Do All Good Things Go Together? Development Assistance and Insurgent Violence in Civil War
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 78, Heft 4, S. 989-1002
ISSN: 1468-2508
45 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 78, Heft 4, S. 989-1002
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 78, Heft 4, S. 989-1002
ISSN: 0022-3816
World Affairs Online
In: IRB: ethics & human research, Band 5, Heft 3, S. 7
ISSN: 2326-2222
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 84, Heft 4, S. 2300-2304
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Terrorism and political violence, Band 29, Heft 6, S. 1126-1148
ISSN: 1556-1836
SSRN
Working paper
In: Bulletin of Latin American research: the journal of the Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS), Band 42, Heft 5, S. 734-748
ISSN: 1470-9856
As the Covid‐19 pandemic began, initial reports suggested that armed groups would seize the opportunity to expand their control over territory and civilians. However, drawing on an original survey of local security officials responsible for monitoring armed group behaviour in Colombia, we find little evidence of significant shifts in the presence or behaviour of political or criminal groups. Contrary to prevailing expectations, we also find that armed group governance is common in areas contested by multiple groups. Our findings shed new light on armed group adaptation to shocks, and challenge the assumption that territorial control is a prerequisite for governance.
In: Terrorism and political violence, Band 27, Heft 3, S. 557-580
ISSN: 1556-1836
In: Conflict management and peace science: CMPS ; journal of the Peace Science Society ; papers contributing to the scientific study of conflict and conflict analysis, Band 31, Heft 5, S. 521-540
ISSN: 0738-8942
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 59-78
When the difference between winning and losing elections is large, elites have incentives to use ethnicity to control access to spoils, mobilizing some citizens and excluding others. This paper presents a new electoral mechanism, the turn-taking institution, that could move states away from ethnically mediated patron-client politics. With this mechanism, the whole executive term goes to a sufficiently inclusive supermajority coalition; if no coalition qualifies, major coalitions take short, alternating turns several times before the next election. A decision-theoretic model shows how the turn-taking institution would make it easier for mass-level actors to coordinate on socially productive policy and policy-making processes. We argue this institution would raise the price elites would pay to deploy and enforce exclusive ethnic markers. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 31, Heft 5, S. 521-540
ISSN: 1549-9219
While many recommend electoral democracy as a way to avoid or resolve civil conflict, the empirical record of electoral democracy as an alternative to civil conflict is decidedly mixed. We apply recent work from new organizational economics on the nature of elite pacts to add to both sides of the debate. On the one hand, we argue that we should be more pessimistic about the ability of existing electoral institutions to help rather than hurt the prospects for a stable peace. We argue that the new organizational economics reveals a design dilemma—a forced trade-off between the credible commitment to an elite pact in the short term and the adaptability of an elite pact in the long term—that plagues the most commonly considered alternatives. On the other hand, we tentatively argue for optimism if institutional designers work with criteria that explicitly take the dilemma into account. We propose novel design criteria that would allow a polity to address the design dilemma.
In: Durant, T. Clark, and Michael Weintraub. 2014. "How to Make Democracy Self-Enforcing After Civil War: Enabling Credible Yet Adaptable Elite Pacts." Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(5): 521–540.
SSRN
In: Durant, T. Clark and Michael Weintraub. 2014. "An Institutional Remedy for Ethnic Patronage Politics." Journal of Theoretical Politics 26(1): 59–78.
SSRN
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 59-78
ISSN: 0951-6298
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 59-78
ISSN: 1460-3667
When the difference between winning and losing elections is large, elites have incentives to use ethnicity to control access to spoils, mobilizing some citizens and excluding others. This paper presents a new electoral mechanism, the turn-taking institution, that could move states away from ethnically mediated patron–client politics. With this mechanism, the whole executive term goes to a sufficiently inclusive supermajority coalition; if no coalition qualifies, major coalitions take short, alternating turns several times before the next election. A decision-theoretic model shows how the turn-taking institution would make it easier for mass-level actors to coordinate on socially productive policy and policy-making processes. We argue this institution would raise the price elites would pay to deploy and enforce exclusive ethnic markers.