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Despite scientists' dire warnings about the catastrophic impacts of climate change, the greenhouse gases that cause it continue to be emitted in substantial amounts. While there is no question that deep, across the board cuts in greenhouse gas emissions are essential, many scientists now agree that simply cutting future emissions will not be enough. It will also be necessary to remove previously-emitted greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. This paper explores one greenhouse gas removal technique—enhanced weathering—which involves spreading finely ground silicate rocks or other materials with similar chemical composition over land or ocean waters. The materials react with carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, sequestering it in mineral form (e.g., as limestone) on land or in the oceans. While further study is needed to fully evaluate the risks associated with enhanced weathering, initial research suggests that it could result in the long-term storage of large amounts of carbon dioxide, likely for centuries or millennia. This paper examines the international and U.S. legal framework for enhanced weathering on land and in ocean waters. As the paper shows, there are currently no international or U.S. federal or state laws dealing specifically with enhanced weathering, but projects could be regulated under various general environmental and other laws. At the international level, potentially applicable instruments include the Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other Matter, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Domestically, projects could be subject to various provisions of the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, among other statutes. Exactly when and how these statutes will apply remains uncertain. Much will depend on the specific design of each project, including where it is conducted, the materials used, and how they are applied to land or ocean waters. The paper identifies areas where new laws could be adopted, or existing laws revised, to reduce uncertainty and facilitate the development of enhanced weathering projects.

The Environmental Protection Agency has a tradition of scientific excellence. EPA has led groundbreaking research on acid rain, lead, chemical safety, and many other public health and environmental issues. However, in the last four budget cycles, the Trump administration has proposed slashing funding for EPA research programs. When Congress has refused, administration officials have sought to prevent, hide, and discredit research in other ways. They have been remarkably successful despite the existence of agency policies designed to protect researchers against political interference.

In the last four budget cycles, the Trump administration has proposed slashing funding for U.S. Environmental Protection Agency research programs. When Congress has refused, administration officials have sought to prevent, hide, and discredit research in other ways. They have been remarkably successful despite the existence of agency policies designed to protect researchers against political interference.

As the federal agency charged with overseeing the interstate transportation of natural gas, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") has recently faced growing criticism over its approval of new pipelines. Critics have lambasted FERC for failing to adequately consider the climate change impacts of pipeline development, particularly the greenhouse gas emissions associated with "upstream" natural gas production and "downstream" use. The D.C. Circuit recently weighed in, holding that the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") requires consideration of downstream greenhouse gas emissions, at least in some circumstances. The precise scope of that requirement continues to be debated before FERC, in the courts, and among scholars. While recognizing the importance of that debate, this Article approaches the issue from a different perspective, exploring whether the Natural Gas Act ("NGA") establishes an independent requirement for FERC to consider climate change impacts, including upstream and/or downstream greenhouse gas emissions. Under section 7 of the NGA, before approving any interstate natural gas pipeline, FERC must find that it "is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity." FERC's finding must be based on an evaluation of all factors bearing on the public interest which necessitates a broad-ranging assessment of the need for pipeline development, its benefits, and costs. This Article contends that, as part of its assessment, FERC must account for the full climate change and other environmental impacts of pipeline development. To support that contention, the Article offers an in-depth look at the history of section 7 of the NGA, and its interpretation by the courts. It also provides a comprehensive analysis of how environmental factors are dealt with by FERC, showing that the Commission historically viewed downstream environmental impacts as a key factor to be considered under section 7 of the NGA, but now largely ignores them. The courts are yet to fully address whether section 7 of the NGA requires FERC to consider upstream and/or downstream environmental impacts when certifying pipeline projects. However, the existence of such a requirement is strongly supported by the language and history of section 7, as well as the case law and administrative materials interpreting it. Indeed, FERC cannot fulfill its statutory obligation under section 7 to ensure pipeline development is required by the public convenience and necessity, without considering upstream and downstream impacts. FERC must, therefore, change its current approach to evaluating pipeline projects. That change could have significant implications for the approval of future projects since, after accounting for environmental impacts, FERC may be unable to conclude that a project is required by the public convenience and necessity.

