Suchergebnisse

1. Introduction -- 2. Interlinking markets, relational contracts and economic transition -- 3. Markets, contracts and economic growth -- 4. Interlinked contracts and development : where do we stand? -- 5. Unraveling the Chinese miracle : a perspective of interlinked relational contracts -- 6. The East Asian development model reconsidered with implications for China -- 7. Costs and benefits of relational contracting in China's transition.

The last three decades has witnessed miraculous economic growth of China. What has accounted for its miracle? What is the nature and future of the Chinese model? Is it unique? This book presents an analytical framework to demystify China's economic growth miracle. The book suggests that interlinked and relational contracts between the agents (in particular, between the state and the business) can compensate for flawed markets to achieve high growth. This kind of relational capitalism is significant in the investment-based stage of development, when mobilization of resources to exploit the existing technologies is key for growth. The book presents a general theory of interlinked relational contract, the workhorse model of the book. The theory highlights that effective governance is a function of market extent and market completeness. The process of economic development and modernization can be looked at fruitfully from two perspectives: the markets and the institutions and their interactions. The book stresses the critical fit between the development stage and the governance for a country's economic transition and development and thus the idea of "appropriate institutions".

The last three decades has witnessed miraculous economic growth of China. What has accounted for its miracle? What is the nature and future of the Chinese model? Is it unique? This book presents an analytical framework to demystify China's economic growth miracle. The book suggests that interlinked and relational contracts between the agents (in particular, between the state and the business) can compensate for flawed markets to achieve high growth. This kind of relational capitalism is significant in the investment-based stage of development, when mobilization of resources to

PurposeThis paper studies the political economy of the endogenous urban–rural divide in two dimensions: labor market and provision of public goods.Design/methodology/approachThis paper gives a dual-sector model endogenously depending on the consumption of public goods (club goods), the number of rural–urban migrants and the tax rate (transfer payments).FindingsAccording to the research findings in this paper, the constraints on the participation of rural residents portray the rural residents' bargaining power, and in the game between the urban elites and the rural residents, tax rates depend on the preferences of the urban elites and the constraints urban elites and the rural residents jointly face. Therefore, the urban elites have to set tax rates deviating from the most preferred ones. The model in this paper can explain a series of empirical findings and yield new theoretical findings for empirical testing.Originality/valueSignificantly, the paper finds that the increase in agricultural productivity will lead to industrialization, accompanied by the disintegration of the dual-sector model. However, though the increase in industrial productivity can accelerate industrialization, it will further expand the urban–rural divide.