Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Inhalt -- Siglenverzeichnis -- 1. Einleitung -- 2. Das literarische Feld der DDR -- 2.1 Relative Autonomie und partikulares Feld -- 2.2 Grundriss des literarischen Feldes -- 3. Hacks und Müller als häretische Gruppe im literarischen Feld -- 3.1 Die Etablierung im literarischen Feld -- 3.1.1 Peter Hacks -- 3.1.2 Heiner Müller -- 3.1.3 Kennenlernen -- 3.2 Das literarische Feld in den 1950er Jahren -- 3.3 Episch-revolutionäres Theater im Anschluss an Brecht -- 3.3.1 Das Didaktische Theater -- 3.3.1.1 Der theaterkonzeptionelle Diskurs -- 3.3.1.2 Der ästhetische Diskurs -- 3.3.2 Die 'didaktischen' Dramen Hacks' und Müllers -- 3.3.2.1 Peter Hacks: Die Kindermörderin -- 3.3.2.2 Peter Hacks: Der Müller von Sanssouci -- 3.3.2.3 Peter Hacks: Die Geschichte eines alten Wittibers im Jahre 1637 -- 3.3.2.4 Peter Hacks: Ein guter Arbeiter -- 3.3.2.5 Peter Hacks: Die Sorgen und die Macht -- 3.3.2.6 Heiner Müller: Zehn Tage, die die Welt erschütterten -- 3.3.2.7 Heiner Müller: Der Lohndrücker -- 3.3.2.8 Heiner Müller: Die Korrektur -- 3.4 Hacks und Müller: Eine Gruppe im Feld? -- 3.4.1 Frühe Differenzen -- 3.4.2 Hacks und Müller als häretische Gruppe -- 4. Differenzen -- 4.1 Brecht fortschreiben: Der Glücksgott -- 4.1.1 Der Glücksgott von Inge und Heiner Müller -- 4.1.2 Der Glücksgott von Anna Elisabeth Wiede und Peter Hacks -- 4.2 Der Skandal um Die Umsiedlerin von Heiner Müller -- 4.2.1 Das Verbot der Umsiedlerin -- 4.2.2 Der dialektische Jambus -- 4.2.3 Die Verteidigung der Umsiedlerin durch Hacks -- 4.2.4 Hacks' Kritik der Fabel -- 4.2.5 Die babylonische Theaterlandschaft der DDR -- 4.3 Die ,helle' und die ,dunkle' DDR: Moritz Tassow und Die Umsiedlerin -- 4.3.1 Realismus und Poesie: Soziolektaler vs. dialektischer Jambus -- 4.3.2 Enactment vs. Emplotment -- 4.3.3 Das unterschiedlich funktionalisierte Schweigen der Titelfiguren.

"... Tells of the extraordinary World War II transformation of Portugal's tranquil port city into the great escape hatch of Nazi Europe"--Jacket

In this reply to Brunell's critique of their article "Do Democrats & Republicans Pay the Same Price for Seats in the US State Lower House Elections?" (2005), Wink & Weber further elaborate on their earlier proposition that turnout bias is important in American legislative elections, & take issue with Brunell's assumptions in which he argues in favor of "sweetheart gerrymandering" as a solution to the partisan gerrymandering woes that have accompanied recent legislative redistricting. The authors argue that application of real-world conditions to Brunell's hypothetical unwittingly reveals a potential source of government sponsored pro-Democratic turnout bias. The determination of whether or not measurable amounts of partisan turnout bias existed in state lower-house elections as identified in U.S. House races by Campbell is investigated to conclude that legislators should also take into account the level of partisan bias produced during legislative redistricting, & the rejection of the notion of sweetheart gerrymandering is a substitution of contemporary redistricting. Turnout bias should be added to the list of considerations that currently include distributional bias & the maximizing of minority voting rights in the effort to create "fair" & responsive legislative systems in the US. References. J. Harwell

Thomas Brunell (2006a) critiques our article, "Do Democrats and Republicans Pay the Same Price for Seats in U.S. State Lower House Elections" (Wink and Weber 2005). We found that partisan turnout bias exists in state lower-house elections, and mostly the turnout bias favors Democratic Party candidates. Brunell does not dispute our findings on distributional bias or take issue with our methodology; rather, his main argument is that turnout bias is not significant enough to warrant concern from legislative parties or the courts. In our reply, we elaborate on our earlier proposition that turnout bias is important in American legislative elections. We also take issue with some of the assumptions made by Brunell in which he argues in favor of "sweetheart gerrymandering" as a solution to the partisan gerrymandering woes that have so frequently accompanied recent legislative redistrictings. Far from being tangential to our argument about turnout bias, Brunell's affinity for the sweetheart gerrymander reveals his understanding of the broader context in which redistricting concerns should be addressed, and his position on a remedy for partisan gerrymandering is one with which we disagree.

We apply Campbell's "Cheap Seats" approach to measuring partisan bias in U.S. House races to elections in forty-four state lower houses from 1968 to 1999. We find that using partisan voter turnout differences as the basis for calculating partisan bias reveals generally pro-Democratic Party biases & that in many states the size of these biases is growing. States with a large number of contested seats & with a large number of marginal districts had higher levels of turnout bias than their counterparts in the 1970s. Partisan turnout bias may, on some occasions, affect party control of the house. We discuss possible efforts to alleviate these biases. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

We apply Campbell's Cheap Seats approach to measuring partisan bias in U.S. House races to elections in forty-four state lower houses from 1968 to 1999. We find that using partisan voter turnout differences as the basis for calculating partisan bias reveals generally pro-Democratic Party biases and that in many states the size of these biases is growing. States with a large number of contested seats and with a large number of marginal districts had higher levels of turnout bias than their counterparts in the 1970s. Partisan turnout bias may, on some occasions, affect party control of the house. We discuss possible efforts to alleviate these biases.

Discusses the general state of research in policymaking and state politics, featuring a typology of various research modalities.