Suchergebnisse

La question de la polarisation des individus, en fonction notamment du niveau éducatif, au centre de cette note, s'inscrit dans un projet de recherche financé par les SSTC. Ce projet a pour thème général l'activation des politiques sociales. Le sous-thème particulier qui nous occupe au GIRSEF est celui de l'intérêt d'une plus grande prise en compte de la polarisation des contextes socio-économiques locaux dans la formulation des politiques publiques et, partant, d'un ciblage géographique de ces politiques. Nous ne traiterons pas cette vaste question ici. L'objet de cette note concerne principalement l'amont, à savoir la question de la polarisation des contextes locaux et de ses déterminants. Cette insistance sur le local dans notre réflexion fait écho à une double évolution: celle de l'analyse économique et celle de la réalité socio-économique ellemême. Sur le plan théorique, un nombre croissant de travaux tendent à élargir la notion de "ressources" utiles en particulier à l'insertion professionnelle à des éléments sans expression monétaire directe comme le capital social (Bénabou, 1994), la densité des réseaux relationnels (Montgomery, 1991), le degré de sécurité, la confiance entre voisins etc. Corrélativement, ces mêmes travaux ou d'autres (Piketty, 1994) suggèrent l'existence de mécanismes (dits d'appariement sélectif) qui tendent à répartir de façon fortement inégalitaire ces ressources en fonction des multiples lieux concrets au sein desquels vivent les individus. Il s'agit du bassin économique, la sous-région, l'agglomération urbaine, le quartier, l'entreprise, l'école, voire la famille (Kremer, 1994). Ces travaux théoriques trouvent un écho auprès de travaux plus empiriques qui mettent en évidence : (i) l'accentuation des certaines inégalités intranationales, ou infra-régionales alors que s'opère un certain nombre de convergences sur les ensembles plus vastes comme les nations (Overman & Puga, 2000) ; et (ii) l'accentuation des différences de fortune (revenus) entre individus "égaux" quant à l'âge, le diplôme scolaire ou le secteur d'activité professionnel (Gibbons & Katz, 1992; Cohen, 1997). Nous tentons ici de faire le point sur cette question de la polarisation: quelles sont les évidences à ce sujet ? Quels sont les mécanismes de l'appariement sélectif qui la produisent ? Quelles en sont les conséquences sur l'intensité de certains problèmes sociaux ?

What is justice in education? How can we evaluate whether given distributions of educational inputs or educational outcomes are just or not? How should a society distribute its educational resources? How canwe evaluate the level of (un)fairness of a schooling system? In this paper, we try to provide a basic framework for thinking about these normative questions in what we consider to be a rigorous way. Inorder to accomplish such task, we interrelate different strands of literature, namely: theories of distributive justice, developed by political philosophers, concepts and tools used in microeconomics (especially inwelfare economics), and insights from positive economics of education. We present, illustrate, and criticize what 'justice in education' is, according to four normative positions – utilitarianism, libertarianism,egalitarianism and egalitarian liberalism.

Roemer's' 1998 seminal work on equality of opportunity has contributed to the emergence of a theory of justice that is modern, conceptually clear and easy to mobilize in policy design. In this paper, we apply Roemer's theory to education policy. We first analyze the reallocations of educational expenditure required to equalize opportunities (taken to be test scores close to the end of compulsory education). Using Brazilian data, we find that implementing an equal-opportunity policy across pupils of different socio-economic background, by using per-pupil spending as the instrument, and ensuring that nobody receives less that 1/3 of the current national average, requires multiplying by 8.6 the current level of spending on the lowest achieving pupils. This result is driven by the extremely low elasticity of scores to per-pupil spending. As such, it implies large reallocations that are probably politically unacceptable. By exploiting our knowledge of the education production function, we then identify ways of reducing financial reallocations needed to achieve equality of opportunity. We show that the simultaneous redistribution of monetary and nonmonetary inputs, like peer group quality (i.e., desegregation) and school effectiveness (i.e., equalizing access to the best-run schools), considerably reduces - by almost 50% - the magnitude of financial redistribution needed. Implementing an EOp policy would not come at any particular cost (or benefit) in terms of efficiency.

Roemer's' 1998 seminal work on equality of opportunity has contributed to the emergence of a theory of justice that is modern, conceptually clear and easy to mobilize in policy design. In this paper, we apply Roemer's theory to education policy. We first analyze the reallocations of educational expenditure required to equalize opportunities (taken to be test scores close to the end of compulsory education). Using Brazilian data, we find that implementing an equal-opportunity policy across pupils of different socio-economic background, by using per-pupil spending as the instrument, and ensuring that nobody receives less that 1/3 of the current national average, requires multiplying by 8.6 the current level of spending on the lowest achieving pupils. This result is driven by the extremely low elasticity of scores to per-pupil spending. As such, it implies large reallocations that are probably politically unacceptable. By exploiting our knowledge of the education production function, we then identify ways of reducing financial reallocations needed to achieve equality of opportunity. We show that the simultaneous redistribution of monetary and nonmonetary inputs, like peer group quality (i.e., desegregation) and school effectiveness (i.e., equalizing access to the best-run schools), considerably reduces - by almost 50% - the magnitude of financial redistribution needed. Implementing an EOp policy would not come at any particular cost (or benefit) in terms of efficiency.

Roemer's' 1998 seminal work on equality of opportunity has contributed to the emergence of a theory of justice that is modern, conceptually clear and easy to mobilize in policy design. In this paper,we apply Roemer's theory to education policy. We first analyze the reallocations of educational expenditure required to equalize opportunities (taken to be test scores close to the end of compulsoryeducation). Using Brazilian data, we find that implementing an equal-opportunity policy across pupils of different socio-economic background, by using per-pupil spending as the instrument, andensuring that nobody receives less that 1/3 of the current national average, requires multiplying by 8.6 the current level of spending on the lowest achieving pupils. This result is driven by the extremely lowelasticity of scores to per-pupil spending. As such, it implies large reallocations that are probably politically unacceptable. By exploiting our knowledge of the education production function we then identifyways of reducing financial reallocations needed to achieve equality of opportunity. We show that the simultaneous redistribution of monetary and nonmonetary inputs, like peer group quality (i.e.,desegregation) and school effectiveness (i.e., equalizing access to the best-run schools), considerably reduces – by almost 50% – themagnitude of financial redistribution needed. Implementing an EOp policy would not come at any particular cost (or benefit) in terms of efficiency.

AbstractThis article explores the connection between two related but distinct models of basic income proposals in the context of a pandemic emergency. While COVID‐19 appears to have increased interest in basic income, this often ended up taking the form of a temporary emergency basic income (EBI) instead of a permanent universal basic income (UBI). In this article we argue that the "dial up/dial down" model of basic income allows us to link EBI and UBI in a way that offers both a practical response to important implementation challenges in emergency policy making and a strategic argument in favour of UBI as a pandemic policy instrument. We illustrate our argument by contrasting the Renda Básica de Cidadania (RBC) in the municipality of Maricá, Brazil, with two comparable programmes in the same region.