Suchergebnisse

The Necessity of Substantially Compiling Civil Code as Soon as Possible -- The Constitutional Awareness in Compiling a Civil Code -- "Pragmatic Methods" in Compiling a Civil Code -- The Object Whose Constitutionality Should be Judged -- The Constitutionality of Legal Interpretation -- The Constitutionality of Legislative Procedures -- The Constitutionality of Legal Application -- The Legislative Design of Compiling a Civil Code in the "Mode of the Codifying of Non-Basic Laws" -- Big Data Analysis on Whether Several Rules in the General Provisions of Civil Law Should be Kept or Not -- Add a Chapter of "Obligations and Liabilities" in Volume of The General Provisions of Civil Law to Regulate the System of "General Provisions of Obligation Law" -- Discovering Techniques for Formatively Compiling Articles of Civil Code from the General Provisions of Civil Law -- The Background of the Compilation and the Adjustment to the Structure of the Tort Liability Volume of the Civil Code -- The Background of Compiling a Civil Code -- Auxiliary Work for Compiling a Civil Code

This article explains why platforms such as Amazon and Visa rely predominantly on ad valorem fees, fees which increase proportionally with transaction prices. It also provides a new explanation for why ad valorem
sales taxes are more desirable than specific taxes. The theory rests on the ability of ad valorem fees and taxes to achieve efficient price discrimination, given that the value of a transaction to buyers tends to vary proportionally with the cost of the good traded.

This paper explains why payment card networks charge fees that are proportional to the transaction values instead of charging fixed per-transaction fees. We show that, when card networks and merchants both have market power, card networks earn higher profits by charging proportional fees. It is also shown that competition among merchants reduces card networks' gains from using proportional fees relative to fixed per-transaction fees. Merchants are found to earn lower profits under proportional fees, whereas consumer utility and social welfare are higher. Our welfare results are then evaluated with respect to the current regulatory policy debates. (JEL E42, G21, G28)