Suchergebnisse

While international trade can offer gains from specialization and access to a wider range of products, it is also closely interlinked with global environmental problems, above all, anthropogenic climate change. This survey provides a structured overview of the economic literature on the interaction between environmental outcomes, trade, environmental policy and trade policy. In this endeavor, it covers approaches reaching from descriptive data analysis based on Input‐Output tables, over quantitative trade models and econometric studies to game‐theoretic analyses. Addressed issues are in particular the emission content of trade and emissions along value chains, the relocation of dirty firms and environmental impacts abroad, impacts of specific trade polices (such as trade agreements or tariffs) or environmental policy (such as Border Carbon Adjustment), transportation emissions, as well as the role of firms. Across the different topics covered, the paper also tries to identify avenues for future research, with a particular focus on extending quantitative trade and environment models.

Damit die EU ihre ambitionierten Klimaschutzziele erreichen kann, werden die Preise für Treibhausgasemissionen in den nächsten Jahren spürbar steigen. Das hat ökonomische Auswirkungen für die EU-Mitgliedsländer, aber auch den Rest der Welt. Einzelne Sektoren und auch Volkswirtschaften werden davon unterschiedlich stark getroffen. ; If the EU is to achieve its ambitious climate protection targets, prices for greenhouse gas emissions will rise noticeably in the next few years. This has economic implications not only for the EU member countries, but also for the rest of the world. This article presents the results of simulations covering 141 countries/regions and 65 economic sectors. The economic impact of the EU increasing its carbon price by $50 is calculated. In addition to the effects on real GDP and sectoral production, the consequences for the volume of emissions are also calculated. The carbon price increase is found to effectively bring down emissions, though with non-negligible leakage effects and at very heterogenous costs, both across countries and across sectors.

AbstractIn view of the deferred start of negotiations for the modernization of the customs union between the EU and Turkey (CU‐EUT), we looked back and analysed the ex post trade consequences of the CU‐EUT. Employing up‐to‐date econometric best practices for regional integration agreements, we quantified both the total and the heterogeneous trade effects of the CU‐EUT. In contrast with most previous studies, our results indicate that the CU‐EUT made a significantly positive, large and robust impact, implying there was an additional increase in EU‐Turkey trade in manufacturing by 55–65 per cent compared with that during the previously active Ankara Agreement. We also provide evidence that the CU‐EUT significantly increased Turkey's trade with non‐member countries of the CU‐EUT. Additionally, a substantial heterogeneity in the CU‐EUT effect was found across different industries as well as for each of its member countries and the direction of trade. We linked the heterogeneity of up to 911 coefficient estimates to the differences in initial trade costs and show that it cannot be ascribed to reductions in bilateral tariff rates.

Abstract
This paper examines the impact of coalitions on the economic costs of the 2012 Iran and 2014 Russia sanctions. By estimating and simulating a quantitative general equilibrium trade model under different coalition setups, we (1) dissect welfare losses for sanctions senders and target; (2) compare prospective coalition partners; (3) investigate 'optimal' coalitions that maximize payoff from sanctions; (4) provide bounds for sanctions potential, that is, the maximum welfare change attainable when sanctions are scaled vertically up to an embargo, and horizontally up to a global regime. Relative to unilateral action, we find that coalitions magnify welfare losses imposed while their impact on domestic welfare loss incurred depends on the design and sectoral dimension of sanctions. Hypothetical cooperation of large developing economies such as China additionally raises the deterrent force of coalitions. Additionally, we quantify transfers that equalize welfare losses across coalition members to further demonstrate asymmetries in the relative economic burden of sanctions. In all scenarios, we implement a novel Bayesian bootstrap procedure that generates confidence bands for simulation outcomes.