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If the median voter wrote the Constitution, every Tuesday would be Election Day. Consider the case of the United States: Halfway into a presidential term, congressional elections allow the people to adjust the course of federal policy. Two complementary mechanisms describe how this opportunity is embraced by centrists: a direct mechanism, which strengthens the out-party in Congress to "balance" the president's policy impact, and an indirect mechanism, by which midterm voting serves to "voice" dissatisfaction as a signal to the president. A model of repeated elections unites the two mechanisms: whereas midterm balancing reacts to the preceding presidential election, midterm voice anticipates the following one. Using micro and macro data for all House elections from 1956 through 2018, I show that balancing and voice work hand in hand: it is those voters with both policy incentives who contribute most to the notorious "midterm loss," and particularly so under circumstances that make balancing more necessary and voice more promising. Yet although policy-oriented behavior typically restrains dominant parties, it may also cushion the fall of unpopular administrations. Centrists can be creative.

A growing literature documents that public policy in modern democracies fails to represent the preferences of traditionally marginalized subconstituencies. By dissecting party agendas, I show that inequality already permeates the very politicization of issues before democratic decision-making even begins. Election platforms worldwide predominantly reflect the concerns of male, educated and affluent citizens. That parties disregard large voter groups at this early stage seems surprising given that campaign agendas are inherently public. My analysis reveals that looming electoral backlash is anticipated by a strategy of "discreet" inequality. In particular, agendas are designed to appear inconspicuous and agreeable by exempting issues from unequal responsiveness that voters perceive as divisive or threatening. Discreet inequality thus appeases marginalized groups while ignoring their views on the large majority of more ordinary issues. The article demonstrates these patterns for gender, education, and income using comparative survey and manifesto data covering 42 countries.

Very few theories of democratic elections can claim to overarch the field. One of them that has not been given due regard, I suggest, is Albert Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. I aim to exploit the integrative capacity of this general framework in a model of typical "midterm" effects occurring through the electoral cycle. The model unites such diverse phenomena as antigovernment swings, declining turnout, protest voting, conversion, and alienation. An empirical test with comparative survey data from elections to the European Parliament reveals that the role of strategic voting in the form of voice is limited. Instead, processes of de‐ and realignment in the form of exit dominate a picture of European Parliament elections beyond the widespread conception of "second‐order" irrelevance. More generally, the "cyclical" view on voting behavior suggests systematic links between short‐run midterm effects and long‐run electoral change.

Quand le chat n'est pas là, les souris dansent. Pourquoi l'enjeu européen participe bien malgré tout aux élections européennes Les élections européennes n'ont d'européennes que le nom. Leur agenda demeure en effet focalisé sur des préoccupations de politique nationale plutôt que sur l'avenir du processus d'intégration. C'est en tout cas ce qui peut être conclu de trente années de recherche sur les élections de « second-ordre ». Ces dernières années cependant, le paradigme de l'élection de second-ordre a été remis en cause. Pour certains auteurs, le comportement électoral lors des européennes refléterait un mélange de préoccupations d'ordre national et européen. Cet article entend montrer que de telles solutions de compromis ne répondent pas à l'argument central des élections de second ordre. Même si l'enjeu européen peut jouer un rôle vis-à-vis du comportement électoral, le degré avec lequel il le fait dépend de la dynamique de la compétition partisane nationale. Cet article démontre en effet qu'à mesure que les élections législatives nationales approchent, le votes des électeurs lors des européennes est de moins en moins influencé par leurs préférences vis-à-vis de l'intégration européenne. Au final, l'article rappelle que les gouvernements nationaux – qui restent les acteurs décisifs du processus d'intégration à travers leur rôle au sein des Conseils des ministres – ne sont pas élus sur des problématiques européennes, alors que les parlementaires européens, qui jouent un rôle moindre quant au design institutionnel de l'Europe, peuvent parfois l'être. Des éléments explicatifs de cet apparent paradoxe sont développés dans l'article.

Second-order elections theory explains cyclical losses by national government parties in elections to the European Parliament (EP) through strategic protest voting owing to performance deficits in policy-making. This paper confronts the conventional bottom-up view with a top-down approach to second-order elections. Ultimately, the electoral cycle is driven not by instrumental voting behaviour but by party strategies oriented towards governmental power in the member states of the European Union. Based on survey data from the European Election Studies of 1999 and 2004, firstorder campaign mobilization is shown to determine the prospects of government parties in second-order elections. Mobilization itself depends on the quality of spatial representation in terms of distinct programmatic alternatives, which governments are unable to provide during the midterm. Although this process can be traced on the left—right dimension, parties prevent it with regard to integration issues by systematic demobilization. After all, EP elections are still second order, but first-order politics exert their influence through cyclical campaign mobilization and not through strategic protest voting.

International audience ; Second-order elections theory explains cyclical losses by national government parties in elections to the European Parliament (EP) through strategic protest voting owing to performance deficits in policy-making. This paper confronts the conventional bottom-up view with a top-down approach to second-order elections. Ultimately, the electoral cycle is driven not by instrumental voting behaviour but by party strategies oriented towards governmental power in the member states of the European Union. Based on survey data from the European Election Studies of 1999 and 2004, firstorder campaign mobilization is shown to determine the prospects of government parties in second-order elections. Mobilization itself depends on the quality of spatial representation in terms of distinct programmatic alternatives, which governments are unable to provide during the midterm. Although this process can be traced on the left—right dimension, parties prevent it with regard to integration issues by systematic demobilization. After all, EP elections are still second order, but first-order politics exert their influence through cyclical campaign mobilization and not through strategic protest voting.

Second-order elections theory explains cyclical losses by national government parties in elections to the European Parliament (EP) through strategic protest voting owing to performance deficits in policy-making. This paper confronts the conventional bottom-up view with a top-down approach to second-order elections. Ultimately, the electoral cycle is driven not by instrumental voting behaviour but by party strategies oriented towards governmental power in the member states of the European Union. Based on survey data from the European Election Studies of 1999 and 2004, firstorder campaign mobilization is shown to determine the prospects of government parties in second-order elections. Mobilization itself depends on the quality of spatial representation in terms of distinct programmatic alternatives, which governments are unable to provide during the midterm. Although this process can be traced on the left—right dimension, parties prevent it with regard to integration issues by systematic demobilization. After all, EP elections are still second order, but first-order politics exert their influence through cyclical campaign mobilization and not through strategic protest voting.