Suchergebnisse

Moet er strenger gestraft worden of juist niet? Mag de rechter door de wetgever aan banden worden gelegd? In hoeverre mag de overheid ingrijpen in het privéleven van haar burgers? Deze vragen zijn inzet van menig opiniërend krantenartikel of discussieprogramma. Ook degenen die zich beroepshalve met het recht bezighouden zullen zich van tijd tot tijd moeten bezinnen op taak en functie van het recht. Moeten we regels toepassen als ze tot onrechtvaardige uitkomsten leiden? Leiden regels wel tot het doel waarvoor ze zijn opgesteld? Dit zijn allemaal vragen over het recht waarop door het recht zelf geen antwoorden kunnen worden gegeven. Betekent dit dat discussies over deze kwesties zinloos zijn omdat zij ontaarden in politieke welles-nietes spelletjes? Deze inleiding in de rechtsfilosofie beoogt te laten zien dat dit niet hoeft

Responsive Regulation advocates a differentiated style of regulation and enforcement that is more responsive to the behavior of the regulated parties than a system of general or uniform rules. This article investigates whether such a differentiated approach can be reconciled with the traditional ideal of general law. On the basis of a conceptual analysis of generality, it is argued that the notion of generality is at best tautological and not inconsistent with a differentiated approach to regulation and enforcement. However, the value of generality is based on the assumption that rules function as reasons, rather than as instructions. As reasons, rules need not comprise large categories, but they do need to last for a long period of time. The conclusion drawn is that flexibility (rather than differentiation) is hard to reconcile with the notion of rules as reasons, although it may be demanded by a notion of rules as effective implementers of policies. Adapted from the source document.

Preliminary Material -- Introduction -- Aquinas's variations on a divine theme -- Aquinas's awareness of contingency -- Suárez's distinction between creation and legislation -- The limits of Suárez's natural law theory -- Grotius's humanisation of natural law -- Grotius's shift from natural law to natural rights -- Pufendorf's divine conductor -- Pufendorfs reconstruction of rationality -- Finnis's natural law without nature -- Finnis's decisionism -- Epilogue -- References -- Index.

This book features essays that investigate the nature of legal validity from the point of view of different traditions and disciplines. Validity is a fascinating and elusive characteristic of law that in itself deserves to be explored, but further investigation is made more acute and necessary by the production, nowadays, of soft law products of regulation, such as declarations, self-regulatory codes, and standardization norms. These types of rules may not exhibit the characteristics of formal law, and may lack full formal validity but yet may have a very real impact on people's lives. The essays focus on the structural properties of hard and soft legal phenomena and the basis of their validity