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The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2084784 ; Leaders of the Peruvian Ministry of Defense (MINDEF), at the direction of national lawmakers and the Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF), have begun a process to implement a results-based budget (RBB). A change in national law prompted the current transition from an input (cash)-based, one-year, non-transparent budgeting system with few links between strategy and execution, to a system linking measurable results to corresponding budgets. Current efforts are underway to structure processes and information systems to assist in linking defense expenditures to goals and desired outcomes. This paper evaluates the Peruvian MINDEF's efforts to implement RBB. We argue that the current processes of planning and budgeting in the MINDEF and military institutions have significant problems in several areas; if MINDEF leaders are unsuccessful in overcoming these obstacles then the benefits normally attributed to implementing RBB may not occur. We examine strategic guidance from the government and the MEF's implementation of RBB in all government organizations, neither of which focus on defense actions and outcomes. We note that no centrally coordinated effort or "champion" exists within the MINDEF to implement RBB, which leads to significant disparities in comprehension, organization, and implementation among the defense institutions. We also observe no consistent method, data collection and information tracking within the MINDEF, and little communication among officials. With continued pressure on national and especially defense budgets, and pressure on the armed forces to show their value, continuing an unsound implementation could have national and international ramifications given the increase in Latin America's security concerns.

In recent years, politicians have called upon the private sector to provide increased support to nonprofit organizations. Included in this call is the public's expectation that the nonprofit sector supply solutions to current social problems. While politicians and the public expect corporations to provide increasing financial support to social services organizations, many nonprofit managers find corporate giving a confusing arena (Zippay, 1992).

Even though there were over four million firms in 1988, only 1,300firms had foundations. However, these foundations contributed nearly $1.3 billion to charities. This article examines the effects of tax and other government policies on the establishment and use of corporate foundations in the United States from the early 1900s until the late 1980s. In addition, the study looks at the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on corporate and foundation giving. Two hypotheses are tested. First, corporate foundations may allow firms to smooth corporate gifts and maintain a steady level of corporate "goodwill." The notion of goodwill is similar to firm image or reputation. Second, corporate foundations may allow firms to minimize their tax bills, or maximize profits, over time. The findings of this paper support both hypotheses under the assumption that firms are profit maximizers. Tax and government policy makers can affect the timing and amount of corporate charitable donations by changing the corporate marginal tax rate, the social perceptions of corporate charitable activities (including foundations), the rulings on tax liability for foundations, and laws on deductibility of corporate and foundation gifts.

Charity watchdogs and the media level serious allegations of mismanagement of funds at charities serving former and current members of the U.S. armed services, affecting service recipients, families, donors, grantors, foundations, and taxpayers. To examine these allegations, we use two approaches from the literature to assess nonprofit financial effectiveness: the organization's ability to gain resources and to sustain activities. We mirror the approach of charity raters, whose measures are widely available to the public. Using GuideStar/Internal Revenue Service data, we compare fund-raising expenditures, assets, and financial sustainability of large national military and veterans nonprofits to a random sample of national nonprofits. We apply propensity score matching and compare organizations similar in size, age, and other factors. We find little difference between military and veterans charities and other nonprofits and provide an improved method for evaluating the financial health of nonprofits across academic discipline, nonprofit field of service, and within or among countries.

Performance management, a management model with a long history (Van Dooren, 2008), has been used internationally to promote better government (OECD, 1996) and has been shown to be difficult to adopt (Lægreid et al., 2006) and more difficult to implement. Adoption of performance-based management systems (PBMSs) has been more successful than implementation (De Lancer Julnes and Holzer, 2001). Over the last thirty years, government practice has at its foundation New Public Management (NPM), which promotes managing for results in public sectors worldwide (OECD, 2005). The U.S. and Italian governments embraced this NPM tenet and introduced PBMSs in parts of or entire organizations. We assess the adoption and use of performance management practices in these hierarchical and complex public organizations, in particular how and to what extent the Italian Army (IA) and the U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE) implemented PBMSs. By analyzing the cases, we find that both organizations have encountered some benefits and difficulties in implementation. We address these critical factors and contribute to the literature and to practical use of performance management in government organizations by demonstrating some key factors of hierarchical, complex government organizations that enable or hamper successful implementation and use of a PBMS.

Performance management, a management model with a long history (Van Dooren, 2008), has been used internationally to promote better government (OECD, 1996) and has been shown to be difficult to adopt (Lægreid et al., 2006) and more difficult to implement. Adoption of performance-based management systems (PBMSs) has been more successful than implementation (De Lancer Julnes and Holzer, 2001). Over the last thirty years, government practice has at its foundation New Public Management (NPM), which promotes managing for re- sults in public sectors worldwide (OECD, 2005). The U.S. and Italian governments embraced this NPM tenet and introduced PBMSs in parts of or entire organizations. We assess the adoption and use of performance management practices in these hierarchical and complex public organi- zations, in particular how and to what extent the Italian Army (IA) and the U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE) implemented PBMSs. By analyzing the cases, we find that both or- ganizations have encountered some benefits and difficulties in implementation. We address these critical factors and contribute to the literature and to practical use of performance management in government organizations by demonstrating some key factors of hierarchical, complex govern- ment organizations that enable or hamper successful implementation and use of a PBMS.