Suchergebnisse

Linguistic Theory, Linguistic Diversity and Whorfian Economics / Nigel Fabb -- Dynamic Models of Language Evolution : The Linguistic Perspective / Andrew D.M. Smith -- Dynamic Models of Language Evolution : The Economic Perspective / Andrew John -- What Do We Learn from Neurolinguistics? / Mark Leikin -- Linguistic Distances and Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and Disenfranchisement Indices / Victor Ginsburgh and Schlomo Weber -- Ancestry, Language and Culture / Enrico Spolaore and Romain Wacziarg -- Language Learning and Communicative Benefits / Efthymios Athanasiou [and others] -- Language and Emotion / Niall Bond and Victor Ginsburgh -- Common Spoken Languages and International Trade / Peter H. Egger and Farid Toubal -- Economic Exchange and Business Language in the Ancient World : An Exploratory Review / Nigel Holden -- Language Use in Multinational Corporations : The Role of Special Languages and Corporate Idiolects / Susanne Tietze [and others] -- Language and Migration / Alícia Adserà and Mariola Pytliková -- Translation : Economic and Sociological Perspectives / Johan Heilbron and Gisèle Sapiro -- Languages, Fees and the International Scope of Patenting / Dietmar Harhoff [and others] -- Linguistic Cleavages and Economic Development / Klaus Desmet [and others] -- Language Choices : Political and Economic Factors in Three European States / Sue Wright -- Languages, Regional Conflicts and Economic Development in South Asia / Selma K. Sonntag -- Is Language Destiny? : The Origins and Consequences of Ethnolinguistic Diversity in Sub-Saharan Africa / Brandon de la Cuesta and Leonard Wantchekon -- Languages, Regional Conflicts and Economic Development : Russia / Denis V. Kadochnikov -- English as a Global Language / Jacques Melitz -- Challenges of Minority Languages / François Grin -- Language Rights A Welfare-Economics Approach / Bengt-Arne Wickström -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Minority Language Use in Multilingual Societies / José Ramón Uriarte

In the global economy, linguistic diversity influences economic and political development as well as public policies in positive and negative ways. It leads to financial costs, communication barriers, divisions in national unity, and, in some extreme cases, conflicts and war--but it also produces benefits related to group and individual identity. What are the specific advantages and disadvantages of linguistic diversity and how does it influence social and economic progress? This book examines linguistic diversity as a global social phenomenon and considers what degree of linguistic variety m

In the global economy, linguistic diversity influences economic and political development as well as public policies in positive and negative ways. It leads to financial costs, communication barriers, divisions in national unity, and, in some extreme cases, conflicts and war--but it also produces benefits related to group and individual identity. What are the specific advantages and disadvantages of linguistic diversity and how does it influence social and economic progress? This book examines linguistic diversity as a global social phenomenon and considers what degree of linguistic variety mi.

Les enquêtes menées par la Commission européenne en 2001 montrent que la Flandre est bien plus multilingue que la Wallonie, ce qui est sans doute un fait bien connu, mais la différence est considérable. Alors que 59 % et 53 % des Flamands connaissent le français ou l'anglais respectivement, seulement 19 % et 17 % des Wallons connaissent le néerlandais ou l'anglais. Dans une Europe de plus en plus multilingue, 57 % des Wallons déclarent connaître le français uniquement. On dira que cela va mieux du côté des jeunes. A peine! Si 12 % des Flamands de moins de 40 ans se déclarent unilingues, ce pourcentage s'élève à 51 % dans la même classe d'âge en Wallonie. Le syndrome d'H ‑ du nom de ce personnage qui a signé le contrat Francorchamps sans très bien le comprendre parce qu'il ne connaissait pas l'anglais ‑ est plus répandu que ce qu'on pouvait croire, et on est en droit de se demander s'il est compatible avec les déclarations de faire de la Wallonie une technopole. Comment exporte-t-on si on ne parle pas la langue des pays importateurs, ou tout au moins l'anglais qui devient, et ce pas nécessairement pour de bonnes raisons ou des raisons que l'on aime, la langue internationale. Mais il n'y a pas que l'anglais. Nous vivons, que nous le voulions ou non, dans un pays bilingue et nombreux sont ceux qui insistent sur la solidarité entre régions. Si le Sud veut vraiment que le Nord reste solidaire, la moindre chose est de connaître sa langue, même si c'est de façon imparfaite, même si le français est une langue plus internationale que le néerlandais et que la logique économique induit naturellement plus de Flamands à apprendre le français que des francophones à connaître le néerlandais. Il faut reconnaître que ces questions ont été ouvertement posées dans le Plan Marshall. Les mesures que celui-ci préconise vont certes dans la bonne direction, mais sont sans doute très insuffisantes pour combler le retard dans un monde qui bouge très vite.

