In: Wan, Y. and A. Zhang (2016), "Air cargo transport and logistics in Hong Kong and southern China," in: J. Zhang and C.-M. Fung (eds.) Handbook of Transport in Asia, Routledge, Forthcoming
This paper analyzes the incentives for and welfare implications of collaboration among local governments in landside port accessibility investment. In particular, we consider two seaports with their respective captive markets and a common inland market for which the ports compete. The ports and the inland belong to three independent regional governments, each making investment decisions on accessibility for its own region. We find that there is a conflict of interest between the port governments and inland government in terms of their jointly making accessibility investment decisions, and that each region's preference over various coalitions is highly affected by ownership type of the competing ports. For public ports, the inland may compensate the port regions to achieve the grand coalition that maximizes total welfare but requires a sizable investment in the port regions. For private ports, however, the port regions benefit from coordinating with the inland and hence may be able to compensate the inland to form the grand coalition. ; Research Grants Council of Hong Kong RGC/PolyU 252015/14E Institute for Complex Engineering systemas (ISCI) grants Conicyt FB0-16 Milenio P-05-004-F Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)
We investigate strategic investment decisions of local governments on inland transportation infrastructure in the context of seaport competition. We consider two seaports with their respective catchment areas and a common hinterland for which seaports compete. The two seaports and the common hinterland belong to three independent local governments, each determining the level of investment for its own inland transportation system. We find: (i) increasing investment in the hinterland lowers charges at both ports; and (ii) increasing investment in a port's catchment area will cause severer reduction in charge at its port than at the rival port. We also examine the non-cooperative optimal investment decisions and equilibrium investment levels under various coalitions.