Suchergebnisse

This thesis assesses from a political economic point of view the role of nuclear power in a (low-carbon) energy transition in the 21st century. To answer this question a more holistic analysis is needed that considers both the entire nuclear value-added chain (including decommissioning and waste management), political interests, corporate strategies, as well as the underlying institutions. In this dissertation, I address these issues in three parts. The first part gives an introduction into the nuclear power debate of the 21st century and presents the "system good" methodology in the stream of new institutional economics. The system good analysis helps identifying ideal-typical organizational models for the value-added stages of the so-called nuclear front-end (mining, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication), constructing nuclear power plants, decommissioning and long-term storage as well as the respective interfaces between these stages. The second part of the dissertation looks at the nuclear industry from different perspectives. An economic historical revision of nuclear power plants deployment since World War 2 links the development and diffusion of reactor technology to political structures and institutional characteristics. An economic and technical analysis of reactor investments coupled with a Monte-Carlo Simulation of investments into current reactor technologies underscores the findings of traditional economic analysis that nuclear power is not profitable. A quantitative assessment of the decommissioning and waste management programs includes the assessment of the status quo of worldwide reactor decommissioning as well as the generated quantities of nuclear waste in Europe including their disposal solutions. A qualitative analysis of costs and financing schemes for decommissioning and waste management sheds more light on the (sometimes) complicated liabilities, both are hardly addressed in traditional economic analysis and if they are included, they are often largely underestimated. The third part is dedicated to Germany. Three studies on the German case provide some lessons-learned from a country, where the nuclear phase-out is in full swing. A modelling exercise on decommissioning and waste management shows that the interface between the two is crucial for cost efficient and timely decommissioning. The modelling on the effects of the closure of nuclear power plants gives insights into electricity markets in respect to prices and energy security. The last chapter describes the German governance of the nuclear sector and lays out the catalytic effects of the Fukushima disaster on German nuclear policy. ; Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich aus politik-ökonomischer Perspektive mit der Fragestellung, welche Rolle die Kernenergie in einem dekarbonisierten Stromsektor im 21. Jahrhundert noch spielen kann. Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage ist eine umfängliche Analyse erforderlich, die sowohl die gesamte nukleare Wertschöpfungskette (einschließlich Stilllegung und Abfallentsorgung), politische Interessen, Unternehmensstrategien als auch die zugrundeliegenden institutionellen Gegebenheiten berücksichtigen muss. Dieser Aufgabe habe ich mich in meiner Dissertation gestellt und beantworte die die genannte Forschungsfrage in drei Teilen. Im ersten Teil wird die Entwicklung der Kernkraft im 20. und 21. Jahrhundert nachgezeichnet und methodisch als "Systemgut" im Rahmen der Neuen Institutionenökonomie eingeführt. Die Systemgut Analyse zielt darauf ab, idealtypische Organisationsmodelle zu entwickeln, welche die verschiedenen Wertschöpfungsstufen (Uranabbau, Konversion, Anreicherung, Brennstoffherstellung, Bau von Kernkraftwerken sowie deren Stilllegung und Langzeitlagerung von Atommüll) sowie die jeweiligen Schnittstellen zwischen diesen Stufen umfassen. Im zweiten Teil der Dissertation wird die Atomindustrie aus wirtschaftlicher, technischer sowie politischer Perspektive analysiert. Eine wirtschaftshistorische Erhebung der weltweit existierenden Kernkraftwerke seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg verknüpft die Entwicklung und Verbreitung der Reaktortechnologie mit politischen Strukturen und institutionellen Gegebenheiten. Eine techno-ökonomische Analyse mittels einer Monte-Carlo-Simulation von Investitionen in aktuelle Reaktortechnologien der dritten Generation, bestätigt die Erkenntnis traditioneller Wirtschaftsanalysen, dass Atomkraft nicht wettbewerbsfähig ist. Eine quantitative Bewertung von Stilllegungs- und Entsorgungsprogrammen umfasst den Status quo der weltweiten Reaktorstilllegung sowie der in Europa anfallenden Mengen an radioaktiven Abfällen einschließlich ihrer Lagerung. Eine qualitative Analyse der Kosten sowie der Finanzierungsmodelle für die Stilllegung und die Abfallentsorgung beleuchtet die (manchmal) komplizierten Handlungs- und Finanzierungsverantwortungen, die in traditionellen Wirtschaftsanalysen kaum berücksichtigt oder oft unterschätzt werden. Der dritte Teil der Dissertation besteht aus drei Fallstudien zum deutschen Atomausstieg. Eine Modellierung der Stilllegung von Kraftwerken und des Abfallmanagements zeigt, dass die Schnittstelle zwischen den beiden Prozessen für eine kosteneffiziente und rechtzeitige Stilllegung von entscheidender Bedeutung ist. Die Modellierung der Auswirkungen von Kernkraftwerksstillegungen gibt Einblicke in Strommärkte in Bezug auf Preise und Versorgungssicherheit. Das letzte Kapitel beschreibt den deutschen Atomsektor und legt die Auswirkungen der Fukushima-Katastrophe auf die deutsche Atompolitik dar.

