Suchergebnisse

There are four paradoxes to be explained in respect of European Union (EU) environmental policy: how it is that a liberal policy regime makes relatively little use of economic instruments; how it is that the formally independent Commission is heavily dependent upon member states in the development of its policy proposals; how it is that a 'weak' European Parliament has had greater influence on environmental standard setting than have most national parliaments; and how it is that a supranational political authority regulates subnational environmental public goods so extensively. The author argues that these four features of EU environmental policy are related to one another as the effects of a common cause: the historical importance of the Monnet method of European integration. How far this method should be transcended is also discussed.

A review essay on books by (1) S. Andersen & K. Eliassen (Eds), The European Union: How Democratic Is It? (London: Sage, 1996); (2) S. Gustavsson & L. Lewin (Eds), The Future of the Nation-State: Essays on Cultural Pluralism and Political Integration (Stockholm: Nerenius & Santerus, 1996); (3) J. Hayward (Ed), The Crisis of Representation in Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1995); & (4) J. Hayward (Ed), Elitism, Populism and European Politics (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1996). These texts investigate the discrepancy between democratic principles & political practice in the European Union. The problematic political principles are identified in every text: the European practice of "unification by stealth"; the appointment of government officials based on technical proficiency rather than political representativeness; European integration independent of public & electoral consent; the complexity of the Europe Union's political structure; the relative weakness of transnational political parties; the presence of a clandestine network of political representation; & the superimposition of the Union's government on the institutions of member states. In ameliorating these problems, it is recommended that the tenets of constitutional democracy undergo re-examination to procure democratic legitimacy; Karl Popper's notion of democracy as institutionalized discourse & critical argument is valuable to such a project. It is concluded that democratic legitimacy for the European Union remains unattainable until integration by stealth is replaced by constitutional democracy. J. W. Parker

The status of rule making in Europe is examined through case study analysis of environmental policy making in the European Union (EU). Environmental policy in the EU operates according to a principle of concurrent majorities -- the agreement of a high proportion of participants in EU decision-making institutions. Such a process creates a joint decision trap that gives privileged position to the status quo & prevents the adoption of important policy measures. Policy measures are typically transformed, modified, or watered down in the interests of political accommodation & under the threat of leading actor veto power. Pathologies of the joint decision trap & the relevance of the environmental policy-making model in the broader context of policy making in Europe is discussed. 30 References. D. Generoli

IS IT POSSIBLE TO RECONCILE A CLASSICAL LIBERAL APPROACH TO ECONOMICS WITH A CONCERN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT? THE CONTRIBUTORS TO ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A RECONCILIATION CONTEND THAT IT IS. BUT THEY FAIL TO DISTINGUISH PROPERLY BETWEEN CLASSICAL LIBERALISM AND A WIDESPREAD ORTHODOXY IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY COMMUNITIES IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA TO THE EFFECT THAT ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY NEED MORE SERIOUS ATTENTION THAN THEY HAVE HITHERTO RECEIVED. ONCE THIS ORTHODOXY IS DISTINGUISHED FROM CLASSICAL LIBERALISM, THE LATTER IS SEEN TO BE IMPLAUSIBLE. IN PARTICULAR, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL APPROACH FAILS TO DEAL WITH THE PRACTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN ENFORCING PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, WRONGLY GENERALIZES FROM THE FAILURES OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TO THE FAILURE OF PUBLIC REGULATION AS SUCH, AND FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CLAIM THAT NATURE SHOULD BE ACCORDED INTRINSIC VALUE.

Focuses on Samuel Brittan's A Restatement of Economic Liberalism, which is itself a revised version of Capitalism and the Permissive Society. (SJK)

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- 1 Introduction -- 1 Equality and Political Argument -- Untitled -- 2 Social Policy and Political Argument -- 3 Some Underlying Themes -- 2 Procedural Equality -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Equality as a Defeasible Concept -- 3 Equality and Consistency -- 3 Substantive Equality -- 1 Justice and Equality -- 2 The Contract Argument -- 3 Equality, Incentives and Efficiency -- 4 Primary Goods and Social Policy -- 1 Distributive Principles and Primary Goods -- 2 Compensation and Welfare -- 3 Equality and Transfers in Kind -- 4 Pensions and Redistribution -- 5 Need and Equality -- 1 The Concept of Need -- 2 Need and Equality -- 3 The Boundaries of Need Claims -- 4 Consent Risk and Need -- 6 Institutions (1) -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Health Care -- 3 Education -- 4 Housing -- 5 Exemption from Collectively Supplied Benefits -- 7 Institutions (2) -- 1 General Framework of Social Policy -- 2 The State and Social Policy -- 3 Social Policy and the Market -- 4 Altruism, Citizenship and Social Policy -- Notes -- Guide to Further Reading -- Bibliography -- Index.

An exposition and evaluation of major work in social contract theory from 1950 to the present. It locates the central themes of that theory in the intellectual legacy of utilitarianism, particularly the problems of defining principles of justice and of showing the grounds of moral obligation. It demonstrates how theorists responded in a novel way to the dilemmas articulated in utilitarianism, developing in their different approaches a constructivist method in ethics, a method that aimed to vindicate a liberal, democratic and just political order.

An exposition and evaluation of major work in social contract theory from 1950 to the present. It locates the central themes of that theory in the intellectual legacy of utilitarianism, particularly the problems of defining principles of justice and of showing the grounds of moral obligation. It demonstrates how theorists responded in a novel way to the dilemmas articulated in utilitarianism, developing in their different approaches a constructivist method in ethics, a method that aimed to vindicate a liberal, democratic and just political order.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Tables -- List of Figures -- Notation -- Preface -- Part I Theory -- 1 A New Keynesian framework for macroeconomic policy -- 1.1 An overview of the ideas in this book -- 1.1.1 New Keynesian financial policy: objectives and instruments -- 1.1.2 The labour market -- 1.1.3 An exchange-rate intermediate target -- 1.1.4 Expectations formation -- 1.1.5 Small models, large models, and control theory -- 1.2 Three policy frameworks compared -- 1.2.1 The Keynes-Bretton Woods framework and its demise -- 1.2.2 The monetarist framework and its demise -- 1.2.3 The New Keynesian framework -- 1.3 Financial policy explained -- 1.3.1 Money GDP as a financial target -- 1.3.2 National wealth as a financial target -- 1.3.3 The rate of interest as the instrument of monetary control -- 1.3.4 The rate of tax as the instrument of fiscal control -- 1.3.5 'Instrument-target emphasis': the linkages of financial targets to financial instruments -- 1.4 Wage fixing and its implications for financial policy -- 1.5 Exchange-rate management -- 1.5.1 The case for foreign exchange rate targeting -- 1.5.2 The foreign exchange rate as an intermediate target -- 1.6 Expectations -- 1.7 The form of control -- 1.8 International aspects of policy rules -- 1.9 Outline of subsequent chapters -- 2 The linkages between financial weapons and financial targets: a comparative static analysis -- 2.1 Linkages and emphasis -- 2.2 The model of a closed economy -- 2.2.1 Assumptions -- 2.2.2 Basic equations -- 2.2.3 Comparative statics -- 2.2.4 Comparative advantage and emphasis -- 2.3 The control of inflation and wealth in a closed economy -- 2.4 The availability of free lunches -- 2.5 The open economy -- 2.6 Conclusion -- 3 The dynamics of price stabilization.