Use of Strategy Methods in Experimental Pivotal‐Voting Game
In: Pacific economic review, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 387-400
ISSN: 1468-0106
AbstractWe use the strategy method to conduct laboratory experiments on a nine‐player heterogeneous‐cost voting game. We replicate the underdog and competition effect, but find significantly higher voter turnout rates to be only partially explained by logit quantal response equilibrium. We examine round‐by‐round changes in cut‐off behaviour and find that voters are highly responsive to historical pivotal events. Voters also respond to past winning and tying, but only as a minority (upsetting the majority), demonstrating an 'underdog winning effect', receiving extra utility when winning as a minority. An equilibrium with such asymmetry in utility explains the high minority turnout (and high majority turnout as a best response).