Atomkraft spielt in der globalen Primärenergieversorgung mit 4,4 Prozent eine geringe und rückläufige Rolle. Der aktuelle Kraftwerkspark ist überaltert, ca. 200 Abschaltungen im kommenden Jahrzehnt stehen lediglich 46 Neubauprojekte gegenüber. Dennoch verbreitet die Atomwirtschaft, insbesondere die World Nuclear Association (WNA), das Narrativ eines großen Interesses vieler Länder an der Neu-Einführung von Atomkraft. Die Realität sieht anders aus: Lediglich vier Länder bauen derzeit ihr erstes Atomkraftwerk, wobei alle Projekte stark subventioniert werden und um viele Jahre verzögert sind. Bei anderen potentiellen "Newcomern" sind die Pläne höchstens vage, wurden aufgegeben oder erheblich verschoben. Angesichts fehlender wirtschaftlich-finanziell begründeter Motivation wurde am DIW Berlin zudem eine empirische Analyse anderer Merkmale der potentiellen Neueinsteiger durchgeführt. Die Befunde legen nahe, dass diese Länder durch ein tendentiell gering ausgeprägtes Maß an demokratischer Freiheit charakterisiert sind, welches mit zentralen Machtstrukturen und schwacher Opposition einhergeht. Zudem liegt nahe, dass diejenigen Länder, die Atomtechnik exportieren, eher geopolitische Ziele verfolgen, derzeit vor allem Russland. Deutschland sollte innerhalb der internationalen Organisationen, vor allem der Internationalen Atomenergie- Organisation sowie EURATOM darauf hinwirken, dass der erstmalige Neubau von Atomkraftwerken nicht gefördert wird sowie sich auf die Durchsetzung von Sicherheitsstandards und ungelöste Fragen von Rückbau und langfristiger Lagerung für atomare Abfälle weltweit konzentrieren

At just 4.4 percent, the contribution made by nuclear power to meeting the world's primary energy requirements is marginal and on the decline. The current nuclear power fleet is outdated with around 200 plants due to be phased out over the next ten years compared to as few as 46 new nuclear power plants under construction worldwide. Yet the nuclear industry, particularly the World Nuclear Association (WNA), is propagating the narrative that there is a plethora of countries interested in constructing their first nuclear plants. The reality is quite different, however. As few as four countries are in the process of building their first nuclear power plants and even these projects are heavily subsidized and experiencing significantly delays. As for other potential newcomers, their plans are, at best, vague, frequently abandoned, or delayed. Given the absence of economic and financial incentive, DIW Berlin has conducted an empirical analysis of other characteristics in potential newcomer countries. Our findings show that these countries tend to have a lack of democratic freedom, something which generally goes hand-in-hand with centralized power structures and weak opposition. Moreover, our analysis suggests that countries exporting nuclear technology more often than not pursue geopolitical objectives, something that currently applies to Russia, in particular. Within international organizations, especially the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) but also Euratom, Germany should be working toward ensuring that countries are not encouraged to construct their first nuclear power plants, that the necessary safety standards are met where nuclear power plants are already built or are in operation, and that as yet unresolved issues relating to decommissioning and the long-term storage of nuclear waste worldwide are addressed

The nuclear industry in the United States of America has accumulated about 70,000 metric tons of high-level nuclear waste over the past decades; at present, this waste is temporarily stored close to the nuclear power plants. The industry and the Department of Energy are now facing two related challenges: (i) will a permanent geological repository, e.g., Yucca Mountain, become available in the future, and if yes, when?; (ii) should the high-level waste be transported to interim storage facilities in the meantime, which may be safer and more cost economic? This paper presents a mathematical transportation model that evaluates the economic challenges and costs associated with different scenarios regarding the opening of a long-term geological repository. The model results suggest that any further delay in opening a long-term storage increases cost and consolidated interim storage facilities should be built now. We show that Yucca Mountain's capacity is insufficient and additional storage is necessary. A sensitivity analysis for the reprocessing of high-level waste finds this uneconomic in all cases. This paper thus emphasizes the urgency of dealing with the high-level nuclear waste and informs the debate between the nuclear industry and policymakers on the basis of objective data and quantitative analysis.

