Chapter 1: An Introduction: Gendered Rentierism in the Arab World -- Chapter 2: State Feminism and Gender Rentierism -- Chapter 3: Foreign Aid and Virtue Signaling -- Chapter 4: The Gender Paradox of Remittances -- Chapter 5: Independents, Women's Work, and Oil Rents -- Chapter 6. Gender Rentierism—a Curse or an Opportunity for Women?
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This book examines women, money, and political participation in the Middle East and North Africa focusing on womens capacity to engage local political systems. In particular, it considers whether and how this engagement is facilitated through specific types of financial flows from abroad. Arab countries are well-known rentier states, and so a prime destination for foreign aid, worker remittances, and oil-related investment. Alongside other factors these external monies have elicited dramatic shifts in gender-related social norms and expectations both from the state and the domestic population, affording certain women the opportunity to enter the political arena, while leaving others behind. The research presented here expands the discussion of women in rentier political economy and highlights their roles as participants and agents within regional templates for economic development.
AbstractThis article aims to survey the state of the literature on gender quotas in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), explicitly focusing on where it stands in terms of their institutional, political, and societal impact after two decades of implementation. In addition, it considers how MENA scholarship on the topic compares with the global literature and includes insights into how region‐specific work contributes to our understanding of gender quotas as an electoral and legislative institution overall.
This article tests two competing theories of the relationship between piety and redistributive preferences in the Muslim world. The first, drawn from the new political economy of religion, holds that more pious individuals of any faith should oppose redistributive economic policies. The second, drawn from Islamic scripture, holds that pious Muslims should favor more redistributive economic policies. Employing survey data from twenty-five countries, the authors find that there is no clear relationship between piety and redistributive preferences among Muslims. The authors find that more pious Muslims are less likely to favor government efforts to eliminate income inequality, but they find only inconsistent evidence that more pious Muslims support governments taking responsibility for the well-being of the poor. The findings offer little evidence to suggest that either scriptural or organizational factors unique to Islam create distinct economic policy preferences. Adapted from the source document.
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of Western Political Science Association, Pacific Northwest Political Science Association, Southern California Political Science Association, Northern California Political Science Association, Band 64, Heft 3, S. 491-506
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 64, Heft 3, S. 491-505
This article tests two competing theories of the relationship between piety and redistributive preferences in the Muslim world. The first, drawn from the new political economy of religion, holds that more pious individuals of any faith should oppose redistributive economic policies. The second, drawn from Islamic scripture, holds that pious Muslims should favor more redistributive economic policies. Employing survey data from twenty-five countries, the authors find that there is no clear relationship between piety and redistributive preferences among Muslims. The authors find that more pious Muslims are less likely to favor government efforts to eliminate income inequality, but they find only inconsistent evidence that more pious Muslims support governments taking responsibility for the well-being of the poor. The findings offer little evidence to suggest that either scriptural or organizational factors unique to Islam create distinct economic policy preferences.