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AbstractUsing longitudinal household survey data from rural China and an identification strategy based on observed rainfall realizations, we are able to test household responses to idiosyncratic and covariate income shocks. We find that negative idiosyncratic income shocks increase migration and elicit household out rental of land. The effect of covariate income shocks is generally dependent on both the timing and the nature of the shock. Our results suggest that rainfall deficiencies during paddy maturing or harvesting seasons reduce the number of migrants by raising the marginal value product of farm labour, thereby increasing the opportunity costs associated with migration.

It is widely recognized that local management of common pool resources can be more ecient and more e↵ective than private markets or top- own government management, especially in remote rural communities in which the institutions necessary for the enforcement of centrally-imposed regulations may be weak or prone to elite capture. In this paper, we explore the propensity for cooperation in the management of local common resources by introducing a varient of a public goods game among remote rural communities in the state of Odisha, in eastern India. We explore various patterns of cooperation, including free riding behavior, uncoditional cooperation (altruism), and conditional cooperation, in which individuals' propensisty toward cooperation is tied to their beliefs about the level of cooperation among their peers. We find that a significant portion of our sample fall into this latter category, but also that their expectations about the level of contributions among their peers is somewhat malleable, and beneficial activities from external actors such as NGOs can foster increased social cohesion which increases both the level of these expectations and the manner in which these expectations are translated into subsequent cooperative behavior. We also find that cooperation is somewhat fragile, with group heterogeneity and risk in the returns to cooperative behavior posing a threat to the stability of the cooperative system. ; IFPRI5; TARINA; CRP2 ; EPTD; PIM ; Non-PR ; 33 pages ; CGIAR Research Programs on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

Researchers and policymakers have long understood the benefits of crop insurance, but have been consistently disappointed by the poor performance of these programs. Rarely have programs seen sizeable take-up rates without support through large government subsidies, and in many countries demand has been meager even at prices well below fair-market rates. Experiences from India have largely followed this trend, despite a number of large policy initiatives. Limited demand stems from low perceived value, arguably because the existing insurance products are unsuited to farmers' needs. The present study fills an important gap by demonstrating that incorporating product characteristics better suited to farmers' preferences can lead to higher take-up. To do so, we conducted a discrete choice experiment with agricultural households in four states in India. While farmers seem to like several of the features of policies offered under existing programs, our results suggest they would generally be willing to pay more as premium than the current highlysubsidized rates, in return for more assured and timely payouts. ; IFPRI5; DCA; CSISA; CRP2 ; EPTD; PIM ; Non-PR ; 41 pages ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

Researchers and policymakers have long understood the benefits of crop insurance but have been consistently disappointed by the poor performance of these programs. Rarely have programs seen sizeable take-up rates without support through large government subsidies, and in many countries, demand has been meager even at prices well below fair-market rates. Experiences from India have largely followed this trend, despite a number of large policy initiatives. Limited demand stems from low perceived value, arguably because the existing insurance products are unsuited to farmers' needs. The present study fills an important gap in rural development by improving upon existing insurance policy design by incorporating product characteristics better suited to farmers' preferences. To do so, we conducted a discrete choice experiment with agricultural households in four states in India. While farmers seem to like several of the features of policies offered under existing programs, our results suggest they would generally be willing to pay more than the highly subsidized rate they currently pay and are also clearly dissatisfied with delayed and uncertain indemnity payments and would be willing to pay a significant premium for more assured and timely payment delivery. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; DCA; CRP2; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance; Capacity Strengthening ; EPTD; SAR; PIM ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)