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Existing scholarship focuses on power or dysfunctional institutions to explain instability of international relations and resulting conflict among great powers. We argue that the extant deterioration of the US-China relation is the result of cognition based on self-centric generated misperception. Our study shows that rather than asymmetric power distribution or the dysfunctional institutions, it is biased and distorted cognition that trigger misunderstanding, which ultimately invites the spiral escalation of suspicions and hostile competition between the two sides. Our argument is primarily justified by our critique over normative approaches, and our proposed political-cognitive model; and then we evaluate the political implications of neglected commonalities, ignored distinctions and exaggerated differences in each party's cognitive processes. Utilizing several analytical variables incorporating observable past experiences and current development in the power transition and in domestic politics of both countries, we found how often the states can be easily galvanized into actions of hostility with misperceptions; and how easy a benign environment for co-evolution can be cooked down to vicious situation for confrontation. We concluded that any action taken by great powers in their relations are the result of cognitive approaches. Clarifying ignorance and misinterpretations in their cognitive activities help mitigate the tensions instigated by biases and distortions. Competition through reciprocity for the great power relations is critical not only due to the deadly constraints in the militarily option, it is pragmatically most cost-beneficial because all it requires is to nurture appropriate cognition that respects the difference over uniformity, and trust regime's rationality for innovation.

Abstract.  In this paper we propose a decomposition technique to examine the sources of industrial contribution to aggregate labour productivity growth. We show that in terms of pure labour productivity growth, the manufacturing and service sectors contributed equally to the aggregate Canada‐U.S. labour productivity growth gap during the 1987–98 period. But, in terms of total industrial contributions, which also take into account the contributions from a change in relative size, the service sector was the largest contributor. We also find that high labour productivity growth industries did not attract resources from stagnant industries – a phenomenon consistent with Baumol's cost disease of stagnant industries. JEL Classification: O47, C43

Develops a linear programming model for integrated production planning based on the practice of a major Canadian steel making company. Considers the entire planning activity in the company as an integrated process involving a number of closely related sub‐functions, such as raw material purchasing, semi‐finished product purchasing and production, and capacity allocation, as well as finished product production and distribution. The mathematical programming model takes into account production costs, product throughput rates, customer demands, sales prices and facility capacities for optimal production planning. Presents a numerical example based on realistic system structure and practical planning data to illustrate the model. Computation results and analysis show that the integrated methodology is a feasible and practical approach for steel production planning.

This paper analyzes the reasons for the Canada-US labour productivity gap, which is mainly explained by the multifactor productivity (MFP) gap. Based on panel data for 41 industries, the regression results show that differences in the machinery and equipment (M&E) capital-labour ratio, trade openness, and capacity utilization explain differences in the Canada-US MFP gap across industries. The M&E capital intensity gap is the dominant source of the MFP gap. Lower wages, R&D intensity, and skills levels, as well as higher investment goods prices in Canada are the major determinants of the M&E capital intensity gap.