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The risk of gridlock has been haunting discussions on European legislative decision-making for decades. All European Union legislation has to pass through the Council of the European Union, which has a relatively high voting threshold and whose members hold a diverse set of preferences, particularly after Eastern Enlargement. Nevertheless, the legislative output of the Union is relatively high. Existing explanations focus on process-related mechanisms (vote trading, cooperative problem-solving). In contrast, this study explains how member states can change the content of proposals to accommodate the specific concerns of recalcitrant governments. Several empirical examples show how member states have adapted European legislation to overcome the risk of gridlock. Based on a new data set covering a five year period in one policy field (environmental policy), this study shows that member states frequently put forward requests to limit the scope of European legislation, to extend transitional time periods or to lower standards. Furthermore, these requests are often successful. Besides allowing member states to opt out of European agreements (differentiated integration), EU legislation can accommodate concerns of individual member states, thus increasing the decision-making capacity of the Union.

To describe and explain legislative politics in the European Union and to assess its democratic quality we need to measure the political importance (salience) of legislative proposals. The existing literature uses several indicators to measure salience. This article compares measures of salience based on three types of data source (expert interviews, text analysis and media coverage) using a large number of legislative proposals that cover a variety of policy fields and types of proposal. Different measures of salience often do not yield similar values. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

To describe and explain legislative politics in the European Union and to assess its democratic quality we need to measure the political importance (salience) of legislative proposals. The existing literature uses several indicators to measure salience. This article compares measures of salience based on three types of data source (expert interviews, text analysis and media coverage) using a large number of legislative proposals that cover a variety of policy fields and types of proposal. Different measures of salience often do not yield similar values.

Veto players are political actors whose consent is necessary to adopt a new policy. Put otherwise, they have veto power which allows them to prevent a change to the status quo. The concept is crucial to the influential veto player theory developed by George Tsebelis. Building on earlier work in formal modeling and social choice, Tsebelis developed veto player theory to compare political systems in terms of their ability for policy change. A political system with a high number of veto players or with large ideological differences among veto players has high policy stability. High policy stability in turn can lead to government or regime instability as it becomes harder to adapt policy to changing circumstances. Furthermore, high policy stability increases bureaucratic and judicial independence as acts by these branches cannot be easily overruled by new or more specific legislation. Finally, high policy stability limits the effect of agenda-setting power. The following summarizes the main points of veto player theory, discusses some criticisms of it, and briefly compares veto player theory to Immergut's concept of veto points.

The Council of the EU is a crucial actor in EU legislative decision-making. However, how its reaches decisions is subject to considerable debate. Constructivists argue that the dominant mode is normguided behaviour and deliberation, pointing to the informal 'culture of consensus'. Scholars working in a rational choice tradition assume that member states strive to move outcomes as close as possible to their ideal positions, either by using their power in bargaining or by arranging beneficial exchanges of votes. Several bargaining and exchange models have been advanced by this literature. Finally, studies report that actors in the Council engage in problem-solving. In this paper, I explore the logics underlying these different conceptualizations of legislative negotiations in the Council of the EU. Furthermore, the paper discusses the interpretation of the existing empirical results and tasks for future research.

The Council of the EU is a crucial actor in EU legislative decision-making. However, how its reaches decisions is subject to considerable debate. Constructivists argue that the dominant mode is norm-guided behaviour and deliberation, pointing to the informal 'culture of consensus'. Scholars working in a rational choice tradition assume that member states strive to maximize their utility and move outcomes as close as possible to their ideal positions, either by using their power in bargaining or by arranging beneficial exchanges of votes. Several bargaining and exchange models have been advanced by this literature. This paper explores the logics underlying these different conceptualizations of negotiations in the Council of the EU. Furthermore, it discusses the interpretation of the existing empirical results and tasks for future research. Due to observational equivalence empirical findings are often inconclusive.

The widely perceived lack of legitimacy of EU decision-making has prompted a major debate about institutional reform. Improving democratic practice in the Council has been one of the key topics in the debates leading up to the Lisbon treaty. In general, we can distinguish between two models of democracy. The majoritarian model of democracy builds on the open competition of political camps who enjoy wide-ranging powers to implement their policy agenda once in office. In contrast, the consociational model of democracy relies on inclusiveness, compromises and power-sharing. I discuss the most prominent topics of the recent debate on institutional reform in the Council (voting threshold, Council Presidency, transparency) in light of these two models of democracy. The current practice of decision-making in the Council resembles the consensual model. The changes in the Lisbon Treaty are unlikely to make any significant difference in this regard.