This paper explores the potential for federal and/or state regulation of gasoline octane levels. At the federal level EPA is authorized to regulate the components and/or characteristics of gasoline under section 211 of the Clean Air Act. Pursuant to that section, EPA may regulate octane if evidence before it demonstrates that switching to high octane gasoline is necessary to achieve vehicle carbon dioxide emissions standards (i.e., adopted under section 202 of the Clean Air Act) or would significantly reduce the costs of achieving those standards. If EPA promulgates regulations, or publishes a finding that regulation is unnecessary, state regulatory action will be pre-empted. There is, however, an exception for California which may adopt its own regulations regardless of any action by EPA. Regulations adopted by California are not subject to review and/or approval by EPA. The regulations only apply in California and cannot be adopted by other states, in preference to federal regulations, as is permitted with respect to vehicle emission standards.

Averting catastrophic climate change requires immediate action to prevent additional carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases being released into the atmosphere. However, even that may not be sufficient, with many scientists now warning that it will likely also be necessary to reduce the existing atmospheric carbon dioxide load. That could be achieved using negative emissions technologies that remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and store or utilize it in some way. One promising technology is direct air capture ("DAC") which uses liquid chemical solutions or solid sorbent filters to capture carbon dioxide from the air and concentrate it into a pure stream. Current DAC technologies are highly energy intensive and must be powered by renewable energy sources to achieve negative emissions. Ideally, DAC equipment would be co- located with a renewable energy facility, at a site where carbon dioxide can be stored or used. There is growing interest in the possibility of locating systems offshore in areas with high wind energy capacity and sub-seabed geologic formations that are suitable for storing carbon dioxide. One possible site off the west coast of Canada—known as the Cascadia Basin—is currently being explored in a Pacific Institute for Climate Solutions study, called Solid Carbon. This paper was developed as part of that study. It provides a comprehensive analysis of legal issues associated with deploying an offshore DAC system, powered by offshore wind turbines, in Canadian waters and storing the captured carbon dioxide in sub-seabed rock formations.

Limiting future temperature increases and associated climate change requires immediate action to prevent additional carbon dioxide being released into the atmosphere and lower the existing atmospheric carbon dioxide load. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, to remain within the 2 degrees Celsius temperature threshold set in the Paris Agreement, emissions must be reduced to "net zero" by mid-century or shortly thereafter and then go "net negative." This goal could be advanced through carbon capture and storage (CCS), which involves collecting carbon dioxide that would otherwise be released by power plants or similar facilities and injecting it into underground geologic formations, where it will remain permanently sequestered. The techniques developed for CCS can also be used to sequester carbon dioxide that has been removed from the atmosphere using direct air capture or other negative emission technologies To ensure CCS delivers lasting climate benefits, injection sites must be carefully selected to avoid leakage of carbon dioxide. One promising option involves injecting carbon dioxide offshore, into sub-seabed geologic formations comprised of basalt rock, which has been shown to react with carbon dioxide, converting it into an immovable solid and thereby substantially reducing the potential for leakage. This paper explores the legal framework governing offshore CCS in U.S. and Canadian waters. Particular attention is devoted to waters off the west coast, adjacent to Washington State in the U.S. and British Columbia in Canada, where there is a large sub-seabed basalt rock formation (the Cascadia basin) with significant carbon dioxide storage potential Neither the U.S. nor Canada has enacted comprehensive legislation specific to offshore CCS, resulting in significant uncertainty as to how future projects will be regulated. Projects may be subject to a patchwork of general laws that were developed for other activities and are often poorly suited to regulating offshore CCS. Indeed, the laws currently prohibit some offshore CCS projects entirely, and impose unnecessarily burdensome restrictions on others. Unless and until these issues are addressed, offshore CCS projects are unlikely to occur in U.S. federal and Canadian waters, despite the potential climate benefits. To realize those benefits, the paper recommends that both the U.S. and Canada enact legislation that deals specifically with offshore CCS, establishing a well-defined framework for the regulation of future projects.

