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Among Jean-Jacques Rousseau's chief preoccupations was the problem of self-interest implicit in all social relationships. A person with divided loyalties (i.e., to both himself and his cohorts) was, in Rousseau's thinking, a divided person. According to John Warner's Rousseau and the Problem of Human Relations, not only did Rousseau never solve this problem, he believed it was fundamentally unsolvable: social relationships could never restore wholeness to a self-interested human being. Warner traces his argument through the contours of Rousseau's thought on three distinct types of relationships—sexual love, friendship, and civil or political association. Warner concludes that none of these, whether examined individually or together, provides a satisfactory resolution to the problem of human dividedness located at the center of Rousseau's thinking.

AbstractCivic republicans have traditionally appealed to friendship as a means of preserving popular liberty, but Machiavelli is a notable exception to this rule. In fact, I argue, he views efforts to reconcile friendship and politics as (1) philosophically dubious, because grounded in false conceptions of person and society, and (2) practically harmful, because they perpetuate patterns of asymmetric dependence that are inconsistent with a free way of life. Machiavelli's neglected skepticism about the political potential of friendship deepens his critique of the Ciceronianconcordia, reveals a diminished idea of the common good, and distances him from the civic republican tradition to which he is so often said to belong.

Among Jean-Jacques Rousseau's chief preoccupations was the problem of self-interest implicit in all social relationships. A person with divided loyalties (i.e., to both himself and his cohorts) was, in Rousseau's thinking, a divided person. According to John Warner's Rousseau and the Problem of Human Relations, not only did Rousseau never solve this problem, he believed it was fundamentally unsolvable: social relationships could never restore wholeness to a self-interested human being. Warner traces his argument through the contours of Rousseau's thought on three distinct types of relationships— sexual love, friendship, and civil or political association. Warner concludes that none of these, whether examined individually or together, provides a satisfactory resolution to the problem of human dividedness located at the center of Rousseau's thinking. In fact, concludes Warner, Rousseau's failure to obtain anything hopeful from human associations is deliberate, self-conscious, and revelatory of a tragic conception of human relations. Thus Rousseau raises our hopes only to dash them.This title was made Open Access by libraries from around the world through Knowledge Unlatched.

Among Jean-Jacques Rousseau's chief preoccupations was the problem of self-interest implicit in all social relationships. A person with divided loyalties (i.e. — to both himself and his cohorts) was, in Rousseau's thinking, a divided person. According to John Warner's Rousseau and the Problem of Human Relations, not only did Rousseau never solve this problem, he believed it was fundamentally unsolvable: social relationships could never restore wholeness to a self-interested human being. Warner traces his argument through the contours of Rousseau's thought on three distinct types of relationships—sexual love, friendship and civil or political association. Warner concludes that none of these, whether examined individually or together, provides a satisfactory resolution to the problem of human dividedness located at the center of Rousseau's thinking. In fact, concludes Warner, Rousseau's failure to obtain anything hopeful from human associations is deliberate, self-conscious and revelatory of a tragic conception of human relations. Thus Rousseau raises our hopes only to dash them. This title was made Open Access by libraries from around the world through Knowledge Unlatched.

Self-interest in social relationships preoccupied Jean-Jacques Rousseau. A person divided between himself and others couldn't achieve wholeness. Warner traces Rousseau's argument via three distinct types of relationships, and he concludes that Rousseau's failure to recognize the good in human associations is deliberate, self-conscious, and tragic. This title was made Open Access by libraries from around the world through Knowledge Unlatched. ; Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ; Rousseau's theory of human relations -- Social longing and moral perfection -- Pity and human weakness -- Romantic love in Emile -- Romantic love in Julie -- Friendship, virtue, and moral authority -- The ecology of justice -- The sociology of wholeness. ; Self-interest in social relationships preoccupied Jean-Jacques Rousseau. A person divided between himself and others couldn't achieve wholeness. Warner traces Rousseau's argument via three distinct types of relationships, and he concludes that Rousseau's failure to recognize the good in human associations is deliberate, self-conscious, and tragic. This title was made Open Access by libraries from around the world through Knowledge Unlatched. ; Mode of access: Internet.

AbstractFor nearly half a century democratic citizens have been preoccupied with the search for self-respect. Though classical liberalism places this question outside its purview and many commentators see in such a concern evidence of a "thin-skinned" political culture, John Rawls has recently provided serious arguments for the political relevance of self-respect. These arguments, we claim, are deeply indebted to the social and political theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose deep albeit underexamined influence on Rawls shows itself both in Rawls's conception of the social problem as well as in his solution to it. Rawls's belief that the provision of self-respect can solve the social problem is uniquely Rousseauan not only because of its emphasis on equality but also because it suggests political life can and must reconcile the conflicts between self and society at a fundamental level.