Suchergebnisse

Does shaming affect human rights treaty ratification? Whereas most scholars study shaming's effects on eventual human rights respect, models of international shame predict states institutionalize rights before behavioral changes become reality. I take a step back and study shaming's effects on treaty ratification. Viewing shaming as a process that seeks to change behavior by isolating and embarrassing the target leads to a somewhat counter-intuitive prediction - although increasing pressure on states raises a state's willingness to ratify treaties, too much shame can cause a state to eschew treaty ratification. The argument follows from the social psychology literature on social exclusion that shows isolated individuals retreat from efforts to act normatively rather than increasing their efforts at inclusion. Using data on ratifications of the core UN human rights treaties and an original latent variable measuring shame, I find support for the argument that shaming increases treaty ratification to a point, but then begins to decrease ratification rates.

Why do states give institutions the ability to legally punish them? While past research focuses on international pressure to delegate authority to third parties, I argue that domestic politics plays a key role. By viewing domestic politics through a principal–agent framework, I argue that the more accountable individual legislators remain to the public, the more likely it is that the legislature will delegate legal punishment authority. I focus on National Human Rights Institutions—domestic institutions tasked with protection and promotion of human rights—to build the argument. Electoral institutions that decrease monitoring of legislator agents, or institutional makeup that allows the executive to displace the public as the principal lead to National Human Rights Institutions without punishment power. Using Bayesian logistic analyses I test four hypotheses, all of which are in agreement with the argument.

Why do states give institutions the ability to legally punish them? While past research focuses on international pressure to delegate authority to third parties, I argue that domestic politics plays a key role. By viewing domestic politics through a principal–agent framework, I argue that the more accountable individual legislators remain to the public, the more likely it is that the legislature will delegate legal punishment authority. I focus on National Human Rights Institutions—domestic institutions tasked with protection and promotion of human rights—to build the argument. Electoral institutions that decrease monitoring of legislator agents, or institutional makeup that allows the executive to displace the public as the principal lead to National Human Rights Institutions without punishment power. Using Bayesian logistic analyses I test four hypotheses, all of which are in agreement with the argument.

Does police militarization influence government use of repression? While comparative work examines police militarization, violence, human rights abuses, and torture, it does not integrate militarized police within existing theories of repression. Connecting police militarization and repression, this article argues that police militarization increases the police's perception of threat as well as their coercive capacity, thereby increasing their willingness to repress. As such, we hypothesize police militarization increases repression. To evaluate the theory, we conduct an international analysis using existing datasets covering 102 countries from 1994 to 2010. Employing several statistical models, the data supports the conclusion that police militarization increases the likelihood of government repression, specifically through extrajudicial killing and torture. Aside from highlighting a consequence of police militarization policy, the findings point to police militarization as an important omitted variable in cross-national models of repression and human rights.

Does police militarization influence government use of repression? While comparative work examines police militarization, violence, human rights abuses, and torture, it does not integrate militarized police within existing theories of repression. Connecting police militarization and repression, this article argues that police militarization increases the police's perception of threat as well as their coercive capacity, thereby increasing their willingness to repress. As such, we hypothesize police militarization increases repression. To evaluate the theory, we conduct an international analysis using existing datasets covering 102 countries from 1994 to 2010. Employing several statistical models, the data supports the conclusion that police militarization increases the likelihood of government repression, specifically through extrajudicial killing and torture. Aside from highlighting a consequence of police militarization policy, the findings point to police militarization as an important omitted variable in cross-national models of repression and human rights.

Abstract
Do regional human rights courts influence respect for rights? Beyond providing remedy for individual human rights abuse, case outcomes help frame potential social mobilization by setting standards and raising the rights consciousness of civil society actors. The expectation of mobilization can increase the government's costs of flouting the court's rulings. We argue that an enabling domestic environment characterized by two features increases government expectation of mobilization following regional court litigation. First, a robust civil society creates strong horizontal ties between potential mobilizing groups. Second, a national human rights institution (NHRI) creates vertical ties that both transfer information down from the court to civil society; and transfer demands up from civil society to political elites in position to make stronger human rights policy. Using data for all Council of Europe countries from 1980 to 2012, we find European Court of Human Rights litigation associated with higher respect for rights in an enabling domestic environment characterized by strong civil society and the presence of a NHRI.

