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An agent often does not have precise probabilities or utilities to guide resolution of a decision problem. I advance a principle of rationality for making decisions in such cases. To begin, I represent the doxastic and conative state of an agent with a set of pairs of a probability assignment and a utility assignment. Then I support a decision principle that allows any act that maximizes expected utility according to some pair of assignments in the set. Assuming that computation of an option's expected utility uses comprehensive possible outcomes that include the option's risk, no consideration supports a stricter requirement.

Groups of people perform acts that are subject to standards of rationality. The book's theory of collective rationality explains how to evaluate collective acts. The people engaged in a game of strategy collectively produce an outcome, and the theory reveals what makes some outcomes solutions

Introduction -- A scientific perspective on labeling genetically modified food / Michael W. Pariza -- Genetically-modified organisms for agricultural food production : the extent of the art and the state of the science / R. Michael Roberts -- Biotechnology and the food label : a legal perspective / Frederick Degnan -- Traceability and labeling of GM food and feed in the European Union / Margaret Rosso Grossman -- Genetically engineered animals and the ethics of food labeling / Robert Streiffer and Alan Rubel -- Mandatory GE labels and consumer autonomy / Peter Markie -- Market evidence of consumer response to mandated genetically modified food labels / Nicholas Kalaitzandonakes, Leonie A. Marks, and Steven S. Vickner -- Frankenfood free : consumer sovereignty, federal regulation and industry control in marketing and choosing food in the U.S. / Thomas O. McGarity -- Regulatory barriers to consumer information / Philip G. Peters and Thomas A. Lambert -- Labeling GM foods : rights, interests, enforcement, and institutional options / Clark Wolf -- Different conceptions of food labels and acceptable risks : some contingent/institutional considerations in favor of labeling / Carl Cranor -- Using food labels to regulate risks / Paul Weirich

In Decision Space: Multidimensional Utility Analysis, first published in 2001, Paul Weirich increases the power and versatility of utility analysis and in the process advances decision theory. Combining traditional and novel methods of option evaluation into one systematic method of analysis, multidimensional utility analysis is a valuable tool. It provides formulations of important decision principles, such as the principle to maximize expected utility; enriches decision theory in solving recalcitrant decision problems; and provides in particular for the cases in which an expert must make a decision for a group of people. The multiple dimensions of this analysis create a decision space broad enough to accommodate all factors affecting an option's utility. The book will be of interest to advanced students and professionals working in the subject of decision theory, as well as to economists and other social scientists

Does rational bargaining yield a social contract that is efficient and so inclusive? A core allocation, that is, an allocation that gives each coalition at least as much as it can get on its own, is efficient. However, some coalitional games lack a core allocation, so rationality does not require one in those games. Does rationality therefore permit exclusion from the social contract? I replace realization of a core allocation with another type of equilibrium achievable in every coalitional game. Fully rational agents coordinate the pursuit of incentives so that equilibria of this type are efficient. They adopt a social contract that is efficient and inclusive. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Does rational bargaining yield a social contract that is efficient and so inclusive? A core allocation, that is, an allocation that gives each coalition at least as much as it can get on its own, is efficient. However, some coalitional games lack a core allocation, so rationality does not require one in those games. Does rationality therefore permit exclusion from the social contract? I replace realization of a core allocation with another type of equilibrium achievable in every coalitional game. Fully rational agents coordinate the pursuit of incentives so that equilibria of this type are efficient. They adopt a social contract that is efficient and inclusive.