Suchergebnisse

In 2004 the economy of Cambodia was still regarded as being a big loser, at least in the eyes of foreigners; three years later however it is praised, on the contrary, as a kind of go-getter. Main reasons for this fundamental change of view were the turning of Cambodia into a (nearly) free market economy in general & the contribution of quite a few economic sectors (like textile industry, tourism, agriculture & extraction economy) in particular. Even a skeptical institution like the IMF has become optimistic in the meantime & predicts a GNP-growth of 9% until the end of 2007. What is it about? A lasting upswing or just a sham boom? In favor of Cambodia there is the persistence of strong increases since 2003, is a low inflation, a stable exchange rate & the rather realistic expectation that the kingdom can turn into a petroleum-exporting country until 2009/10. On the other side, Cambodia suffers from infrastructural bottlenecks & from depressing social loads: 35% of the population continue living below the official poverty line. Adapted from the source document.

At first sight, 2006 was one of the better years within the history of the new kingdom of Cambodia, which began in 1993. The three leading political parties became to some extent reconciled. Economic growth remained high and the country witnessed the biggest bumper rice harvest in its history. The end of much misery and famine was, however, the beginning of a lot of self-delusion.

Die beiden Großstaaten China und Indien haben sich in erstaunlich kurzer Zeit zu neuen Antriebskräften der Weltwirtschaft entwickelt. Beide Länder haben sich von ihrem "autozentristischen" Kurs in der Politik abgewandt und wachsen seit ihrem "großen Sprung" in die Marktwirtschaft und in die Globalisierung mit einem rekordverdächtigen Tempo von jährlich sechs bis acht Prozent des nominellen Bruttoinlandsprodukts. Zudem sind sie auch längst aus traditionellen agrarischen Strukturen ausgebrochen. Beide Volkswirtschaften stellen somit ernsthafte Konkurrenten zu den europäischen Ländern und zu den USA dar. Sind sie aber in der Lage, den Westen in überschaubarer Zeit - bis etwa zur Jahrtausendmitte - zu überflügeln und damit den Prozess der Globalisierung zu "entwestlichen"? Der Autor zeigt in seiner Erörterung dieser Frage, dass China und Indien einen zumindest dreifachen Vorsprung im wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerb erreichen müssen, um eine Globalisierung "mit asiatischem Gesicht" herbeizuführen: mehr Synergie, qualitative Überlegenheit und quantitatives Übergewicht. Diesen Zielen steht jedoch eine Reihe von Hindernissen im Wege, die Autor in seinem Kommentar kurz skizziert. (ICI2)

Als Leitfaden des Beitrags dient eine Doppelfrage: Ist Religion ein Schrittmacher auf dem Weg zur Demokratisierung oder wirkt sie am Ende nicht eher als Bremsklotz? Bejahendenfalls: Hilft sie dem Demokratisierungsprozess mehr direkt oder mehr indirekt? Der Autor zeigt zunächst, dass in Asien sämtliche theoretisch denkbaren Kombinationsformen zwischen Staat und Religion vorhanden sind, nämlich (1) die Suprematie der "Kirche" gegenüber dem Staat ("Gelbmützen" in Tibet, "Gurus" im theokratischen Militärstaat der Sikhs des 18. Jahrhunderts) - sowie gerade umgekehrt (2) die Vorherrschaft des Staats gegenüber der Religion (mandarinäres China), darüber hinaus aber auch (3) das Nebeneinander verschiedner Buddhismen (4) die Trennung (Staat und Shinto-Gemeinschaften in Japan der Jahre nach 1945) sowie (5) die "Untrennbarkeit" von Religion und staatlichem Leben, wie sie für islamische Staaten zumindest theoretisch gefordert wird. Der Autor interpretiert diese Vielfalt als eine gleitende Skala auch für die anderen asiatischen Varianten des Verhältnisses von Staat und Religion. (ICA2)

It took the Vietnamese reformers only five years to realize that quick development of their country's
economy could be pushed forward not only by work and capital, but also by utilizing the factor
space. Capitalizing on the experiences of several maritime Southeast Asian countries with "Growth
Triangles" as well as of "Silicon Valley Industrial Park", of Taiwan and of China with their "Special
Economic Zones", Vietnam decided in 1991 to establish its first "Special Economic Zone" (SEZ)
in Tan Thuan/Saigon. During the following fifteen years three so-called "Key Economic Areas"
and 140 "Industrial Zones", "Export Processing Zones" and other units with similar names have
been created.
The SEZ have proven to be cornucopias on the one hand, because they helped to accelerate
the transfer of capital, technology and management to Vietnam and provided almost 1 million jobs.
Furthermore they served as catalysts for the industrialization and urbanization of some areas and
served, moreover, as models of dealing with the complexities of modernization. On the other side,
the SEZ are extremely unequally distributed over the country, and therefore tend to reinforce the
social and regional differences within Vietnam. Moreover, foreign companies to be invested in
the SEZ frequently have to lead a Robinson Crusoe existence and are therefore rather insulated
from the domestic economy. Last but not least however, the Vietnamese legislation, facing the SEZ
proves frequently to be a toothless tiger.

In 2004 the economy of Cambodia was still regarded as being a big loser, at least in the eyes of
foreigners; three years later however it is praised, on the contrary, as a kind of go-getter.
Main reasons for this fundamental change of view were the turning of Cambodia into a (nearly)
free market economy in general and the contribution of quite a few economic sectors (like textile
industry, tourism, agriculture and extraction economy) in particular. Even a sceptical institution
like the IMF has become optimistic in the meantime and predicts a GNP-growth of 9% until the
end of 2007.
What is it about? A lasting upswing or just a sham boom? In favour of Cambodia there is the
persistence of strong increases since 2003, is a low inflation, a stable exchange rate and the rather
realistic expectation that the kingdom can turn into a petroleum-exporting country until 2009/10.
On the other side, Cambodia suffers from infrastructural bottlenecks and from depressing social
loads: 35% of the population continue living below the official poverty line.