Suchergebnisse

"The complex relationship between globalization and European integration was largely shaped in the 1970s. During this decade, globalization began, for the first time, to threaten Western European prosperity. Using an innovative approach, the book shows how western Europeans coped with the challenges of globalization during a time of deep economic crisis during the period 1973-1986. It examines the evolution of economic and social policies at the national, European and global level and expands beyond the European Economic Community (EEC) by analysing the various solutions envisaged by European decision-makers towards regulating globalization, including the creation of the Single Market. Based on extensively examined archives of transnational actors, international organizations and focusing on the governments of France, Germany and the UK, as well as the European Commission, the book uncovers deep, previously unknown, economic divisions among these actors and the roles they played in the success of the EEC.This book will be of key interest to students, scholars and practitioners of political science, European studies, history, comparative politics, public policy and economic history."--Provided by publisher.

"The complex relationship between globalization and European integration was largely shaped in the 1970s. During this decade, globalization began, for the first time, to threaten Western European prosperity. Using an innovative approach, the book shows how western Europeans coped with the challenges of globalization during a time of deep economic crisis during the period 1973-1986. It examines the evolution of economic and social policies at the national, European and global level and expands beyond the European Economic Community (EEC) by analysing the various solutions envisaged by European decision-makers towards regulating globalization, including the creation of the Single Market. Based on extensively examined archives of transnational actors, international organizations and focusing on the governments of France, Germany and the UK, as well as the European Commission, the book uncovers deep, previously unknown, economic divisions among these actors and the roles they played in the success of the EEC. This book will be of key interest to students, scholars and practitioners of political science, European studies, history, comparative politics, public policy and economic history."--Provided by publisher.

La France a été l'un des acteurs majeurs du processus de construction européenne, qu'elle a soutenu malgré ses profondes divisions internes entre les partisans d'une Europe fédérale, d'une Europe interétatique ou du repli national. Les Français jettent les bases de l'Europe communautaire avec la déclaration Schuman de 1950, puis influencent considérablement le traité de Rome de 1957, qui reste au fondement de l'Union européenne actuelle, en offrant un compromis autour d'une ambition de promotion de la paix, de la prospérité et de lutte contre le déclin .

Between 1969 and 1993, a genuine 'European welfare state' was forged at the level of the European Economic Community (EEC), even though this expression was not used per se. After a definition of the welfare state as a three-pronged set of policies, the article develops first the flourishing period in the 1970s, when many ambitious ideas such as a common reduction of working hours, or the control of multinationals, emerged. In a second step, it explains the failure of this project due to the neoliberal backlash of the early 1980s and the division of the welfarist coalition. Ultimately, the whole project was rekindled as a flanking wing of the internal market programme when the latter was launched in 1985. Hence, when the internal market opened up in 1993, a very unique kind of European welfare existed at the international level. It was less redistributive than that of national welfare states and more geared towards the management of common norms.

L'ordonnance du 1 er décembre 1986 impose une double rupture avec la fin du contrôle des prix et l'établissement d'une politique de la concurrence de plein exercice. C'est la fin du dirigisme de Vichy selon certains observateurs. En lieu et place d'un contrôle tatillon des prix, émerge le Conseil de la concurrence, une autorité qui décide seule, indépendamment du ministère de l'Économie autrefois tout puissant, en matière d'entente. L'ouverture des archives permet d'évaluer tant le processus de décision, où le rôle d'impulsion d'Édouard Balladur s'impose comme déterminant, que de remettre en perspective cette double réforme, qui apparaît comme en continuité directe avec celle de 1977 promue par Valéry Giscard d'Estaing et Raymond Barre, mais aussi avec certaines inflexions introduites par les gouvernements socialistes antérieurs. À une autre échelle, elle permet de mesurer la part de la dynamique européenne, alors que la France et ses huit voisins de la Communauté économique européenne s'accordent en 1986 autour du projet de marché unique, et que les gouvernements voisins adoptent parfois des réformes similaires.

Trop souvent réduite dans les discours politiques de gauche actuels à la réalisation d'un projet néolibéral, la construction européenne a reposé sur des compromis politiques, économiques et sociaux entre nations qui ont structuré trois approches différentes : de marché, sociale et de puissance.

This article contributes to the historical debate about the two French referenda of 1992 and 2005, the former on the Maastricht Treaty (a feeble "yes") and the latter on the Constitutional Treaty (a resounding "no"), by adding three further elements that the passing of time has revealed. First, new sources on the history of European economic policies reveal the role of the rise of neoliberal policies, and hence of their major importance in the second referendum. Second, the perspective given by subsequent events, such as the Brexit vote, sheds light on two factors hardly men‐ tioned in studies about the 2005 referendum: the importance of the internet as a source of alternative information during the campaign, and the role played by a key pivotal figure - namely, a globalist associated with international liberalisation who eventually supported a Euroscepticist stance. Third, thanks to the 2005 referendum, Euroscepticism (to be differentiated from Europhobia) morphed into a mainstream ideology in France, including among part of the elite.