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The recent growth in the size and number of private business enterprises that operate in many countries has generated a great deal of speculation as to whether a form of international organization has been created which is able to frustrate the policies of the traditional nation-state. The enterprise with subsidiaries scattered around the globe clearly has the potential to evade the influence of many governmental policies. The firm can circumvent a tight monetary policy in one country by having an affiliate borrow in another country and transfer the funds across national borders. If direct transfers of capital from abroad are restricted, transfer prices, royalty payments, or open accounts between affiliates can be adjusted to bring in the needed financial resources. If taxes are high in one jurisdiction, profits that would be subject to tax can be shifted to another tax jurisdiction through manipulation of affiliate transactions. National labor unions and comparatively harsh labor legislation can be frustrated by moving production to facilities in another country when strikes or higher costs threaten a particular market. A governmental program aimed at increasing technical and managerial training to provide a larger domestic supply of skilled personnel may only generate technicians or managers for the multinational enterprise to shift out of the country, back to its head office or to other countries. Technology developed in one country—often through governmental support and often related to defense needs of governments—can be leaked quickly to other countries through the communication network of the multinational enterprise.

Regierungen, die sich entscheiden, statt allgemeiner Richtlinien für die Bedingungen ausländischer Direktinvestitionen diese Bedingungen im Einzelfall auszuhandeln, benötigen die dafür geeigneten organisatorischen Strukturen und administrativen Kompetenzen. Interviews mit Regierungsbeamten aus vier asiatischen Ländern (Indien, Singapur, Indonesien, Philippinen) und Unternehmensvertretern aus vier Branchen zeigen, daß die Verhandlungsstrategien von Land zu Land und von Branche zu Branche sich zum Teil erheblich unterscheiden. Zusammen mit der grundsätzlichen Haltung der Regierung zu ausländischen Direktinvestitionen sind sie von großer Bedeutung für die Attraktivität des betreffenden Landes als Investitionsstandort.(SWP-Spb)

Governments must choose between general policies and individual negotiations to reach agreements with foreign investors. General policy leaves nothing to be negotiated. But once negotiation is selected, governments face difficult choices over how to conduct ne otiations. No single choice of organizational structure or administrative process is optimal for all countries or for all industries. Each organizational choice carries a range of economic and political costs and benefits that are valued differently by the domestic and foreign interests affected by the negotiation's outcome. Interviews with government officials in four Asian countries and corporate executives in four industries, all involved in international business negotiations between 1978 and 1982, demonstrate that different governments should and do choose different approaches to negotiating with foreign firms. Even single countries use different approaches at different times and with different industries. Moreover, the managerial choices of structure and process are not random. Rather, they are influenced by a government's general strategy toward foreign investment, the "political salience" of a given investment, and the degree of competition among countries for a specific investment. Ultimately, a government's management of international business negotiations shapes its effectiveness in negotiating with foreign firms and in competing for foreign investment.

Despite the many dramatic developments that have occurred over the past half dozen years in relation to the production of natural resources in some areas of the third world, mineral production in most developing countries is still carried out through contractual arrangements between foreign firms and host country governments. The nationalization of the copper industry in Chile and the bauxite industry in Guyana, the spectacular successes of OPEC, and the completed or projected nationalizations of petroleum operations in a number of countries have taken center stage since 1969. Nevertheless, these developments are not typical of the vast majority of mineral arrangements in developing countries.