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Scholars have been studying whether China's call for "discourse power" in international politics (initially made in 2011) is simply a tactic in the country's now-familiar pursuit of national interests as part of its ascendency. A closer look is required to avoid mistakenly considering it as no more than the Communist Party's propaganda, which would miss the point regarding China's use of the phrase in the context of prevailing normative worldviews regarding fairness and justice. The current Chinese international relations (IR) literature contains a significant number of articles on discourse power ( huayuquan) that discuss how calls for protecting sovereignty and rights in international affairs represent a perceived cultural need on the part of the Chinese government to articulate its own worldview while promoting its national interests. The author argues that without identifying theoretical or conceptual rationales and processes that support China's assertion of a need for discourse power in international affairs, it is possible to overlook the important cultural roots underlying the Chinese government's repeated demands for legitimacy in its dealings with other nation-states. (China/GIGA)

In this paper I address the question of how Chinese scholars participate in scientific knowledge production by appropriating Western IR theories, primarily by examining interactions between North American theories that claim universality and China-specific IR efforts. Drawing on post-Mao era publications and books, I discuss how increasingly independent Chinese IR scholars are portraying their country's rising status in international politics and identifying China's national interests, while still emphasizing socialist concepts such as anti-hegemonism. The result is a form of Chinese IR scholarship that combines Western IR language with a worldview that emphasizes a modern China within the context of traditional socialist foreign policy norms. I will argue that Chinese scholarly discussions about IR theory building reflect efforts to present 'their rising China' (as individually perceived) in the study, research, and development of IR theory in response to the appearance of modern IR methods that require new definitions and new roles for old socialist forms. In this context, identity concerns are more important than the actual theories being established or appropriated. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

In this paper I analyse how Taiwanese liberalist scholars have discursively and operationally shaped the meanings of Taiwanese democratization via a mix of liberal values and nationalist concerns. I will argue that a valid understanding of democratization in Taiwan has never emerged in a way that adequately responds to a liberalist perspective of the country's ongoing political development. Instead, such an understanding has been subjectively influenced by liberal intellectuals writing on the subject. In other words, current discourses in Taiwan represent efforts on the part of scholars to manage connections between liberalist values and nationalist concerns rather than shared views regarding facts emerging from Taiwanese democratization. In this paper I discuss four types of liberalist orientations to Taiwanese democratization - universal, moderate, pragmatic and nationalist - in the contexts of national-identity constraints, a balance between liberal values and national identity, and flexibility regarding liberalist and nationalist concerns. I conclude that democratization research in Taiwan reflects an aspect of knowledge production formulated by the relationship between the researcher and the subject under study. (JCCA/GIGA)

Wang discusses the dynamics of Sino–US relations since 2008 and the implications for relations between Taiwan and both the United States and the People's Republic of China. Ever since China surpassed Japan to become the world's second largest economy, it has appeared to shift its policy shift from "biding our time" and a self-described "peaceful rise" toward increased assertiveness in regional and international affairs. This has only become more pronounced since the 19th Party National Congress in October 2017, when Xi Jinping reiterated his agenda for "the Chinese Dream." In contrast, the US's "Pivot to Asia" strategy has been widely perceived as unsuccessful. In its precarious political position between China and the United States, Taiwan is especially exposed to the fluctuations in policy and diplomatic relations between the two powers. The three bilateral relationships are intertwined, with policy changes and actions in any one of them affecting the other two. Wang emphasizes the "small power" and "disputed nation-state" perspective of Taiwan, over the "great power politics" of the United States and China. In doing so, he presents an analysis of how the changing dynamics of Sino–US relations and the great power transition in Asia have an impact on smaller stakeholders in the region. A valuable resource for scholars and policy-makers with a focus on Taiwan's position in Sino–US relations.

