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AbstractThis paper experimentally explores the epistemic conditions behind people's non‐equilibrium behaviour in the centipede games. We propose a novel design of laboratory experiment to elicit people's first‐ and second‐order beliefs regarding their opponents' choices and beliefs. The measured beliefs, together with the choice data, help us to estimate people's level of rationality, belief of rationality and second‐order belief of rationality. To examine how these epistemic variables are affected by the social‐efficiency property of the classic increasing‐sum centipede game, we revisit the constant‐sum centipede and compare the measured epistemic conditions from the constant‐sum with those from the classic centipede. We find that people's non‐backward induction behaviour may be attributed to the diffusion of beliefs and higher‐order beliefs in the increasing‐sum centipede. We consider a behavioural model in which people's preferences for social efficiency are incorporated into the extended utility maximization problem. Our analytical and estimation results indicate that the presence of efficiency‐oriented players and people's belief towards the uncertain portion of such type of players may play a part in the non‐backward‐induction outcomes in experimental centipede games.

Cet article a pour but d'étudier ce que recouvre le « rêve chinois » au paradigme de la sociologie compréhensive. Cette expression renvoie au pouvoir d'imaginer l'ensemble spécifique qu'est la société chinoise dans tous ses éléments historiques, psychologiques et culturels. Si le paradigme compréhensif nous permet d'entendre le rêve collectif comme le choix d'un mode de vie sociale, son application dans le cas de la Chine nous permet de conclure à une double modalité du « rêve chinois ». Premièrement, étant assimilable à un slogan politique, le rêve chinois préconisé par le président chinois Xi Jinping ne peut durablement exister ; deuxièmement, les rêves chinois multidimensionnels sont en train de déborder dans une lutte contre la politique du « contrôle total ».

My dissertation project explores the question of how activist networks operate in a highly repressive country when outside intervention is restrained. People have seen how effectively the Chinese Communist Party has cracked down on transnational religious activisms sponsored by Falun Gong, the exiled Tibetan government, and the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, Protestant advocacy groups from the United States and elsewhere enter China each year, despite the fact that the Party has stated that no Chinese church is allowed to receive any form of foreign support. I argue that understanding this variation in the success of transnational religious networks sheds light on the significance of an approach to transnational collaboration that is quite different from the "naming and shaming" strategy that dominates the literature on advocacy networks. I tested this strategic alliance argument with a mixed-methods research design, including face-to-face interviews, participant observations in four major cities, and a cross-provincial phone survey in randomly selected prefectures. This project makes notable corrections to previous understanding about protecting minority groups in authoritarian states. First, it addresses the neglect of religion and religious activists in the scholarship on transnational social movements and activism. Second, the strategic collaboration that is demonstrated by religious activists and advocates provides an alternative to the "naming and shaming" strategy of conventional transnational activism that more or less relies on powerful Western states and the United Nations. Third, the project identifies two commonly overlooked causal mechanisms between effective activism and its networks: the alliance strategy of foreign advocates and the leverage provided by government-sponsored social entities. The role of government-sponsored social organizations has been largely ignored in the existing literature. Members from legal entities often help fragile advocacy networks by providing information, legal protection, and connections, while brokering acquiescence from pragmatic local officials. In return, the advocacy networks provide funding, services and, most importantly, necessary legitimacy from globally recognized norms and standards. This unique benefit makes local leaders who ally with the advocacy networks seem more legitimate in the eyes of their own constituency.

Die vorliegendeArbeit wurde im Sommersemester 2007 vom Fachbereich Rechtswissenschaft der Johann Wolfgang Goethe- Universität Frankfurt am Main als Dissertation angenommen. Danken möchte ich hier an erster Stelle meinem Doktorvater, Herrn Prof. Dr. Michael Stolleis, der mir nicht nur den größten Freiraum für die E- stehung der Untersuchung gelassen hat, sondern auch viel Unterstützung während meines Aufenthalts in Deutschland geleistet hat. Herrn Prof. Dr. Günter Frankenberg gilt mein Dank für die rasche Erstellung des Zwe- gutachtens. Ein herzliches Dankschön gebührt auch Herrn Prof. Dr. Chen