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THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES WHY CONGRESS IMPOSED REQUIREMENTS ON THE FTC & ANALYZES THEIR EFFECTS AS A "MEANS" OF IMPLEMENTING POLICY. THE RULEMAKING PROCEDURE WAS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE AS THE MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT WAS CONSIDERED IN CONGRESS. JUDICIALIZED PROCEDURES HAVE FORCED A MORE RIGOROUS & TIMECONSUMING EXAMINATION OF DECISIONAL PREMISES, & HAVE LIMITED THE RANGE OF ISSUES WHICH THE AGENCY CAN DEAL EFFECTIVELY.

More than 2.5 million people work across the entire executive branch of the US government in hundreds of agencies and commissions. William West takes an in-depth look at how the President is able to oversee this vast bureaucracy. He writes that centralized influence over agency policy making is mostly reactive and based around the practice of regulatory review. He argues that Presidents lack the organizational capacity to monitor and influence what agencies do in more than a selective way, and that this reactive strategy allows the White House to focus its limited resources on agency initiatives that are problematic while ignoring the majority that are not.

A brief history of PPB -- The survival and evolution of program budgeting at DOD -- NOAA's adoption of PPB and matrix management -- Evaluating NOAA's management initiatives -- PPB and the holy grail of performance management -- Administrative doctrine and administrative reality

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter -- 1. Ideas and Politics: The Context for Understanding and Evaluating Institutional Controls -- 2. Administrative Due Process -- 3. Politics, ideas, and Administrative Procedures -- 4. The Administrative Presidency -- 5. The Politics of Presidential Management -- 6. Legislative Oversight -- 7. The Politics of Congressional Influence -- 8. Constitutional Issues -- Index -- About the Author

AbstractThe fact that centralized executive oversight of agency policy making is primarily reactive reflects the motives and constraints that define the president's relationship with the domestic bureaucracy. Such a strategy allows for the allocation of limited resources to agency initiatives that are inconsistent with the president's agenda or that evoke conflict within the executive branch or the larger political system. This calls into question the descriptive model of presidential administration as proactive management by a unitary actor, as well as its prescriptive corollary that equates a strong executive with coordination across the bureaucracy. Reactive presidential oversight can produce a kind of ad hoc coordination that can be salutary, but its often pluralistic character can also undermine other important values in the administrative process.