Tactical repertoires of mobilization and repression play an essential role in understanding dynamics of political violence, yet existing quantitative approaches focus primarily on intensities or counts of repressive actions. We focus instead on the diversity of repression, and demonstrate a novel method of measuring repertoires of state repression using event data. We show that more repressive states are likely to employ more diverse repertoires of repression, rather than specializing narrowly in particularly coercive tactics. We demonstrate that, globally, repertoires of state repression are growing less diverse over time. Finally, in the Online appendix, we model repertoires of repression across countries and over time, finding evidence of broader repertoires during protest and civil war, but narrower under democratic regimes and international human rights treaties.

How can information campaigns of nongovernmental human rights organizations (HROs) to "name and shame" human rights violators improve human rights conditions? Is the effect direct—does HRO targeting induce violating states to change their behavior? Or is the effect indirect—does pressure by third parties mediate the relationship between HRO actions and changes in human rights practices? The boomerang and spiral models suggest HRO activity provokes third parties, such as other states and international organizations, to pressure violating states. This pressure, in turn, drives violating states to improve human rights conditions. On the other hand, recent empirical work finds third-party pressure can further degrade human rights conditions. In this paper we provide a comprehensive analysis of how these individual factors—HRO activities and pressure from third parties—work together in the larger chain of causal events influencing human rights conditions. Using a causal mediation model, we examine whether HRO campaigning improves human rights directly or if the effect is mediated by costs imposed by powerful actors through sanctions and military interventions. We find that, although HRO activities have an overall positive effect on human rights conditions, the negative effects of third-party pressure somewhat diminish the positive effects.

Abstract
How can information campaigns of nongovernmental human rights organizations (HROs) to "name and shame" human rights violators improve human rights conditions? Is the effect direct—does HRO targeting induce violating states to change their behavior? Or is the effect indirect—does pressure by third parties mediate the relationship between HRO actions and changes in human rights practices? The boomerang and spiral models suggest HRO activity provokes third parties, such as other states and international organizations, to pressure violating states. This pressure, in turn, drives violating states to improve human rights conditions. On the other hand, recent empirical work finds third-party pressure can further degrade human rights conditions. In this paper we provide a comprehensive analysis of how these individual factors—HRO activities and pressure from third parties—work together in the larger chain of causal events influencing human rights conditions. Using a causal mediation model, we examine whether HRO campaigning improves human rights directly or if the effect is mediated by costs imposed by powerful actors through sanctions and military interventions. We find that, although HRO activities have an overall positive effect on human rights conditions, the negative effects of third-party pressure somewhat diminish the positive effects.

A wealth of literature argues that domestic institutions can sometimes restrain government repression. In this article, we highlight an institution tasked specifically with protecting and promoting human rights: the National Human Rights Institution (NHRI). Although common international standards exist, NHRIs exhibit substantial variation in their organization, the rights that they protect, the activities they permit, and the manner in which they appoint their members. Scholarship to date has conceptualized and measured NHRIs dichotomously; an NHRI either exists or it does not. We present data that highlights NHRI heterogeneity collected via content analysis of NHRI annual reports, NHRI websites, national constitutions, government legislation, and other sources. Using these data, we show NHRIs that can publish their findings and NHRIs that can punish offenders are each associated with less state torture. These data will allow future researchers to better explore important questions regarding NHRI origins, design, processes, and effectiveness.

AbstractWe evaluate the determinants of officer support for their agency participating in the 1033 Program: a program that facilitates the flow of military hardware to local law enforcement agencies. In doing so, we provide insight into why officers demand such equipment, which, in turn, may partially explain patterns of program participation and equipment usage. We utilize a series of random forest models to examine survey data collected from officers in a large police department, finding that being White and exhibiting animus toward minority communities are highly predictive of officer support across models. Our findings validate long‐held public concerns regarding the distributional patterns and consequences of 1033 transfers: concerns that have led to a number of proposed policy changes at the state and federal levels meant to restrict program usage (e.g., EO‐13688, HR‐1694, MO HB‐330). Policy makers should consider how out‐group animus may drive distributional patterns and usage when considering policy reform.

This special issue is dedicated to Will H. Moore's enduring influence on peace science research and the community of peace science scholars. The five pieces in this special issue exemplify Will's dedication to the development of rigorous concepts and theories that generate testable hypotheses about political violence and are evaluated using novel, fine-grained data. Will's pioneering contributions to the study of peace science were both direct—through his scholarship—and indirect—through the mentorship of his students. All of the articles in this special issue were written by former students or scholars directly influenced by Will's research and mentorship.