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"Examines international cooperation in European security from a transaction cost economics perspective. This book addresses the puzzle of how to approach differing institutional preferences. It argues that the reduction and limitation of transaction costs was the primary determinant of security preferences"--

"Examines international cooperation in European security from a transaction cost economics perspective. This book addresses the puzzle of how to approach differing institutional preferences. It argues that the reduction and limitation of transaction costs was the primary determinant of security preferences"--

First published online: 26 February 2020 ; Why did ordoliberal Germany unconditionally privatize its aerospace and defense industries in the 1980s, whereas the neoliberal government in the United Kingdom established significant state control? To shed light on this puzzle, this article builds on the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) and theorizes how different production regimes – complemented by distinct legal traditions – shape governments' decisions about how to privatize state-owned industries. I argue that Germany's coordinated market economy included informal networks between state and business actors that were based on trust. These relationships enabled the government to transfer ownership of the defense industries to the private sector without retaining any formal control. The United Kingdom's liberal market economy, by contrast, lacked such informal trust-based networks. That explains why the British government maintained formal control instruments and thus intervened more forcefully in its aerospace and defense sector. The comparative process-tracing analysis draws on original sources, such as formerly secret archival files and interviews with decision-makers. The article's contribution lies not only in extending the firm-centered logic of VoC to coordination between corporate actors and the state, but also in institutionalist theory-building: Trust-based coordination within informal networks systematically reduces vulnerabilities and can thus substitute for the arguably constant need of formal control.

Cyberspace has evolved as a domain of overlapping and essentially contested authorities. This paper seeks to explore the underlying power dynamics between supranational and national actors within the European Union. I argue that, historically, the persistent securitization of cyberspace has constituted structural power positions that privilege member states and grant them the responsibility of formulating policy responses to new challenges. An empirical analysis of more than 500 speech acts collected from public discourse in Germany and the United Kingdom from 1988 to 2017 shows, however, that securitization has not freed governments from normal politics. Calls for exceptional policies have been vague. The conceptual link between securitization and structural power thus allows for a differentiated view as to who should be in charge of cyberspace. These findings contribute to a better understanding of today's cyberpolitics and the historical constitution of structural power within Europe.

AbstractThis article puts forward a historical institutionalist explanation of how rising powers translate increased wealth into military strength. It develops microfoundations for path dependence and applies them empirically as an approach to defense procurement. The Indian government layered market reforms onto a state-run defense sector. It aimed to exploit competition in its massive acquisition of combat fighter aircraft after 2007. Yet, despite formal rule changes and overwhelming material benefits, government reformers ultimately failed and returned to an intergovernmental purchase in 2015. I develop two mechanisms to explain this instance of failed institutional change in India. First, the reform's structural misfit created uncertainty, as some of the prerequisites for a market such as sound legal protection and private actors were absent. Second, the government reformers were reluctantly supported at the outset by a coalition of so-called opportunists, which neither fully embraced nor strongly opposed institutional reforms. When problems resulting from the misfit multiplied and promised benefits vanished, however, this coalition dissolved and layering failed. A process-tracing analysis and the triangulation of a diverse set of data substantiate this explanation. The article contributes to debates on institutional change as well as to those on rising powers and the constraints they face in their attempts to transform growing wealth into military strength. Most significantly, it specifies a causal pathway along which state institutions shape the defense policies of rising powers. Layered reforms may fail not only when faced by defenders of the status quo; opportunists may suffice to defeat them.

AbstractStates generate the hardware of military power by either developing new technologies as first mover or adopting demonstrated technology as second mover. Given that military drones have arguably demonstrated effectiveness and thus proliferate, scholars have produced profound insights into today's second mover dynamics. Yet, the preceding political process of developing this military technology remains poorly understood. The article's objective is to explain how states become first movers of military hardware. To this end, it applies four causal mechanisms of military innovation studies to the historical trajectory of the development of drones. I argue that security threats initially formed state interests in drones. Yet, capacity was necessary for success. Politically induced transfers and cross-sector diffusion supplied technological progress. At the same time, distributional implications and legacy systems constrained the development process, but could ultimately be overcome. This mechanismic pathway results from the process-tracing analysis of two separate, but related trajectories in Israel and the United States since the 1970s. Given within-case variation, a sequencing and domain-of-application perspective allows the formulation of scope conditions of the mechanisms behind military innovation. This contributes to a historically contingent, yet generalisable, understanding of the political process of how states generate military power.