Search results

Researchers, healthcare managers and human factors practitioners who need to know the latest developments within the theory and application of Patient Safety Culture within healthcare should read this book. It brings together contributions from the most prominent researchers and practitioners in the field of PSC and covers the background to work on safety culture, the dominant theories and concepts within PSC, examples of PSC tools, methods of assessment and their application, and details the future challenges facing this area.

Telehealth and telecare have been heralded as major mechanisms by which frail elderly people can continue to live at home but numerous pilot studies have not led to the adoption of these technologies as mainstream contributors to the health and social care of people in the community. This paper reviews why dissemination has proved difficult and concludes that one problem is that these technologies require considerable organisational changes if they are to be effective: successful implementation is not just a technical design issue but is a sociotechnical design challenge. The paper reviews the plans of 25 health communities in England to introduce integrated health and social care for the elderly. It concludes that these plans when implemented will produce organisational environments conducive to the mainstream deployment of telehealth and telecare. However, the plans focus on different kinds of integrated care and each makes different demands on telehealth and telecare. Progress on getting mainstream benefits from telehealth and telecare will therefore depend on building a number of different sociotechnical systems geared to different forms of integrated care and incorporating different forms of telehealth and telecare.

This is a conference paper. ; The importance of considering human/organisational factors when reporting transfusion incidents has been highlighted recently. The UK haemovigilance scheme, Serious Hazards of Transfusion (SHOT), has established over the past two decades that most incidents are caused by human errors in the transfusion process. In order to enhance reporter's awareness of human and organisational factors, we implemented two interventions and evaluated the effects. First, we created and incorporated a bespoke human factors investigation tool (HFIT) explicitly asking the level of contribution of individual staff member(s), the local environment or workspace, organisational or management and government or regulation. Second, we created and incorporated a self-learning package with good examples of human and organisational factors reporting within the UK national haemovigilance reporting database. Data from this tool have been analysed to investigate whether increased learning is possible. The main conclusion after one year's use of the HFIT, was that incident reporters tended to attribute culpability mostly to individuals (62.6%). It is possible this result is due to lack of system awareness amongst incident reportersSix month initial data analysis after the inclusion of the self-learning package shows that if the incident reporter has studied the self-learning package before scoring the level of contribution associated with an incident , there is a slightly lower tendency to attribute most responsibility to individuals.

This paper was presented at the International Conference on Ergonomics & Human Factors 2017, Daventry, UK, 25-27th April. ; Despite established and proven prescriptive safety legislation, accidents regularly occur across all sectors of shipping. Of particular concern is the number of collisions that continue to occur, even when experienced and trained officers are on board and modern navigation aids are in use. Using a systems approach, this paper will highlight common contributory factors, which can lead to collisions and then propose a set of countermeasures which can be used to reduce these types of shipping accidents.

This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in Prevention of Accidents at Work: Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on the Prevention of Accidents at Work (WOS 2017) on 18 September 2017, available online: http://www.routledge.com/9781138037960. ; This study examines the perceptions and attitudes of RAF personnel following the 2006 fatal loss of Nimrod XV230 and subsequent Public Inquiry. The main focus was "cultural readjustment" and organisational learning. Phase 1 was carried out in 2010-2011 (18-month aftermath following the Haddon-Cave report) and Phase 2 in 2016 using follow up interviews, focus groups, observations and document analysis. The results point to a number of barriers to change in the early days post-inquiry, including fear of litigation and risk aversion, a military culture of 'can-do', normalized rule-breaking and insufficient safety expertise. Facilitators include leadership and followership, publicity and training and an enhanced regulatory framework. Ongoing disrupting factors were identified that may make the organisation vulnerable e.g. churn of critical personnel. The study suggests that organisations settle into a new quasi-stationary equilibrium following disaster, which may provide the 'illusion' of safety through increased safety bureaucracy.

This paper was accepted for publication in the journal Applied Ergonomics and the definitive published version is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apergo.2016.07.014 ; The South Korea Sewol ferry accident in April 2014 claimed the lives of over 300 passengers and led to criminal charges of 399 personnel concerned including imprisonment of 154 of them as of Oct 2014. Blame and punishment culture can be prevalent in a more hierarchical society like South Korea as shown in the aftermath of this disaster. This study aims to analyse the South Korea ferry accident using Rasmussen's risk management framework and the associated AcciMap technique and to propose recommendations drawn from an AcciMap-based focus group with systems safety experts. The data for the accident analysis were collected mainly from an interim investigation report by the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea and major South Korean and foreign newspapers. The analysis showed that the accident was attributed to many contributing factors arising from front-line operators, management, regulators and government. It also showed how the multiple factors including economic, social and political pressures and individual workload contributed to the accident and how they affected each other. This AcciMap was presented to 27 safety researchers and experts at 'the legacy of Jens Rasmussen' symposium adjunct to ODAM2014. Their recommendations were captured through a focus group. The four main recommendations include forgive (no blame and punishment on individuals), analyse (socio-technical system-based), learn (from why things do not go wrong) and change (bottom-up safety culture and safety system management). The findings offer important insights into how this type of accident should be understood, analysed and the subsequent response.

The paper describes a new method for allocating work between and among humans and machines. The method consists of a series of stages, which cover how the overall work system should be organized and designed; how tasks within the work system should be allocated (human-human allocations); and how tasks involving the use of technology should be allocated (human-machine allocations). The method makes use of a series of decision criteria that allow end users to consider a range of factors relevant to function allocation, including aspects of job, organizational, and technological design. The method is described in detail using an example drawn from a workshop involving the redesign of a naval command and control (C2) subsystem. We also report preliminary details of the evaluation of the method, based on the views of participants at the workshop. A final section outlines the contribution of the work in terms of current theoretical developments within the domain of function allocation. The method has been applied to the domain of naval C2 systems; however, it is also designed for generic use within function allocation and sociotechnical work systems.

Outlines a comprehensive taxonomy of modern manufacturing practices. Previous attempts have tended to be partial in coverage and to concentrate on performance issues, rather than explain the reasons why a particular practice may have been adopted. In order to overcome these problems, the new taxonomy categorizes manufacturing practices according to two dimensions: strategic emphasis and primary domain of application. Suggests 20 different categories of practice for a total of 87 practices. Supplements the taxonomy by a list of definitions which specify each of the practices identified. Considers practical implications of the taxonomy, as well as its limitations. Future research suggestions include using the taxonomy to provide the basis for systematic surveys of manufacturing, as well as closer examination of the links between companies' manufacturing strategy and financial performance.