs may be incentivised to use the ISDS mechanism since the costs may be outweighed by the benefits of even just delaying regulatory adoption, particularly since the chilling effect tends to ripple out across jurisdictions. Drivers of regulatory chill may include ambiguity in treaty terms, inconsistency in arbitral rulings, potential arbitrator bias and the high cost of arbitration. Evidence indicates ISDS can delay policy adoption both within the country directly involved but also in other jurisdictions. Additionally, governments are adopting standard assessments of public health regulatory proposals for trade and ISDS risk. Various economic, political and industry-related factors likely interact to increase (or decrease) the ultimate risk of regulatory chill. Some evidence indicates that THCCs take advantage of governments' prioritization of foreign investment over NCD prevention objectives to influence the NCD prevention regulatory environment. CONCLUSIONS: While ISDS-related regulatory chill is a real risk under certain conditions, international investment-related NCD prevention policy non-decisions driven by broader political economy dynamics may well be more widespread and impactful on NCD regulatory environments. There is therefore a clear need to expand the research agenda on investment liberalization and NCD policy beyond regulatory chill and engage with theories and approaches from international relations and political science, including political economy and power analyses.

BACKGROUND: Public health concerns relating to international investment liberalization have centred on the potential for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)-related regulatory chill. However, the broader political and economic dimensions that shape the relationship between the international investment regime and non-communicable disease (NCD) policy development have been less well explored. This review aimed to synthesise the available evidence using a political economy approach, to understand why, how and under what conditions transnational corporations may use the international investment regime to promote NCD prevention policy non-decisions. MAIN BODY: Methods: Mechanisms explaining why/how the international investment regime may be used by transnational health-harmful commodity corporations (THCCs) to encourage NCD prevention policy non-decisions, including regulatory chill, were iteratively developed. Six databases and relevant grey literature was searched, and evidence was extracted, synthesized and mapped against the various proposed explanatory mechanisms. Findings: Eighty-nine sources were included. THCCs may be incentivised to use the ISDS mechanism since the costs may be outweighed by the benefits of even just delaying regulatory adoption, particularly since the chilling effect tends to ripple out across jurisdictions. Drivers of regulatory chill may include ambiguity in treaty terms, inconsistency in arbitral rulings, potential arbitrator bias and the high cost of arbitration. Evidence indicates ISDS can delay policy adoption both within the country directly involved but also in other jurisdictions. Additionally, governments are adopting standard assessments of public health regulatory proposals for trade and ISDS risk. Various economic, political and industry-related factors likely interact to increase (or decrease) the ultimate risk of regulatory chill. Some evidence indicates that THCCs take advantage of governments' prioritization of foreign investment over NCD prevention objectives to ...

Alcohol-related harm has gained increased attention in high-income countries (HICs) in recent years which, alongside government regulation, has effected a reduction in alcohol consumption. The alcohol industry has turned its attention to low-income and middle-income country (LMIC) markets as a new source of growth and profit, prompting increased consumption in LMICS. Alcohol use in LMICs is also increasing. There is a need to understand particularly in LMICs the impact of industry strategy in shaping local contexts of alcohol use. We draw on conceptualisations from food systems research, and research on the commercial determinants of health, to develop a new approach for framing alcohol research and discuss implications for alcohol research, particularly in LMICs, focusing on South Africa as an illustrative example. We propose a conceptualisation of the 'alcohol environment' as the system of alcohol provision, acquisition and consumption-including, critically, industry advertising and marketing-along with the political, economic and regulatory context of the alcohol industry that mediates people's alcohol drinking patterns and behaviours. While each country and region is different in terms of its context of alcohol use, we contrast several broadly distinct features of alcohol environments in LMICs and HICs. Improving understanding of the full spectrum of influences on drinking behaviour, particularly in LMICs, is vital to inform the design of interventions and policies to facilitate healthier environments and reduce the harms associated with alcohol consumption. Our framework for undertaking alcohol research may be used to structure mixed methods empirical research examining the role of the alcohol environment particularly in LMICs.