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This open access handbook, Ten Crises systematically traces the economic history of China from 1949 to 2020, unravelling the complex domestic and global factors leading to the cyclical crises identified by WEN and his research team, and examining the corresponding counteracting policies and measures by the government to resolve or defer the crises. The book offers profound insights into China's endeavours and predicaments on the path of modernization, and contemplates opportunities and lessons for the forging of alternative trajectories not only for China but also for the global south: to reconstruct rural communities for integrated cooperation and governance, and to revitalize ecological civilization.

Wen Tiejun, the School of Agriculture and Rural Development at Renmin University, talked about economic and agricultural policies in China. The accompanying audio file provides the complete recording and audience discussion of the talk given by the author. Those who download the audio file must have their own software for playing and listening.

Jusqu'à présent, en Asie du Sud, il n'y a eu aucun modèle réussi de réforme agraire, alors qu'en Asie de l'Est, il n'y a eu aucun cas de réforme agraire qui ait échoué, quelles que soient les idéologies ou les institutions dont le gouvernement se réclamait. La révolution agraire «hors légalité» imposée par la force par le Parti communiste du Népal (CPN-M), maoïste, sous l'autorité de Prachanda, a pu s'étendre pendant la décennie de lutte armée paysanne qui a commencé en 1996. Pour accéder au pouvoir les dirigeants du CPN-M durent demander aux paysans de restituer les terres aux propriétaires et rencontrèrent une vive opposition. Cet article s'appuie sur l'expérience de la réforme agraire en Asie de l'Est et suggère des recommandations pour établir des projets qui serviront de référence pour éviter d'autres échecs du modèle des réformes agraires en Asie du Sud s'inspirant de la réforme agraire du Népal.

AbstractChina's political and economic systems are often discussed in combination. It is generally believed that under the political system of centralization, the economic system had to be a state monopoly. This article challenges that view by providing an economic perspective. The period 1949–1984 is selected to explore the causes of successive periods of strengthening and weakening of the state's monopoly power over the economy. Scholars have generally assumed that the period of state monopoly originated from socialist ideology or the personal will of the leaders. But economic conditions severely limited the options available. After the new China was established, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did not try to create a fully socialist economy in the short run. Instead, the CCP formulated a New Democracy platform that pragmatically allowed many types of enterprise to function side by side, including private industry, household ventures, and state‐owned enterprises. The original plan of the CCP was to allow private enterprise to develop in order to build up capital to rebuild the war‐damaged economy so that a strong foundation could be established for creating a socialist economy. But the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 and an influx of Soviet capital caused a shift from a mixed economy to state capitalism by 1956. From that point on, Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders had to change course again and again as fiscal crises limited available options. A reversal occurred in 1958 when the Soviets withdrew both their advisors and their capital subsidies, leaving the state capitalist system weakened. The crisis in the Chinese economy from 1959 to 1961 required decentralization of economic authority and efforts to promote rural capital formation. The next shift occurred after 1963 as the economy was organized to prepare for a possible military invasion. The required mobilization of industrial resources in remote regions of China inevitably reinforced state management of the economy. The final reversal occurred in the late 1970s, when imports of Western technology and equipment created another fiscal crisis for the central government, which then had to shift the burden of capital formation from the state to private entities. The reform of the rural household contract system, the adjustment of economic structures, and an increase in exports to gain foreign exchange all took place as part of "de‐monopolization" reforms. The reforms that occurred after 1979 were not an aberration or a radical break from the past. They were part of a pattern that evolved from 1949 to 1984, with fluctuations dependent on the weakening and strengthening status of state finances. The shifts that occurred during this period have either been ignored by observers, or they have been misinterpreted as being motivated by ideology. In fact, new policies were created to enable the government to adjust to changes in the internal and external environment.

This article examines how China deals with the global crises. China's policies to counter the crises rely on maintaining investment-led growth, which, however, has incurred an overexpansion of credits and serious debts similar to those of the West entering the era of financial capitalism. The current challenge is whether China can deploy the strategy of rural vitalization to turn to ecological civilization.

During the 1960s, China was effectively excluded from the two major camps: the Soviet camp and the U.S. camp. For about a decade, China was obliged to seek development within its own borders and thereby achieved some extent of delinking: a refusal to succumb to U.S.-eurocentric globalization and an embrace of a people's agenda of development. While foreign relations were later normalized and China once again brought in foreign capital, since being explicitly targeted as the primary rival of the United States, however, the situation may again warrant moves toward delinking and searching for alternatives, with ups and downs along the way.

The tyranny of global monopoly-finance capital can be seen in part as monetary geopolitics backed by military power. It directly appropriates, through investment schemes, production gains from the physical and resource economies of developing countries. At the same time, it engages in financial speculation by means of buying long and selling short in capital markets. The end result is the plundering of social wealth. China is not immune to this tyranny. This article analyses how China negotiates with the effects of global financial crises through adopting the policy of strategic transformation towards ecological civilisation and rural revitalisation. In addition, the grassroots initiative of rural reconstruction movement has played an important role in the ongoing transformative process.

The recurrent crises of financial capitalism that has erupted within core countries have resulted in a double cost-transfer to countries in the Global South in conditions where the South suffers from political upheaval, economic down turns and social unrest. Encountering the challenges of global financialization and de-industrialization, the Global South needs to strengthen national sovereignty over common resources and enhance its capability of reorganizing the labour force, in order to protect the livelihood of the majority. Other than the usual approach of providing more urban jobs, an alternative more socially and culturally beneficial to society in the long term is to enhance local resilience against globalization and reactivate rural communities to promote jobs as well as reincorporate young people. Though the Chinese government's central policy of 'New Socialist Countryside' attempts to absorb the crises of overproduction and unemployment through large scale domestic investment in basic infrastructure and social welfare in rural areas, it does not necessarily strengthen local resilience. Local resilience evolves through initiatives from below for social transformation through self-organization, popular participation, reciprocity and ecological practices.

Since the 1980s, economic growth in the core capitalist countries has been driven by an enormous expansion of financial capital, accompanied by steady deindustrialization. In recent years, the monopoly power of this financial capital has displayed increasingly tyrannical characteristics: it depends for its continued growth on ever-increasing indebtedness and dependence in developing nations, widening the divide between rich and poor and ultimately fostering state violence that serves to suppress popular resistance.… [Today,] military and monetary strength work together to profit from inequality and instability in emerging economies.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.