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Intro -- Preface -- Introduction of Chief Editor -- Contents -- About the Translator -- Connotation and Function of Social Governance -- 1 The Origin of the Concept of Social Governance -- 1.1 The Intellectual Evolution of the Term-"Social Governance" -- 1.2 The Connotation and Denotation of Social Governance -- 2 Determinants of Social Governance -- 2.1 Productivity and Production Relations -- 2.2 Economic Base and Superstructure -- 3 The Function and Goal of Social Governance -- 3.1 The Basic Function of Social Governance -- 3.2 The Main Goals of Social Governance -- 4 Status and Role of Social Governance -- 4.1 The Status and Role of Social Governance in State Governance -- 4.2 The Status and Role of Social Governance in Social Construction -- 4.3 The Promotion Role of Social Governance on Economic, Political, Cultural and Ecological Civilization Construction -- Basic Theory of Social Governance in China -- 1 The Social Governance Thought of Marxism -- 1.1 The Background of the Social Governance Thought of Marxism -- 1.2 The Main Contents of Social Governance Thought of Marxism -- 1.3 Significance of Social Governance Thought of Marxism -- 2 The Development of Social Governance Thought of Marxism in China -- 2.1 Mao Zedong's Thought of Social Governance -- 2.2 Socialist Social Governance Thought with Chinese Characteristics -- 2.3 Important Discussion on Social Governance by General Secretary Xi Jinping -- References -- Chinese Traditional Thoughts on Social Governance -- 1 The Social Governance Thought in Ancient China -- 1.1 Social Relations and Social Order Thought -- 1.2 People's Livelihood Security and Power Operation -- 2 The Social Governance Thoughts in Modern China -- 2.1 The Evolutionary View on Social Order and the Equality View on Social Relations -- 2.2 The Principle of People's Livelihood and Democratic Thoughts -- References.

AbstractBy mitigating supply‐demand mismatch through advanced forecast technology, demand learning has attracted widespread attention and is increasingly adopted in conjunction with inventory sharing. However, this combination is not necessarily efficient given the unclear relationship between the two strategies. Therefore, crucially, this article investigates the strategic relationship between inventory sharing and demand learning, that is, when and whether they are substitutes or complements. We develop a theoretical game model consisting of two firms facing uncertain demand, and both of them need to determine their production quantity before demand is realized. Contrary to the intuition that demand learning is a substitute for inventory sharing, we find that these two strategies can be complements when the production cost is relatively low or high. Moreover, when forecast accuracy is relatively low, the substitutability will be weakened while the complementarity will be enhanced as forecast accuracy increases. Additionally, the substitutability first weakly decreases and then weakly increases, while the complementarity first weakly increases and then weakly decreases with the transfer price.