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement recognizes the right of Parties to cooperate in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) through both market- and non-market-based approaches. One market-based approach is outlined in Article 6.2 which provides for "the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes [(ITMOs)] towards" NDCs. This is widely seen as establishing a "bottom-up" approach, whereby "mitigation outcomes," representing emission reduction credits, can be transferred internationally and then become ITMOs. It can be contrasted with other market-based approaches that are "top-down," involving centralized programs supporting emission reduction projects. One such program is created in Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement which establishes a new "mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development" (sustainable development mechanism or SDM). Under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement, in making use of ITMOs, Parties must "promote sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity." Similarly, under Article 6.4, the SDM is intended to "support" and "foster" sustainable development. While that phrase is not defined in the agreement, several Parties have argued that it requires the protection and promotion of human rights, consistent with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. That argument is supported by the recognition, in the preamble to the agreement, that Parties should "respect, promote, and consider their respective obligations on human rights" when taking action to address climate change. This creates an overarching expectation that Parties will, in implementing the agreement, take steps to protect human rights. This paper identifies, describes, and explores different approaches to ensuring human rights are protected in the context of Article 6. We consider, as one possible approach, whether and how social and environmental safeguards could be incorporated into the rules governing ITMOs and the SDM. We find that there is a compelling policy rationale for incorporating safeguards into both the ITMO and SDM frameworks, not only to prevent human rights abuses, but also to ensure the success of ITMO and SDM programs and projects. However, the legal basis for incorporating safeguards is somewhat uncertain, particularly in the context of the ITMO regime. That issue, along with the scope, substance, and enforcement of safeguards, is explored in this paper.

Reducing the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is vital to mitigate climate change. To date reduction efforts have primarily focused on minimizing the production of carbon dioxide during electricity generation, transport, and other activities. Going forward, to the extent that carbon dioxide continues to be produced, it will need to be captured before release. The captured carbon dioxide can then be utilized in some fashion, or it can be injected into underground geological formations – e.g., depleted oil and gas reserves, deep saline aquifers, or basalt rock reservoirs – where, it is hoped, it will remain permanently sequestered ("carbon capture and storage" or "CCS"). Research is currently being undertaken into the possibility of injecting carbon dioxide into the seabed. One study, involving researchers from Columbia's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, aims to identify possible injection sites in the seabed along the northeast coast of the U.S. It is anticipated that, following identification of suitable sites, a demonstration project will be undertaken to assess the feasibility of offshore CCS. This paper outlines key regulatory requirements for the demonstration project and any subsequent commercial operations.

The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) aims to "support" and "facilitate" wholesale market participation by aggregations of distributed energy resources (DERs)—solar panels, batteries, and other energy technologies installed in small quantities at scattered locations. This reflect CAISO's recognition that "[t]he number and diversity of these resources are growing and represent an increasingly important part of the future grid." However, CAISO has also recognized that system operators can only draw on DERs if they perform reliably, their operation is predictable and transparent, and their contributions are large enough to be economical both to their owners and the grid as a whole. While the aggregation of multiple DERs can support each of these conditions, providing for such aggregation will require adjustments to existing wholesale market rules. CAISO is not alone in recognizing the potential contributions to market performance of aggregated DERs, but it was the first wholesale market operator to begin exploring how to make the adjustments necessary to enable their participation. Similar programs for the aggregation of demand response have existed in markets operated by CAISO and other independent system operators and regional transmission organizations (ISO/RTOs) for several years. Those programs do not, however, allow energy exports to the bulk power grid. To address this limitation, CAISO adopted a new program, which allows DERs to provide energy and ancillary services to the grid. At the time of writing, CAISO's program had attracted just four participants—DER providers or "DERPs"—none of which had yet begun operating in the energy or ancillary services markets. Meanwhile, the other ISO/RTOs and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or the Commission) that oversees them are following CAISO into the fray. The FERC is considering requiring all ISO/RTOs to adopt their own programs for DER aggregation, which may be modeled on the one currently used by CAISO.4 Despite this, however, there has been no comprehensive review of how the CAISO program is operating and why it has attracted so few participants. This article is intended to fill that gap. This article examines CAISO's DER program after its first year of operation. It draws on written comments submitted to CAISO in the course of program development and on interviews the authors conducted with stakeholders—including active and potential DERPs, investor-owned utilities, and customer groups—to identify "barriers" to program participation. Irrespective of whether these barriers are appropriate—e.g., to ensure continued wholesale system reliability as DER penetration increases—they have clearly prevented the DER program fulfilling CAISO's stated goal. The barriers should, therefore, be considered by other ISO/RTOs in developing programs with similar goals. The authors identify six key lessons that other ISO/RTOs and regulatory authorities can learn from CAISO's experience.