Current anti-Chinese sentiment in the international community has emerged from a knowledge-production background that entails the material fact of China's rising power and ideational factors tied to how the rising China phenomenon is interpreted. The ideational factors can be divided into two groups. One analyses China according to established Western IR theories that describe the country in terms of either threat or opportunity, thereby rendering China as part of an established universal ontology. A second group approaches China's experiences in a more sympathetic light, but still conceptualizes China's rise according to fixed categories such as "nation-state." This paper argues that both of these groups are guilty of creating self-fulfilling prophecies – that is, they consistently theorize China in opposition to the West owing to the rational epistemology upon which they built their knowledge or perceptions of China. This epistemology conflicts with the efforts of Chinese IR scholars to evaluate China's rise in a relational manner. (China Q / GIGA)

AbstractCurrent anti-Chinese sentiment in the international community has emerged from a knowledge-production background that entails the material fact of China's rising power and ideational factors tied to how the rising China phenomenon is interpreted. The ideational factors can be divided into two groups. One analyses China according to established Western IR theories that describe the country in terms of either threat or opportunity, thereby rendering China as part of an established universal ontology. A second group approaches China's experiences in a more sympathetic light, but still conceptualizes China's rise according to fixed categories such as "nation-state." This paper argues that both of these groups are guilty of creating self-fulfilling prophecies – that is, they consistently theorize China in opposition to the West owing to the rational epistemology upon which they built their knowledge or perceptions of China. This epistemology conflicts with the efforts of Chinese IR scholars to evaluate China's rise in a relational manner.

In the past decade, observers in Western countries have been increasingly challenged to describe China's rising power in one of two ways: as contributing to established world systems, or as a growing threat fulfilling certain predictions made at the end of the Cold War. For some, perceptions of increasingly assertive regional behaviors confirm that China's self-proclaimed policy of pacifism is being used to cloak selfish national interest and power goals. The current international relations (IR) literature tends to treat China's assertiveness as evidence that it is indeed a threat, with few attempts to conceptualize assertiveness as a relational strategy. In this paper, the author uses eight current and historical cases involving four relational strategies — engagement, boycotting, reciprocation, and pressing — to examine conventional assessments of assertiveness that focus solely on perceptions of and responses to threatening statements and behaviors made in defense of Chinese national interests. In the end, this paper tries to contribute to the general IR literature that has tended to misinterpret China's assertiveness, which is actually an identity issue regarding bilateral relationality instead of power or interest calculations.

Abstract:Individual relationships between Mainland China and Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan are considered confusing for some because China's rising international power is not resulting in stronger calls for a shared identity based on 'Chinese pride' or historical links. Instead, China's economic growth appears to be provoking increasingly stronger calls for autonomy or independence. In this article I discuss why Beijing's self-described peace and development policy is failing to procure positive responses in those four regions, with a primary focus on the failed use of narrowly-defined Westphalian thinking to understand relevant issues. I argue that the reason for this failure is the tension between the individualist ontology underlying modern international politics (as expressed in terms of Westphalian sovereignty) and the relational ontology underpinning a traditional Chinese politics built upon a tianxia ('all-under-heaven') world view. This tension has become conspicuous in the context of China's recent rise and Beijing's growing confidence in contesting Western power. The Chinese leadership's reliance on arguments involving historical connections with Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and calls for autonomy or independence from citizens living in those four areas, are examples of this contestation.

In this paper I analyse how Taiwanese liberalist scholars have discursively and operationally shaped the meanings of Taiwanese democratization via a mix of liberal values and nationalist concerns. I will argue that a valid understanding of democratization in Taiwan has never emerged in a way that adequately responds to a liberalist perspective of the country's ongoing political development. Instead, such an understanding has been subjectively influenced by liberal intellectuals writing on the subject. In other words, current discourses in Taiwan represent efforts on the part of scholars to manage connections between liberalist values and nationalist concerns rather than shared views regarding facts emerging from Taiwanese democratization. In this paper I discuss four types of liberalist orientations to Taiwanese democratization – universal, moderate, pragmatic and nationalist – in the contexts of national-identity constraints, a balance between liberal values and national identity, and flexibility regarding liberalist and nationalist concerns. I conclude that democratization research in Taiwan reflects an aspect of knowledge production formulated by the relationship between the researcher and the subject under study.