Suchergebnisse

AbstractPay‐for‐priority system is believed to be an efficient service mechanism in congested systems since it introduces service differentiation that prioritizes those who are more delay‐sensitive. However, in practice, not all customers are aware of the provision of such auxiliary service (i.e., priority access). Does the lack of awareness or ignorance of priority service make the social welfare or customer surplus worsen off? To answer this question, we establish a queueing‐game‐theoretic model by capturing the strategic interactions between service provider and customers to examine the effect of customer awareness on the priority queues. Our main results are as follows. First, we confirm that increasing the level of customer awareness indeed improves the revenue of service provider, and it triggers a higher priority premium price. Second, perhaps surprisingly, we find that under the profit‐maximizing priority price, the social welfare as well as the customer surplus are both nonmonotone in the level of customer awareness, that is, full or no customer awareness can be suboptimal for the social welfare and customer surplus. Third, despite the common belief that priority is socially efficient in congested systems, we demonstrate that the optimal information levels for social welfare and customer surplus are decreasing in the congestion level, and the full customer awareness is optimal only when the system load is relatively low. Finally, to reach the maximal social welfare or customer surplus, some regulation policies are proposed, whereby the social planner can provide advertising subsidy to (levy tax on) the service provider (advertising agency) when the system load is low (high).

This book introduces the most advanced and recent theoretical research on innovative priority mechanisms in service settings. It covers cutting-edge topics on service innovations such as line-sitting, service-position-trading, referral priority programs, queue-scalping, distance-based priority, and dynamic priority policy. It also contains a variety of practical examples and applications which help managers to make better decisions and to develop a coherent business strategy. This book appeals to a wide readership, from academics and Ph.D. students who are interested in priority mechanisms, to service managers and researchers in the service industry. This is an open access book.

AbstractThis article considers an M/M/1 online retailing queueing model with strategic customers and a monopoly retailer. Customers arrive according to a Poisson process, and upon arrival, they decide whether to purchase the product based on a reward‐cost structure. The valuation of the product is determined by its matching probability with the demand. After receiving the purchased product, each customer enters a "virtual" orbit to update the information about the product and then makes her decision on whether to replace or return the product based on the product's assessed value. Accordingly, a two‐dimensional decision among customers is formulated and we investigate the equilibrium customer strategies and the optimal pricing strategy for the retailer. Interestingly, in equilibrium, we find that the system's throughput can be nonmonotone in the product's matching probability. In addition, under the equilibrium strategy of customers, we reveal the fact that the retailer's optimal price is not necessarily increasing in the matching probability. From the perspective of the social planner, the returning behavior can worsen the social welfare, and therefore those unsatisfied customers are encouraged to replace the product rather than to return it. Finally, some numerical experiments are conducted to verify our results and to examine the sensitivity of several key performance measures of the system.