At just 4.4 percent, the contribution made by nuclear power to meeting the world's primary energy requirements is marginal and on the decline. The current nuclear power fleet is outdated with around 200 plants due to be phased out over the next ten years compared to as few as 46 new nuclear power plants under construction worldwide. Yet the nuclear industry, particularly the World Nuclear Association (WNA), is propagating the narrative that there is a plethora of countries interested in constructing their first nuclear plants. The reality is quite different, however. As few as four countries are in the process of building their first nuclear power plants and even these projects are heavily subsidized and experiencing significantly delays. As for other potential newcomers, their plans are, at best, vague, frequently abandoned, or delayed. Given the absence of economic and financial incentive, DIW Berlin has conducted an empirical analysis of other characteristics in potential newcomer countries. Our findings show that these countries tend to have a lack of democratic freedom, something which generally goes hand-in-hand with centralized power structures and weak opposition. Moreover, our analysis suggests that countries exporting nuclear technology more often than not pursue geopolitical objectives, something that currently applies to Russia, in particular. Within international organizations, especially the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) but also Euratom, Germany should be working toward ensuring that countries are not encouraged to construct their first nuclear power plants, that the necessary safety standards are met where nuclear power plants are already built or are in operation, and that as yet unresolved issues relating to decommissioning and the long-term storage of nuclear waste worldwide are addressed.

This paper analyzes the nature of democratic development in a nation on the process of introducing nuclear power over the period 1960 - 2017 for an unbalanced panel of 171 countries. Given the involved political process of introducing nuclear power and its political importance, as well as the current tendency of about 30 countries to "go nuclear", this question is both of historic and current interest. We apply a multinomial logistic regression approach that relates the likelihood of a country to introduce nuclear power to its level of democratic quality and nuclear warhead possession. The model results suggest that countries with lower levels of democratic development are more likely to introduce nuclear power. Our results moreover indicate that countries which possess at least one nuclear warhead are more likely to continue to use nuclear power instead of not using nuclear power at all. We discuss these results in the context of the public policy debate on nuclear power, yet beyond energy and environmental issues addressing international relations, conflict, and security issues connected to nuclear energy.

The catastrophic accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant on March 11, 2011, revealed unexpected safety risks of nuclear energy once again. It also accelerated the decline of nuclear energy in the international energy sector: Nuclear energy's share of global electricity generation fell from 17 percent in 1996 to 13 percent in 2011 to approximately ten percent in 2019, with a share of primary energy from nuclear at only four percent. In addition to the regular occurrence of major nuclear accidents since 1945, nuclear power plants also experience considerable outages during normal operation: Only 66 percent of the global available capacity for nuclear power has been utilized since the 1970s. There have also been a number of incidents in Germany and its neighboring countries. Although the outages at German nuclear power plants are below the international average, they are nevertheless considerable even for the younger plants. Economic analyses have largely neglected the unreliable availability of nuclear power—so far, many energy and climate models still view nuclear power as an important source in the future. In Germany, the Fukushima major accident accelerated the nuclear phase-out, which is to occur by the end of 2022 in accordance with the Thirteenth Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act (July 2011).

Der katastrophale Unfall im japanischen Kernkraftwerk Fukushima am 11. März 2011 brachte einmal mehr unerwartete Sicherheitsrisiken zutage und beschleunigte den Bedeutungsverlust von Kernkraft in der internationalen Energiewirtschaft. Ihr Anteil an der globalen Stromerzeugung fiel von vormals 17 Prozent (1996) über 13 Prozent (2011) auf circa zehn Prozent, der Anteil am Primärenergieverbrauch liegt sogar bei nur noch vier Prozent. Neben den seit 1945 regelmäßig auftretenden Großunfällen kommt es auch immer wieder zu erheblichen Ausfallzeiten von Kernkraftwerken im normalen Betrieb: Weltweit beträgt die Nutzung der verfügbaren Kraftwerkskapazität seit den 1970er Jahren lediglich 66 Prozent. Auch in Deutschland und den Nachbarländern gab es eine Vielzahl von Zwischenfällen. Zwar liegen die Ausfallzeiten der deutschen Kernkraftwerke unter dem internationalen Durchschnitt, dennoch sind sie hier ebenfalls erheblich, auch bei den jüngeren Anlagen. Die unzuverlässige Verfügbarkeit von Kernkraft ist in der energiewirtschaftlichen Analyse bisher weitgehend vernachlässigt – bisher sehen viele Energie- und Klimamodelle noch eine Bedeutung von Kernkraft auch in der Zukunft. Der Unfall in Fukushima beschleunigte den Atomausstieg in Deutschland, der entsprechend des 13. Gesetzes zur Änderung des Atomgesetzes (Juli 2011) bis Ende 2022 erfolgen soll.

