Suchergebnisse

Zusammenfassung
Die demografische Alterung führt langfristig zu einem sinkenden Erwerbspersonenpotenzial. Zur Deckung einer denkbaren Personallücke wird in der politischen Diskussion neben Zuwanderung auf die Förderung der Erwerbsbeteiligung von Frauen und Älteren gesetzt. Der vorliegende Beitrag behandelt die Frage, wie quantitativ bedeutsam solche inländischen Personalreserven sind und untersucht, ob sie ausreichen würden, den demografisch bedingten Rückgang zu kompensieren. Dazu werden unterschiedliche Szenarien für die Erwerbsbeteiligung gerechnet, mit teilweise erheblich höheren Erwerbsquoten. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der erwartete Rückgang des Erwerbspersonen­potenzials damit nur gebremst werden kann, weil die demografische Basis, die Bevölkerung im erwerbsfähigen Alter, schneller und langfristig stärker schrumpft, als die Erwerbsquoten steigen können.
Abstract: Higher Employment Rates Do Not Stop Declining Labor Supply
Demographic ageing is expected to reduce labor supply in the long run. This could result in a substantial labor shortage. Attracting migrants and promoting labor participation of females and older persons are subject of the public debate to mitigate the problem. Our study focuses on the question, whether domestic human resources will be sufficient to close the gap between future labor supply and demand. We simulate and analyze scenarios even using rather extreme assumptions regarding labor participation rates. The results show higher labor participation rates cannot compensate the demographic influence, as the working age population will shrink to a greater extend and faster than the participation rates.

PurposeWe investigate causes for the cost overrun and delay of the railway project Stuttgart 21. Besides, we try to forecast the actual costs and completion date at an early stage.Design/methodology/approachThe results of exploratory research show the causes for the cost overrun and delay of Stuttgart 21; we compare our findings with other railway projects. To estimate the costs at an early stage, the reference class forecasting (RCF) model is applied; to estimate the time, we apply an OLS regression.FindingsWe find that the following causes are relevant for the cost overrun and delay of Stuttgart 21: scope changes, geological conditions, high risk-taking propensity, extended implementation, price overshoot, conflict of interests and lack of citizens' participation. The current estimated costs are within our 95% confidence interval based on RCF; our time forecast underestimates or substantially overestimates the duration actually required.Research limitations/implicationsA limitation of our approach is the low number of comparable projects which are available.Practical implicationsThe use of hyperbolic function or stepwise exponential discount function can help to give a clearer picture of the costs and benefits. The straightforward use of the RFC for costs and OLS for time should motivate more decision-makers to estimate the actual costs and time which are necessary in the light of the rising demand for democratic participation amongst citizens.Social implicationsMore realistic estimates can help to reduce the significant distortion at the beginning of infrastructure projects.Originality/valueWe are among the first who use the RCF to estimate the costs in Germany. Furthermore, the hyperbolic discounting function is added as a further theoretical explanation for cost underestimation.

"Forecasts show a substantially decreasing and ageing labour force in Germany. This paper provides a decomposition of the projected change in the overall labour force into three parts. The first, called the 'demographic component', shows the effects of fertility, mortality and a changing age structure of the population. The second effect is the migration component. This part is due to the cumulative net inflow of migrants, but includes their reproductive behaviour as well. Changes in the participation rates give the third effect, the participation component. The decomposition was conducted by comparing different labour force scenarios until 2050. The method can easily be extended for decomposition into more than three factors. Not surprisingly, the downward trend in the labour force is attributable only to population effects. Ageing of the baby-boom generation and low birth rates both are the responsible factors behind. Neither a strong increase in labour force participation nor large immigration flows can halt this trend in the labour force. As the age structure is almost given and increasing fertility rates only have positive effects in the very long run, the projected decline in the labour force should be taken as a fact." (author's abstract)