Suchergebnisse

This study makes use of a political economy/rational choice framework to shed light on the nature of cooperative security arrangements in the international environment. It argues that states choose among security arrangements with varying degrees of structural commitment and that two factors are crucial in explaining the degree of institutionalization elected—the level of threat in the international system and the magnitude of transaction costs. Since there is no common metric, like price, to ascertain the degree of transaction costs that allies are confronted with, the study relies on three proxy measures: uncertainty, heterogeneity, and asset specificity. Focusing on Swiss security provisions at the end of the Napoleonic Wars and drawing on the findings of two security arrangements examined in a larger study—the German Confederation of 1815 and the founding of NATO—the analysis shows that, when exposed to serious external threat and high transaction costs, states give rise to sophisticated, binding security structures. To demonstrate the broad applicability of the transaction costs framework, the concluding section sketches recent integrative moves within the European Union.

Intro -- Cultures of Order -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- 1. Introduction -- ORDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS -- A GERMAN DEBATE -- CONTRIBUTIONS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM -- OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK -- 2. Language and the Problem of Order -- CONSTRUCTING ORDER -- TOWARDS A NEW EUROPEAN ORDER -- CONCLUSION -- 3. The Westpolitik Debate -- ADENAUER AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINT -- SCHUMACHER AND NATIONAL RIGHTS -- THE WESTPOLITIK DEBATE -- CONCLUSION -- 4. The Ostpolitik Debate -- KIESINGER AND STATE RIGHTS -- BRANDT AND INSTITUTIONAL EXPANSION -- THE OSTPOLITIK DEBATE -- CONCLUSION -- 5. The Deutschlandpolitik Debate -- KOHL AND INSTITUTIONAL ACHIEVEMENT -- LAFONTAINE AND EUROPEAN RIGHTS -- THE DEUTSCHLANDPOLITIK DEBATE -- CONCLUSION -- 6. Japan and the Problem of Order -- YOSHIDA AND THE PATH FROM REALISM TO RIGHTS -- ORDER AND THE YOSHIDA DOCTRINE -- A DEBATE FORECLOSED -- CONCLUSION -- 7. Conclusion -- THE NEW WORLD ORDER IN GERMANY -- CONSTRUCTING ORDER, CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.

Increased nationalism, greater protectionism and a gradual move away from a rules-based international order by some members of the international community do not bode well for vulnerable populations around the globe. Human security is threatened by a host of non-traditional security challenges catalysed by the growth of physical technologies and require multifaceted responses from a variety of actors. Many of those actors look to transnational networks built on globalized liberal order's social norms—what we call social technologies—for protection. The dwindling interconnectedness of deglobalization is likely to further empower corrupt governments at the expense of vulnerable citizens. This results from a decreased willingness by states and international institutions to defend human security. Whether one looks at the plight of persecuted citizens during Burma's military junta, human slaves in the fisheries off the coast of Indonesia, or farmers uprooted from their land by palm oil plantations, without social technologies to counterbalance the negative implications of physical technology the international community will lack the political capacity (sanctions, arms embargoes, travel restrictions, etc.), to aid those most in need. Ultimately, the effects of deglobalization on human security will depend largely on the trajectory of social technology developing alongside advances in physical technology.