In der sich verschärfenden Diskussionen über wirksamen Klimaschutz wird sowohl in Deutschland als auch in Europa und weltweit die Atomkraft als "saubere Energie" ins Spiel gebracht. Vor diesem Hintergrund analysiert dieser Bericht ihre historischen, gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen Kosten und Risiken. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Atomkraft aufgrund radioaktiver Strahlung für über eine Millionen Jahre mitnichten als "sauber" bezeichnet werden kann, sondern für Mensch und Umwelt gefährlich ist. Zudem fallen hohe Risiken bezüglich Proliferation an. Eine empirische Erhebung aller jemals gebauten 674 Atomkraftwerke zeigt, dass privatwirtschaftliche Motive von Anfang an keine Rolle gespielt haben, sondern militärische Interessen. Selbst bei Vernachlässigung der Kosten für den Rückbau der Atomkraftwerke und die langfristige Lagerung des Atommülls wären rein privatwirtschaftliche Investitionen in Atomkraftwerke mit hohen Verlusten verbunden – im Durchschnitt knapp fünf Milliarden Euro pro Kraftwerk, wie eine betriebswirtschaftliche Simulation zeigt. In Ländern, in denen noch Atomkraftwerke gebaut werden, wie etwa China und Russland, spielen private Investitionen auch keine Rolle. Atomkraft ist zu teuer und gefährlich und daher keine Option für eine klimafreundliche Energieversorgung.

The debate on effective climate protection is heating up in Germany and the rest of the world. Nuclear energy is being touted as "clean" energy. Given the circumstances, the present study analyzed the historical, current, and future costs and risks of nuclear energy. The findings show that nuclear energy can by no means be called "clean" due to radioactive emissions, which will endanger humans and the natural environment for over one million years. And it harbors the high risk of proliferation. An empirical survey of the 674 nuclear power plants that have ever been built showed that private economic motives never played a role. Instead military interests have always been the driving force behind their construction. Even ignoring the expense of dismantling nuclear power plants and the long-term storage of nuclear waste, private economy-only investment in nuclear power plant would result in high losses— an average of five billion euros per nuclear power plant, as one financial simulation revealed. In countries such as China and Russia, where nuclear power plants are still being built, private investment does not play a role either. Nuclear power is too expensive and dangerous; therefore it should not be part of the climate-friendly energy mix of the future.

The catastrophic accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant on March 11, 2011, revealed unexpected safety risks of nuclear energy once again. It also accelerated the decline of nuclear energy in the international energy sector: Nuclear energy's share of global electricity generation fell from 17 percent in 1996 to 13 percent in 2011 to approximately ten percent in 2019, with a share of primary energy from nuclear at only four percent. In addition to the regular occurrence of major nuclear accidents since 1945, nuclear power plants also experience considerable outages during normal operation: Only 66 percent of the global available capacity for nuclear power has been utilized since the 1970s. There have also been a number of incidents in Germany and its neighboring countries. Although the outages at German nuclear power plants are below the international average, they are nevertheless considerable even for the younger plants. Economic analyses have largely neglected the unreliable availability of nuclear power-so far, many energy and climate models still view nuclear power as an important source in the future. In Germany, the Fukushima major accident accelerated the nuclear phase-out, which is to occur by the end of 2022 in accordance with the Thirteenth Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act (July 2011).

The debate on effective climate protection is heating up in Germany and the rest of the world. Nuclear energy is being touted as 'clean' energy. Given the circumstances, the present study analyzed the historical, current, and future costs and risks of nuclear energy. The findings show that nuclear energy can by no means be called 'clean' due to radioactive emissions, which will endanger humans and the natural environment for over one million years. And it harbors the high risk of proliferation. An empirical survey of the 674 nuclear power plants that have ever been built showed that private economic motives never played a role. Instead military interests have always been the driving force behind their construction. Even ignoring the expense of dismantling nuclear power plants and the long-term storage of nuclear waste, private economy-only investment in nuclear power plant would result in high losses- an average of five billion euros per nuclear power plant, as one financial simulation revealed. In countries such as China and Russia, where nuclear power plants are still being built, private investment does not play a role either. Nuclear power is too expensive and dangerous; therefore it should not be part of the climate-friendly energy mix of the future.