Decentralizing Community Development Decisions: A Study of Oklahoma's Small Cities Program
In: Publius: the journal of federalism, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 109-109
ISSN: 0048-5950
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In: Publius: the journal of federalism, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 109-109
ISSN: 0048-5950
In: Policy studies journal: an international journal of public policy, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 652-667
ISSN: 0190-292X
In: Policy studies journal: an international journal of public policy, Band 23, S. 652-667
ISSN: 0190-292X
Examines the extent of economic improvement achieved through creation of jobs and investment, hiring and training the disadvantaged, and fostering small business; Kansas City and Cuba, Missouri.
In: Journal of urban affairs, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 191-205
ISSN: 1467-9906
In: Publius: the journal of federalism, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 109-122
ISSN: 0048-5950
Decentralization of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Small Cities program in 1981 gave states great latitude in deciding how to allocate grant funds. Consequently, scholars expressed concern that, under state control, fewer CDBG funds would be expended for low- & moderate-income benefits via housing rehabilitation. Here, analysis of CDBG expenditures on the Small Cities program in Okla indicates a definite shift in spending priorities. Since 1982, Okla localities diverted CDBG funds primarily to infrastructure & economic development instead of housing-related activities, & channeled a larger amount of dollars into moderate- & median-income areas. As a result, the Small Cities program in Okla, under state control, was found to provide less direct & immediate housing aid to lower-income citizens. 2 Tables.
In: Publius: the journal of federalism, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 31-31
ISSN: 0048-5950
In: The American review of public administration: ARPA, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 113-125
ISSN: 1552-3357
Using data from a 1987 nationwide survey of U.S. cities of 25,000 population and above, this research analyzes the formal authority and the informal powers associated with the office of mayor. We divide cities by mayor-council or council-manager form. The findings confirm that elected chief executives in mayoral cities possess considerably more formal authority than their counterparts in manager communities, yet informal mayoral powers are quite comparable among these two forms of government. Using ANOVA (GLS), we also predict variations in mayoral power using five demographic and political variables. Among mayor-council cities, location in a central city and large size are the best explanatory variables. For manager cities, regional location and the presence of partisan ballots and ward elections are the best predictors of mayoral power.
In: American review of public administration: ARPA, Band 26, S. 113-125
ISSN: 0275-0740
In: American review of public administration: ARPA, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 113-127
ISSN: 0275-0740
In: Policy studies journal: an international journal of public policy, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 231-246
ISSN: 0190-292X
In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 54, Heft 5, S. 474
ISSN: 1540-6210
In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 54, Heft 5, S. 474-482
ISSN: 0033-3352
In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 52, Heft 5, S. 438
ISSN: 1540-6210
In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 52, S. 438-446
ISSN: 0033-3352
In: Publius: the journal of federalism, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 31-48
ISSN: 0048-5950
Daniel J. Elazar's typology of political culture (American Federalism: A View from the States, New York: Crowell, 1966), which posits the existence of three basic political orientations -- moralistic, individualistic, & traditionalistic -- is updated for all US states for 1980 using religious affiliation data taken from a decennial enumeration (N not provided) conducted under the auspices of the National Council of Churches. The effects of political culture on state politics & policy are tested using two strategies: calculating partial correlation coefficients for ten dependent variables holding four environmental variables constant; & estimating regression equations within two categories: calculating partial correlation coefficients for ten dependent variables holding four environmental variables constant; & estimating regression equations within two categories of political culture to measure the indirect or contextual effects of culture. The analysis reveals that moralistic states have more interparty competition, higher voter turnout, more policy-relevant parties, & more liberal & innovative policies. Traditionalistic states show less interparty competition, lower voter turnout, & more conservative & less innovative policies. It is concluded that political culture should be ignored in explaining differences in state politics, & that more research on the contextual influence of political culture is needed. 4 Tables. Adapted from the source document.