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"One of the most commonly cited virtues of American federalism is its "laboratories of democracy"-the notion that decentralization and political competition encourage states to become testing grounds for novel social policies and ideas. In Experimentalist Constitutions, the first book that systematically compares subnational experimentalism in different countries, Yueduan Wang argues that the idea of federal laboratories is not exclusive to the American system; instead, similar concepts can be applied to constitutions with different center-local structures and levels of political competition. Using case studies from China, India, and the United States, the book illustrates that these vastly different polities have instituted their own mechanisms of subnational experimentalism based on the interactions between each country's constitutional system and partisan/factional dynamics. The study compares and contrasts these three versions of policy laboratories and comments on their pros and cons, thus making contributions to the discussion of these great powers' competing models of development"--

AbstractA commonly held view maintains that diminished autonomy substantially weakens the capacity of legal institutions to challenge state entities, particularly in authoritarian contexts. This study offers an alternative perspective through an empirical analysis of China's recent implementation of prosecutor‐led public interest litigation against state agencies. It suggests that integration within an authoritarian framework might, at least temporarily, enhance the leverage of justice institutions over state entities that violate laws, thereby aiding in navigating the challenges of law enforcement in a restrictive political environment. The research indicates that prosecutors have elicited compliance from the scrutinized agencies by deploying a strategic mix of legal deterrence, informal collaboration, and political threat. This approach is tailored to align with the objectives of local party‐state authorities, thereby securing their support and facilitating governmental compliance. Nonetheless, this political integration concurrently constrains the capacity for such legal initiatives to challenge the discretionary power of upper‐tier or more powerful agencies. These insights reveal the complex interplay between institutional independence and legal enforcement within authoritarian regimes.

The local party-state has always been a major source of extrajudicial influence in China. Drawing on interviews with judges, this article examines the impact of Xi Jinping's ambitious judicial centralization reforms, which are aimed at enhancing judicial autonomy by transferring authority over local court personnel and finances from local to provincial level. It finds that the reforms have achieved limited results. Although many appointment and budgetary powers were formally transferred to the provincial level, the local party-state retains considerable influence in both areas owing to its superior manpower, local knowledge and, in the case of developed regions, financial resources. Moreover, the local party-state maintains significant informal influence over the courts, which require many forms of discretionary assistance from various state organs – ranging from appropriating land for new courthouses to providing police protection for remote tribunals – in order to function. This setback highlights the depth and complexity of the courts' political and economic embeddedness and serves as a reminder of the inherent difficulty of institutionalizing judicial autonomy, however limited, in a large and diverse party-state. (China Q/GIGA)

AbstractThe local party-state has always been a major source of extrajudicial influence in China. Drawing on interviews with judges, this article examines the impact of Xi Jinping's ambitious judicial centralization reforms, which are aimed at enhancing judicial autonomy by transferring authority over local court personnel and finances from local to provincial level. It finds that the reforms have achieved limited results. Although many appointment and budgetary powers were formally transferred to the provincial level, the local party-state retains considerable influence in both areas owing to its superior manpower, local knowledge and, in the case of developed regions, financial resources. Moreover, the local party-state maintains significant informal influence over the courts, which require many forms of discretionary assistance from various state organs – ranging from appropriating land for new courthouses to providing police protection for remote tribunals – in order to function. This setback highlights the depth and complexity of the courts' political and economic embeddedness and serves as a reminder of the inherent difficulty of institutionalizing judicial autonomy, however limited, in a large and diverse party-state.

AbstractAlthough judicial empowerment has become increasingly common worldwide, the expansion of judicial powers in authoritarian countries faces persistent obstacles, such as institutional dependence, lack of political clout, and the repression of civil society. Through empirically examining three cases of environmental legal entrepreneurship under China's new public interest litigation (PIL) system, this study aims to reevaluate the patterns and limits of judicial expansion under authoritarianism. It finds that Chinese judges, prosecutors, and NGOs have been able to leverage the PIL system and their respective institutional advantages to substantially expand judicial oversight on eco‐environmental protection. However, the state has established boundaries for such legal entrepreneurship in terms of subject matter, institutional autonomy, and geographic reach, effectively confining them within political spheres considered unthreatening to the regime. Such quarantined judicial expansion shields relevant actors from authoritarian governments' tendency to suppress legal mobilization and thus may be a more viable form of judicial expansion in nondemocratic settings.

Scholars consider deficient local accountability mechanisms a key shortcoming of China's response to environmental issues. Through empirical analysis of the new procurator-led public interest litigation (PIL) system, this study examines whether – and to what extent – this shortcoming can be remedied by empowering the juridical institutions. It concludes that thanks to the procuratorates' political insider status, relative autonomy from local politics and extensive resources, procurators have generally found ways to maintain a delicate balance between holding executive agencies environmentally accountable and managing local governments' resistance to the PIL system. However, reliance on top-down political support may ultimately hinder the expansion and stability of the procuratorial PIL system. (China Q/GIGA)

AbstractScholars consider deficient local accountability mechanisms a key shortcoming of China's response to environmental issues. Through empirical analysis of the new procurator-led public interest litigation (PIL) system, this study examines whether – and to what extent – this shortcoming can be remedied by empowering the juridical institutions. It concludes that thanks to the procuratorates' political insider status, relative autonomy from local politics and extensive resources, procurators have generally found ways to maintain a delicate balance between holding executive agencies environmentally accountable and managing local governments' resistance to the PIL system. However, reliance on top-down political support may ultimately hinder the expansion and stability of the procuratorial PIL system.