Search results

This volume identifies the main drivers of the current Sino-Russian relationship, assesses whether-and under what conditions-China and Russia would cooperate more extensively and effectively against American interests, and recommends U.S. policies that could prevent such an outcome.

Russia and the United States are the most important countries for many vital security issues. They possess the world's largest nuclear weapons arsenals, are involved in the principal regional conflicts, and have lead roles in opposing international terrorism and weapons proliferation. Despite persistent differences on many questions, mutual interests consistently drive Russians and Americans to work together to overcome these impediments. This Adelphi paper argues that opportunities for improving further security cooperation between Russia and the United States exist but are limited. Near-term results in the areas of formal arms control or ballistic missile defences are unlikely. The two governments should focus on improving and expanding their joint threat reduction and nonproliferation programmes, enhancing their military-to-military dialogue regarding Central Asia and defence industrial cooperation, and deepening their antiterrorist cooperation, both bilaterally and through NATO. Using more market incentives, expanding reciprocity and equal treatment, and limiting the adverse repercussions from disputes over Iran would facilitate progress. Russia and the United States will not soon become close allies, but they should be able to achieve better security ties given that, on most issues, their shared interests outweigh those that divide them.

Global Security Watchâ€"China presents a comprehensive overview of the main foreign and defense policies of the People's Republic of China, emphasizing the political-military developments in the modern era since the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. It prov

Introduction -- United Nations -- The Group of Eight -- Africa Union -- Case study: Kosovo -- Case study: Somali pirates -- Concluding observations

A mixture of fear and opportunity have motivated Russian government policies towards the new Taliban government in Kabul. Fears that the group will resume supporting international terrorist groups have declined, though worries persist that the group may not be able to constrain some extremists, who could be inspired by the Taliban victory in Afghanistan to promote Muslim militancy in Central Asia or the North Caucasus. Moscow also perceives opportunities to advance its economic and security interests in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Notwithstanding predictions since 1991 that Russia and China would form an anti-U.S. bloc, the normalization of their relations has proceeded for reasons mostly unrelated to any joint effort to counterbalance the United States. Russian arms sales do not constitute a military alliance. The two countries' policies on important issues have been uncoordinated and often conflicting. Finally, despite security agreements signifying the end of their Cold War hostility, nondefense economic ties and societal contacts between Russia and China have remained minimal.