Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe Jelinski–Moranda model of software reliability is generalized by introducing a negative‐binomial prior distribution for the number of faults remaining, together with a Gamma distribution for the rate at which each fault is exposed. This model is well suited to sequential use, where a sequence of reliability forecasts is made in the process of testing or using the software. We also investigate replacing the Gamma distribution with a worst‐case assumption about failure rates (the worst‐case failure rate in models such as this is not infinite, since faults with large failure rates are immediately discovered and removed). © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006

AbstractGass, Zafra, and Qiu (1996) introduce a modified version of fictitious play for matrix games where only the more successful player's strategy is retained. This paper introduces additional modifications that appear to converge faster. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.* Naval Research Logistics 48: 270–280, 2001

This is a brief, technical review of the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) part of ITEM, a widely used theater combat model. Several apparent deficiencies are pointed out. The recommendation is that ITEM's documentation be improved, and that a more extensive verification be carried out. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

There is a crisis approaching for military OR, centered on the role of information on the battlefield. It is clear to military professionals that information is becoming increasingly important, but the OR profession's ability to measure the contribution of information is still primitive. We are not good at deciding whether information is cost/effective or whether information is more important than firepower, and yet precisely these questions will be asked more and more frequently as budgets shrink. We are not even sure how information should be measured - is it measured in bits, or what? The word "crisis" is not too strong for our approaching predicament.

AbstractA simple formula is found to be just as accurate as a complicated one for estimating the probability of detection achievable by an ingenious searcher patrolling a channel or barrier. The difference between "detection" and "closure" is emphasized in an extension.

AbstractThis paper includes two simple analytic formulas for kill probability that are applicable in circumstances where shots should be fired in a pattern. The two formulas bracket the maximum kill probability achievable with an optimal pattern. The upper bound corresponds to an optimal nonfeasible pattern, and the lower bound to a nonoptimal feasible pattern.