"Science is science and facts are facts. My administration will ensure that there will be total [scientific] transparency and accountability without political bias." That was the promise made in September 2016 by then-candidate Donald Trump when asked how he would protect federal scientists from political interference in their work. Since taking office, however, President Trump has led a concerted effort to undermine federal scientific research, particularly in areas where research findings contradict his own views or undermine the basis of his deregulatory agenda. That effort is documented in the Silencing Science Tracker, an online database that records anti-science actions taken by the federal government. Drawing on three-and-a-half years of tracker data, this Comment analyzes the Trump Administration's evolving war on science and shows how it is changing the way federal agencies perform, use, and communicate scientific research. We focus primarily on climate science, which has been the subject of particularly fierce attacks under President Trump, though he has also targeted other areas. His actions could have long-lasting consequences, damaging the role of science in regulation for years to come.

Electricity generation, transmission and distribution, and load are all impacted by weather patterns. Electric system assets have been designed for historic weather conditions, with the goal of ensuring reliability and quick recovery following extreme events. However, climate change is causing major shifts in historic weather patterns and more frequent and severe extremes, which are creating new risk profiles for the electric system. Proactive climate resilience planning by electric utilities to identify, respond, and rationally allocate these climate risks is thus increasingly salient. This paper argues that it is also legally required. Recently published industry studies demonstrate that accurate, specific, and actionable climate resilience planning is possible. Nevertheless, and despite the significant benefits of climate resilience planning, relatively few electric utilities have engaged in the process. This paper explores two legal doctrines, public utility law and tort law, which we argue obligate electric utilities to plan for the impacts of climate change on their assets and operations. Public utility law requires electric utilities to meet, among other things, prudent investment and reliability standards. Tort law establishes a duty of care that obligates electric utilities to, among other things, avoid foreseeable harm when performing acts that could injure others. We argue that, as climate science becomes more precise and predictive, these legal standards take on new meaning and require electric utilities to engage in climate resilience planning.

Science is science and facts are facts. My administration will ensure that there will be total [scientific] transparency and accountability without political bias." That was the promise made in September 2016 by then-candidate Donald Trump when asked how he would protect federal scientists from political interference in their work. Since taking office, however, President Trump has led a concerted effort to undermine federal scientific research, particularly in areas where research findings contradict his own views or undermine the basis of his deregulatory agenda. That effort is documented in the Silencing Science Tracker, an online database that records anti-science actions taken by the federal government. Drawing on three-and-a-half years of tracker data, this Comment analyzesthe Trump Administration's evolving war on science and shows how it is changing the way federal agencies perform, use, and communicate scientific research. We focus primarily on climate science, which has been the subject of particularly fierce attacks under President Trump, though he has also targeted other areas. His actions could have long-lasting consequences, damaging the role of science in regulation for years to come.

Front Matter -- Copyright -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Contributors -- 1. Introduction -- PART I OCEAN CDR PRIMER -- 2. The role of ocean CDR in mitigating climate change -- 3. Ocean CDR approaches -- PART II THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR OCEAN CDR -- 4. Jurisdiction over the ocean -- 5. International laws governing ocean CDR -- PART III DOMESTIC LAWS GOVERNING OCEAN CDR -- 6. Canada -- 7. China -- 8. Germany -- 9. The Netherlands -- 10. Norway -- 11. United Kingdom -- 12. United States -- 13. Conclusion -- Index.

This paper explores two ocean-based carbon dioxide removal strategies – ocean alkalinity enhancement and seaweed cultivation. Ocean alkalinity enhancement involves adding alkalinity to ocean waters, either by discharging alkaline rocks or through an electrochemical process, which increases ocean pH levels and thereby enables greater uptake of carbon dioxide, as well as reducing the adverse impacts of ocean acidification. Seaweed cultivation involves the growing of kelp and other macroalgae to store carbon in biomass, which can then either be used to replace more greenhouse gas-intensive products or sequestered. This paper also examines the international and U.S. legal frameworks that apply to ocean alkalinity enhancement and seaweed cultivation. Depending on where they occur, such activities may be subject to international, national, state, and/or local jurisdiction. Under international law, countries typically have jurisdiction over activities within 200 nautical miles of their coastline. In the U.S., coastal states typically have primary authority over areas within three nautical miles of the coast, and the federal government controls U.S. waters further offshore.