Suchergebnisse

A STUDY of representation in a democratic legislature must be directed towards actual membership of the legislature and towards laws and practices governing the selection of members. The electoral system must be broadly viewed as embodying the devices by which constituencies are established and altered, the franchise which determines the extent of the electorate, and the provisions which are intended to control corrupt campaign tactics and otherwise prevent perversions of representation. The first few decades after Confederation were years of bitter struggle over election laws. The result was that genuine reform of the electoral machinery in the public interest was a literal impossibility until well after the turn of the century. That honesty in elections became possible, and even profitable, was the result at least as much of forces beyond the reach of legislative enactment as of positive federal policies conscientiously adopted and administered. The chronicle of this development, as it can be observed in several major sections of the electoral system, follows in these pages. In the first chapter the general nature of representation is discussed. The alteration of constituency boundaries after each decennial census is analysed in Part I. Membership in the legislature is examined in Part II. Part III covers the electoral machinery, both in its narrow aspect as a technique by which members of Parliament are returned, and in a broader sense as a large organization which includes the franchise, electoral corruption, and election expenses. Part IV comprises the conclusion

Frontmatter -- PREFACE -- CONTENTS -- A NOTE ON THE DOCUMENTATION -- THE PUBLIC PURSE -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. THE POWER OF THE PURSE BEFORE CONFEDERATION -- 3. CONFEDERATION AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT -- 4. THE SELECT STANDING COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, 1867-78 -- 5. THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE AND THE AUDITOR GENERAL, 1879-90 -- 6. THE SCANDAL SESSIONS, 1891-6 -- 7. THE AUDITOR GENERAL VERSUS THE LIBERAL ADMINISTRATION, 1896-1905 -- 8. A NEW AUDITOR GENERAL AND AN OLD COMMITTEE, 1905-11 -- 9. THE CONSERVATIVES AND THE WAR, 1911-21 -- 10. THE NADIR OF THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE, 1921-39 -- 11. THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-45 -- 12. THE POST-WAR PERIOD, 1946-60 -- 13. THE GRANTING OF SUPPLY BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR -- 14. THE GRANTING OF SUPPLY SINCE THE FIRST WORLD WAR -- 15. THE RECORD AND THE FUTURE -- APPENDIX: THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION ACT, 1951, AND AMENDMENTS -- INDEX

Sometime between 30 October 1972 and the spring of 1973, the government led by the Rt. Hon. Pierre Trudeau, with fewer than half the members of the House of Commons belonging to the Liberal party, discovered that, unless it was prepared to use maps based on the 1961 census, one of the courses not immediately available to it was the dissolution of Parliament and the calling of another general election. The handicap (and it must also have particularly affected the strategy of the New Democratic party), was not for any constitutional reason; nor was it based on the possibility that the governor general might refuse the prime minister a dissolution. That possibility existed, although no one in the cabinet or Commons appears to have recognized it. Eugene Forsey concluded years ago, after his exhaustive study of the prerogatives governing dissolution: "Even where a great new issue of public policy has arisen, the Crown would be justified in refusing dissolution if Supply had not been voted, or a redistribution or franchise Act had not yet had time to come into operation, provided an alternative Government could be found, or provided the issue was not one which brooked no delay, e.g. a mandate for the despatch of troops overseas." Two of the conditions noted by Dr Forsey three decades ago existed in 1972–3: a redistribution act had not yet had time to come into operation, and an alternative government could be found.

La première partie de cet article recense les principaux développements survenus dans le système électoral du Canada. On compare les réformes réelles et potentielles de l'époque actuelle avec celles des années 1870, en montrant qu'il n'y a pas eu de réforme importante pendant près d'un siècle. Ensuite, on fait l'examen détaillé des expériences faites au Canada en matière de revenus et de dépenses électorales, eninsistant tout particuliérement sur la loi du Québec, adoptée en 1963, qui pose des limites aux dépenses des candidats et des partis et prévoit un remboursement partiel des dépenses autorisées. On décrit également l'influence que cette formule a exercée sur la législation subséquente, en Nouvelle-Ecosse, sur les travaux du comité consultatif des dépenses électorales qui a fait rapport au Parlement fédéral, en 1966, ainsi que sur les travaux du comité spécial de la Chambre des communes qui a fonctionneé en 1970–1.La deuxième partie de l'article tente de mesurer quelques-uns des coûts annuels directs du système électoral et parlementaire, y compris ceux des bureaux du Directeur Général des Elections, ceux du Commissaire à la Représentation et des commissions des frontières électorales, les coûts de radiodiffusion et de télédiffusion et ceux du Parlement lui-même. Le total se chiffre à $ 45,000,000, mais des coûts demeurent mal connus, dont ceux des conventions pour le choix des candidats et des chefs, et ceux entraînés par les activités de pression des groupes. Il demeure que les coûts totaux sont relativement peu élevés, et que toutes proportions gardées, ils ne sont pas plus grands qu'au moment de la Confédération. Il est suggéré d'augmenter le financement du coût des activités licites, comme prolongement logique du mouvement qui a mis tous les électeurs sur le même pied.