Suchergebnisse

This paper studies the impact of entry of non-banks (termed Independent Service Operators, ISOs) into ATM markets. We compare two different regimes by which the ISO may generate income: (1) The ISO receives interchange fees and (2) the ISO charges consumers directly. We find that due to the entry of an ISO, the size of the total ATM network increases independent of the way the ISO is financed. Account fees increase if the ISO receives interchange fees and decrease if the ISO charges consumers directly. Consumers may not benefit from the entry of the ISO. If a regulator can control the interchange fee, entry by an ISO financed through interchange fees increases consumer surplus, while the entry of a surcharging ISO decreases consumer surplus. Adapted from the source document.

This thesis deals with two topics in Industrial Organization: The first one is the issue of product differentiation, whereas the second one analyzes the impact of deregulation of shopping hours in retail industries. These two subjects are treated in two separate parts. Part 1 deals with product differentiation and covers three chapters. The first chapter in this part, extends the Salop model by introducing a general purpose product, that is, a product that is suited for all purposes alike. The second chapter lifts the assumption of inelastic demand which is usually assumed in spatial models of product differentiation. We introduce price- dependent demand and analyze the impact on the excess entry theorem. The third chapter in this part integrates the issue of multi-products firms into a spatial model of product differentiation. We state conditions about variety in the segment of high-quality products in contrast to the variety level in the low-quality segment. Part 2 of the thesis deals with competition over shopping hours in retail industries. In the public and political debate, this topic is controversial. Though there has been a substantial trend towards deregulation in recent years, shopping hours are still regulated in many European countries. In Germany, shopping hours have been liberalized recently. However, the issue whether shopping hours should be further deregulated is still controversial. We treat this issue in two chapters, each chapter focusing on a different aspect of deregulation of shopping hours: The first chapter is concerned with competition over shopping hours when entry into the industry is endogenous. The second chapter of this part analyzes the unequal impact of a deregulation on retailers of different sizes, namely we study competition between a large retail chain and a small corner shop.

This paper studies competition in prices and opening hours in a model with free entry. It is shown that under free competition a market failure arises: Entry is excessive and opening hours are under-provided. Restrictions on opening hours aggravate this failure. I analyze the impact of a liberalization of opening hours. The model predicts that in the short run prices will remain constant, but increase in the long run. Concentration in the retail sector will rise and opening hours will increase in two steps, immediately after deregulation and further over time. Finally, employment in the retail sector increases.

AbstractThis paper studies firms' obfuscation choices in a duopoly setting where two firms differ in their marginal costs of production. We show that the high‐cost firm chooses maximum obfuscation while the low‐cost firm chooses minimal (maximal) obfuscation if the cost advantage is large (small). We argue that in this setting there is a new role for price regulation as it leads to more transparent pricing. Moreover, a price cap benefits social welfare as it shifts production to the more efficient low‐cost firm.

Abstract
We study a retail market where firms compete in shopping hours and prices, and consumers have night-time or day-time preferences. In contrast to the existing literature, we introduce a market expansion effect of extending shopping hours by adding a segment of consumers (the loyal consumers) whose demand is increased if shopping hours are extended. We find that prices can increase due to shopping hours deregulation so that some consumers are worse off with deregulation. We also find that the extent of the price increase depends on the competitiveness of the retail industry.

Abstract
This paper introduces price-dependent individual demand into the circular city model of product differentiation. We show that for any finite number of firms, an unique symmetric price equilibrium exists provided that demand functions are not "too" convex. As in the case of unit demand, the number of firms under free entry decreases in the fixed cost of entry while increases in the transportation cost of consumers. However, this number is no longer always in excess of the socially optimal level. Insufficient entry occurs when the fixed and transportation costs are high.

Television advertising levels in Europe are regulated according to the Audiovisual Service Media Directive where member states of the European Union usually impose stricter regulation on their Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) channels. The present model evaluates the effects of symmetric and asymmetric regulation of ad levels on competition for viewers and advertisers in a duopoly framework where a public and a private broadcaster compete. If both broadcasters face the same advertising cap, regulation can be profit-increasing for both channels. If the public broadcaster is more strictly regulated, this may benefit the commercial rival if higher revenues in the advertising market outweigh the loss in viewership.

Das Internet ist stark durch Wettbewerb zwischen Plattformen geprägt, welche potenzielle Tauschpartner zusammenbringen. Die Konkurrenz zwischen solchen mehrseitigen Plattformen und die Marktkonzentration wird maßgeblich bestimmt durch (1) die Stärke der indirekten Netzeffekte, (2) das Ausmaß steigender Skaleneffekte, (3) Überlastungsgefahren, (4) Differenzierung der Plattformen und (5) die Möglichkeit des sogenannten Multihoming. Je nach Ausprägung dieser Faktoren ergeben sich unterschiedliche Konzentrationstendenzen und Markteintrittsbarrieren. Pauschal lässt sich zwar nicht feststellen, dass im Internet besonders viele dauerhaft resistente Monopole anzutreffen wären und ein besonderer Regulierungsbedarf besteht. Gleichwohl zeigt sich, dass einzelne Plattformen wie z.B. ebay auf manchen Märkten durchaus beträchtliche Marktmacht besitzen, die aufgrund erheblicher Markteintrittsbarrieren auch nicht schnell erodieren wird. ; The Internet is characterized by competition between platforms which bring together potential partners of exchange. The degree of competition between these multi-sided platforms und market concentration are determined through (1) the strength of the direct and indirect network effects, (2) the extent of economies of scale, (3) the risk of congestition, (4) platform differentiation, and (5) the possibility of multi-homing. Depending on these factors different market concentrations and barriers to entry result. While there is no general tendency for concentration in the Internet and no general need for special market regulation of online content providers and intermediaries, single platforms may still have long lasting and significant market power which is unlikely to erode fastly, as the example of ebay illustrate.

This paper analyzes a market in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete by setting menus of two-part tariffs, and in which some consumers are not informed about the linear per-unit price component. We consider two regulatory interventions that limit firms' ability to price discriminate: (i) diminishing the range of contracts via a reduction in the number of two-part tariffs offered (which prohibits inter-group price discrimination), and (ii) a reduction in tariff complexity via the abolishment of linear fees (which prohibits inter- and intra-group price discrimination). We characterize the effects of these interventions on firm profits and (informed and uninformed) consumer welfare, and identify conditions for the optimal policy. Our results provide insights for the evaluation of recent policy interventions (e.g., the regulation of roaming charges in the EU market).