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Recommender Systems under Privacy Protection
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Information Design of a Delegated Search
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Informing the Public About a Pandemic
In: ESMT Berlin Working Paper No. 20-03 (R2)
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Working paper
Engineering Social Learning: Information Design of Time-Locked Sales Campaigns for Online Platforms
In: Management Science, Forthcoming
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Working paper
The Informational Role of Buyback Contracts
In: Management Science, Forthcoming
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A Stationary Infinite-Horizon Supply Contract under Asymmetric Inventory Information
In: Alain Bensoussan, Suresh Sethi, Shouqiang Wang. 2023. A Stationary Infinite-Horizon Supply Contract under Asymmetric Inventory Information, Operations Research, forthcoming.
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Working paper
Informing the public about a pandemic
This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find the government has an incentive to either downplay or exaggerate the severity of the epidemic if it heavily prioritizes the economy over population health or vice versa. Importantly, we find that the level of economic inequality in the population has an effect on these distortions. The more unequal the disease's economic impact on the population is, the less the government exaggerates and the more it downplays the severity of the epidemic. When the government weighs the economy and population health sufficiently equally, however, the government should always be fully transparent about the severity of the epidemic. ; Revised version - January 28, 2021
BASE
Informing the public about a pandemic
This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find the government has an incentive to either downplay or exaggerate the severity of the epidemic if it heavily prioritizes the economy over population health or vice versa. Importantly, we find that the level of economic inequality in the population has an effect on these distortions. The more unequal the disease's economic impact on the population is, the less the government exaggerates and the more it downplays the severity of the epidemic. When the government weighs the economy and population health sufficiently equally, however, the government should always be fully transparent about the severity of the epidemic. ; Revised version - February 11, 2021
BASE
Informing the public about a pandemic
This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find that governments have an incentive to either downplay or exaggerate the severity of the epidemic if the government heavily prioritizes the economy over population health or vice versa. Importantly, we find that the level of economic inequality in the population has an effect on these distortions. The more unequal the disease's economic impact on the population is, the less the government exaggerates and the more it downplays the severity of the epidemic. When the government weighs the economy and population health sufficiently equally, however, the government should always be fully transparent about the severity of the epidemic.
BASE
Procurement with Cost and Non-Cost Attributes: Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
In: Published in Operations Research. DOI: https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/opre.2020.2060
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Working paper
Rudong Wind Farm, its Development, Benefits, Challenges and Future Directions
In: EGYR-D-21-03343
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Avoiding Fields on Fire: Information Dissemination Policies for Environmentally Safe Crop-Residue Management
In: Management Science, Forthcoming
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