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Public Administration (PA) is no longer considered as essential as it once was for students from developing countries. In regard to both PA and Public Management (PM), much of the difficulty stems from a lack of an acceptable overarching theory. This is the objective of Political Elasticity (PE) Theory, as here introduced, including the concept of "political software" (referring to the social relationships essential for effective governance). The usefulness of the theory is suggested by a series of American and Less Developed Country (LDC) urban case studies. At the conclusion, the analytical and foreign aid implications of using PE theory (emphasizing political software) are presented.

The kidnaping, rape, mutilation, and murder of more than 400 women and girls in Juárez, Mexico since l993 expose the dismal weakness of all the institutions responsible for criminal investigation, prosecution, prevention, and justice. If the inept handling of the femicides were confined to Juárez, that would be tragic enough. However, the 2007 report of Amnesty International suggests that this is a national situation, with implications for Mexican poverty and the pressure to illegally migrate. A theory of national poverty (political elasticity theory) is put forward to link injustice in Juárez to Mexican poverty and illegal immigration, suggesting that Mexico is politically inelastic, without the capacity to effectively decentralize (like a rubber band) and to influence and control national behavior (like a balloon). Corruption is therefore uncontrollable (i.e., secondary in nature) and forms of decentralization cannot be used to facilitate business and rural development. At the conclusion, a comparison with Chile is made, indicating that, because it is far less corrupt than Mexico, its globalization efforts have been far more effective than those of Mexico in improving living conditions for the majority of its population.

Political Elasticity (PE) theory is used to link public administration to urban development. The history of this theory (which won for the author the 2010 Fred Riggs Award given by the American Society of Public Administration's Section on International and Comparative Administration) is presented. Basically it suggests that, as countries develop, political power takes "rubber band" and "balloon" characteristics, able to be delegated in many different ways while also being controlled and also able to affect predictably the behavior of subordinates and the general public. It indicates the following aspects to pay attention to: (a) the mixing of soft and hard forms of political power, (b) the delegation and control of political power, (c) responsiveness to regulations; (e) quality of human relationships and (f) problem-solving capacity. Several comparative case studies (solid waste management in Lagos, Nigeria and Tokyo, Japan; urban conditions in Mumbai, India and Shanghai, China) are then introduced. At the conclusion, it is suggested that, unless public administration is properly taken into account, "best practices" in urban development cannot be adequately evaluated. This can be seen in regard to both "failure stories" (slum upgrading in Indonesia and Brazil) and "success stories" (El Salvador's site and service projects; Bangladesh's micro-credit programs, and Singapore's public housing new towns). Adapted from the source document.

Michael Mandelbaum's Democracy's Good Name: The Rise and Risks of the World's Most Popular Form of Government (2007) provides a valuable analysis of the success of democracy in the modern world but fails to adequately deal with remaining questions having to do with: (i) the definition of democracy; (ii) the linkage between democracy and economic development and (iii) the importance of public administration. Political Elasticity (PE) theory is used to explain the im- portance of public administration, particularly the linkage between effective decentralization and centralization. To illustrate the usefulness of PE theory, several comparative case studies (China and India; Bangladesh and Vietnam) are introduced in regard to the question of why is it that authoritarian states (for example, China and Vietnam) are sometimes more successful in economic development, particularly in raising standards of living, than their more democratic counterparts. Finally, at the conclusion, the question is raised about the relationship of democracy to corruption. In so doing, Lord Acton's provocative assertion, 'power tends to corrupt and absolute power, to corrupt absolutely', is addressed, including a comparison of authoritarian Singapore and democratic Jamaica, suggesting: (i) that political power, if persuasive, is not necessarily corruptive; (ii) liberal or partisan democracy tends to corrupt and lawless democracy, to corrupt absolutely and (iii) authoritarian regimes may recognize that controlling corruption is essential for their legitimacy and economic prosperity.

This article focuses on the debate over the usefulness of foreign aid, beginning with books by Jeffrey Sachs and William Easterly, combined with the more recent contributions of Dambisa Moyo and Paul Collier. Political Elasticity (PE) theory is put forward to facilitate our understanding what has to happen for countries to economically develop. In so doing, the theory attempts to reform political terminology, including such words as corruption, democracy, decentralization, and political power. Also introduced is the concept of "political software," referring to the quality of relationships between leaders and followers. The case studies presented, dealing, first of all, with solid waste management in Lagos, Nigeria, and, secondly, with agricultural production in Ghana, are intended to illustrate the effect of political software deficiency on urban and rural life. This is followed by a comparison of Bangladesh and Vietnam, suggesting that a "development from below" approach (including microcredit programs) advocated by Muhammad Yunus, is not enough to enable countries to escape extreme poverty unless (as in Vietnam) political leaders are motivated enough to engender the "social energy" necessary to do so. At the conclusion, the experience of the World Bank is presented, indicating various reasons why it has not been more successful in bringing about development and suggesting an "alternative approach" intended to be "motivational," rather than charitable. Adapted from the source document.

To understand political science, we must understand political power. Our misunder-standing of political power is especially problematic for those concerned with comparative politics.Political Elasticity (PE) theory, including the concepts of 'quality of power' and 'political software', is used to examine and clarify such dichotomies as: (i) transitive and intransitive power; (ii) hard and soft forms of power; and (iii) power as a resource and power as a relationship. What PE theory attempts to prove (by presenting many examples and using comparative case studies) is that political power tends to be more elastic (with rubber band and balloon characteristics) in more developed countries than in less developed countries.As the conclusion, the relationship of democracy to the evolution of political power is examined, including questions having to do with corruption, authoritarian rule and bureaucratization.The PE theory is also defended against criticisms that it is 'untestable' and 'tautological'.

This article examines Lord Acton's famous assertion, "power tends to corrupt and absolute power, to corrupt absolutely," including the suggestion that democratization reduces corruption. This assertion requires us to look at the meaning of three words: power, corruption, and democracy. For this reason, the article begins by making a distinction between primary and secondary corruption (essentially, controllable and uncontrollable corruption) and between liberal democracy (emphasizing competitive politics) and classical democracy (emphasizing consensusbuilding politics). An argument is made for a case study approach (combined with "ordinary language" methodology) in analyzing the corruption-democracy linkage, rather than the prevailing quantitative methodology, particularly comparing India and China. Conventional definitions of corruption (e.g., misuse of public resources for private gain) and democracy (emphasizing elections and majority rule) would indicate that China is more corrupt than India. Adapted from the source document.