Suchergebnisse

In understanding Malaysia's surprise 14th General Election, this article argues for the need to rethink how we understand elections. We need to bring together macro socio-political forces with more micro-level evolving phenomena in the campaign, within political institutions, and in voting behaviour. Rather than buck international trends, Malaysia's socio-political conditions before the election - political polarisation, a rise of anger, increasing economic vulnerabilities, as well as increased nationalist and populist sentiments - echoed global trends and served as fertile ground for political change. It was however three sufficient conditions that brought about the political breakthrough: the impact of emotional campaigning through social media, the deinstitutionalisation of the dominant Malay party, United Malays National Organisation, and the failure to win over young voters - all factors that tie closely with the macro forces shaping the country. Given the factors that shaped the electoral outcome and Malaysia's "saviour politics," it is suggested that the government turnover was more about breaking with the past than embracing democracy. As such, there will be constraints placed on expanding democracy going forward. (JCSA/GIGA)

The party Lee founded … is grappling with the question of how to hold onto power in the face of a more diverse and demanding electorate and a less advantageous economic environment.

Despite losing the popular vote, Malaysia's long-ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) triumphed again in the country's 2013 elections, disappointing an emboldened opposition that had high hopes after a strong performance in 2008. Why and how did Najib and the BN win? What do the answers to those questions mean for his government and for democracy in Malaysia? In many ways, the 2013 polls typify those of competitive authoritarian systems, in which incumbents use finely honed tactics and institutional leverage to stay in office. But the 2013 general election also revealed social forces pushing for greater democracy. The nature of BN's victory, the voting patterns, and the broader political forces within society point to continuing pressures for further democratization and high levels of political contestation in the future.

[T]he incumbent forces have reformulated old strategies to deflect contenders for power while narrowing the political space for substantive reform.

The political reforms that have occurred from August 2011 in Myanmar have captured international attention due in part to the overwhelming desire for the pariah of ASEAN to move toward better governance and greater political liberalization. The unexpected changes began in August 2011 when the current president Thein Sein rallied reformers in his Cabinet and sat down with the country's de facto opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi to move the country toward national reconciliation. Over the last seven months, Myanmar's military leadership has begun a process of liberalization that is unprecedented.

From horrific accounts of men decapitated to "ordinary" accounts of stolen motorcycles, the routine beating and killing of alleged criminals by mobs (massa) has become common in Indonesia. This article examines the patterns ofkeroyokan—mobbing—from 1995 through 2004 in four provinces and highlights the temporal, spatial, and substantive variations of this phenomenon. Drawing from a database of provincial and local news clippings in Bali, Bengkulu, West Java, and South Kalimantan and in-depth case studies and interviews, this article shows that mobbing varies considerably. Its causes are nationalandlocal. The temporal data show that nationally the most important factor to influence levels of mobbing was the introduction of decentralization. The power vacuum that resulted from the policy decision to transfer authority from the center to localities increased local violence. Yet this macrolevel explanation is inadequate to show the spatial variation and different forms of mobbing violence. To understand the causes of these dimensions of variation, one has to move away from macronational approaches measuring violence and include a more microethnographic local approach. A richer understanding of mobbing must be locally rooted. This article uses three case studies to illustrate the centrality of local factors affecting this form of violence. The case studies suggest that mobbing is shaped by the acquiescence of actors in local communities and local learning. The article draws attention to the need to incorporate local data and methods into an analysis of violence in Indonesia and to appreciate varied daily rituals of violence as reservoirs of conflict.