In this chapter we examine the notion of linguistic and other types of societal diversity that have become an important factor in evaluating economic, political and societal progress. While most of the existing research on the measurement of diversity has been focused either on the number and size of different groups, this approach fails to take into account the degree of their distinctiveness. Thus, it is important to incorporate the notion of distances or dissimilarity between groups which should help resolving the difficult group identification problem. We discuss various ways of measuring similarity between groups, the wide range of fractionalization and polarization indices and their impact (positive or negative) on various economic and political outcomes. To mitigate the negative impact of linguistic fractionalization, societies has often chosen to standardize by reducing the number of official languages. The numerous examples of such standardization policies (in the Russian Empire, India, Sri Lanka, among many others, including the European Union) lead to the feeling of disenfranchisement experienced by some population groups, and often end up failing. The search for a compromise between efficiency and the sentiment of being disenfranchised represents a serious challenge for any multi-lingual country or union; we examine this problem in the context of the European Union for which good data are available. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Two incumbent parties choose their platforms in a unidimensional policy space while facing a credible threat of an entry by the third party. Relative electoral support is the predominant objective of each party, and the third party enters only if it can displace one of the incumbents. In an equilibrium the two incumbents choose to prevent the entry and achieve the balance of power, i.e., splitting the electorate equally. The incumbents' positions might diverge more as compared to a system in which the parties seek to solely maximize the voters' support. Therefore, rank preoccupation under the threat of entry might contribute to more polarized political platforms of the two leading parties.

Two incumbent parties choose their platforms in a unidimensional policy space while facing a credible threat of an entry by the third party. Relative electoral support is the predominant objective of each party, and the third party enters only if it can displace one of the incumbents. In an equilibrium the two incumbents choose to prevent the entry and achieve the balance of power, i.e., splitting the electorate equally. The incumbents' positions might diverge more as compared to a system in which the parties seek to solely maximize the voters' support. Therefore, rank preoccupation under the threat of entry might contribute to more polarized political platforms of the two leading parties.

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialised countries and immigrants that come from "the rest of the world". The countries are distinguished on the basis of three parameters: population size, bias towards immigrants, and production complementarity between native population and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game where each country makes a strategic choice of its immigration quotas. We first show that our game admits a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium and then study the welfare implications of countries' choices. It turns out that a county with a higher degree of production complementarity and a higher level of tolerance towards immigrants would allow a larger immigration quota and achieve a higher welfare level. Our results call for coordinated and harmonised immigration policies that may improve the welfare of both countries.

We introduce the notion of language disenfranchisement which arises if the number of EU working languages is reduced. We use the data on language proficiency in EU and show that, in spite of the widespread knowledge of English, the retention of French and German as working languages in essential to avoid a too large degree of disenfranchisement of citizens. The picture, however, becomes somewhat different if we consider the population under age of 40. We also argue that even though French is the second leading language within the EU, the situation is likely to be reversed after the enlargement.

In this paper we consider a model of oligopolistic competition where firms make a two‐dimensional product line decision. They choose a location in style space, thus inducing horizontal differentiation, and produce different qualities (a product line) of a given good (vertical differentiation), consumed by a population of customers who differ in their income and preference for style. We prove the existence of a non‐cooperative equilibrium and show that, as the degree of competition increases, prices approach marginal cost. The approach is used to show that European car producers seem indeed to use product lines to discriminate across EU countries.