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Das Projekt Nord Stream 2 stellt die Bundesregierung vor das Dilemma, sich zwischen energie- und außenpolitischen Interessen entscheiden zu müssen. Eine Priorisierung sollte nicht ohne den Blick auf den energiepolitischen Kontext erfolgen. In der Frage der Güterabwägung gibt es keine einfachen und 'billigen' Antworten. Das gilt umso mehr, als die Energietransformation in Kooperation die größte Dividende für einen Interessenausgleich zu sein verspricht. Allerdings setzt sie einen Minimalkonsens innerhalb der Europäischen Union (EU), mit den USA, der Ukraine und auch Russland voraus. ; Zweite, am 21.04.2021 korrigierte Version

Germany's energy sovereignty is undermined by US sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. As a result, questions surrounding states' strategic capability in energy affairs have recently become a matter of discussion, particularly in Germany, where little attention was previously paid to the notion of energy sovereignty. In view of today's fundamental upheavals in international politics, especially with regard to the geostrategic US-China rivalry, debates about a state's ability to formulate its strategic interests, prioritise its actions and shape its options for energy policy are becoming increasingly important. China's industrial and connectivity policies, the role of the US in energy markets and the energy transformation at large are rapidly changing the global energy landscape and tipping balances of power. The Covid-19 pandemic further accelerates and reinforces these trends. Therefore, it is necessary to integrate energy sovereignty into political debates on the future of sustainable and resilient energy supplies, particularly at the EU level. In order for this to occur, strengthening EU cohesion remains a prerequisite, if not a conditio sine qua non.

The Nord Stream 2 project presents the German government with the dilemma of choosing between energy and foreign policy interests. Geopolitical arguments often prevail in the political discourse. Yet, a weighing of priorities requires a look at the energy policy context, too. When it comes to balancing interests, there are no easy or 'cheap' answers. With a focus on the energy context, it has to be emphasized that a cooperative approach toward energy transformation promises the greatest dividend for a balance of interests, but it presupposes a minimum consensus within the Euro­pean Union (EU), along with the United States (US), Ukraine, and Russia.

Russia is the world's largest gas exporter and Germany is its most important market. Moreover, natural gas is a centerpiece of the Russian economy and the backbone of its energy supply to the Russian population. In terms of its external gas relations, Germany has always kept a special and strategic position, both in terms of volumes, but also in substance. This contribution explores the impact of the energy transition on the bilateral gas relationship. It argues that the bilateral gas relationship has been subjected to various paradigm shifts in the past, but, until recently, the relationship has been seen as in line with the strategic energy triangle of climate change/sustainability, supply security and economic competitiveness. This perception has come into question over two issues: climate change and supply security. Moreover, Germany's authority over the conduct and the legal framework of bilateral gas relations has been increasingly contested, by Brussels, but also horizontally by other EU member states. At this stage, it is very uncertain whether both sides will manage to maintain and redefine their close energy partnership to address climate change. Decarbonizing the gas value chain would be a centerpiece. This would require a political shift away from securitization to decarbonization, not only in Germany, but even more so in the EU, and in particular, in Russia.

Russia is the world's largest gas exporter and Germany is its most important market. Moreover, natural gas is a centerpiece of the Russian economy and the backbone of its energy supply to the Russian population. In terms of its external gas relations, Germany has always kept a special and strategic position, both in terms of volumes, but also in substance. This contribution explores the impact of the energy transition on the bilateral gas relationship. It argues that the bilateral gas relationship has been subjected to various paradigm shifts in the past, but, until recently, the relationship has been seen as in line with the strategic energy triangle of climate change/sustainability, supply security and economic competitiveness. This perception has come into question over two issues: climate change and supply security. Moreover, Germany's authority over the conduct and the legal framework of bilateral gas relations has been increasingly contested, by Brussels, but also horizontally by other EU member states. At this stage, it is very uncertain whether both sides will manage to maintain and redefine their close energy partnership to address climate change. Decarbonizing the gas value chain would be a centerpiece. This would require a political shift away from securitization to decarbonization, not only in Germany, but even more so in the EU, and in particular, in Russia.

Deutschlands Energiesouveränität wird durch die US-Sanktionen gegen die Gas­pipeline Nord Stream 2 beschnitten. Damit rücken Fragen der strategischen Handlungsfähigkeit in der Energiepolitik in den Fokus, die bisher in Deutschland kaum diskutiert werden. Die Auseinandersetzung mit strategischen Interessen, Handlungs­maximen und Gestaltungsoptionen wird immer wichtiger angesichts der fundamentalen Umbrüche in der internationalen Politik, insbesondere der strategischen Rivalität zwischen China und den USA. Chinas Industrie- und Konnektivitätspolitik, die Rolle der USA auf den Energiemärkten und die Energietransformation verändern die globale Energielandschaft und die Machtverhältnisse rasant. Die Corona-Pandemie beschleunigt und vertieft die Trends zusätzlich. Deshalb tut es not, Fragen der Energiesouveränität in die politische Debatte darüber zu integrieren, wie eine nach­haltige und resiliente Energieversorgung ausgerichtet werden sollte. Nicht zuletzt gilt es, den Zusammenhalt in der Europäischen Union (EU) zu stärken.

In October 2020, Russia adopted a roadmap for hydrogen development, and a full-length Hydrogen Development Concept is expected soon. Even though Russia remains somewhat sceptical about hydrogen's much-vaunted transformative potential, it is interested in using its natural gas wealth to become a leading exporter of this new energy carrier and views Germany as a key partner in this effort. In the absence of a serious national decarbonisation agenda in Russia, stimulating hydrogen production primarily for exports and without significant domestic demand will be a challenge. Still, amid Russia's steadily worsening political relations with the West, clean energy (and hydrogen in particular) is one of the few promising areas of cooperation between Germany and Russia, with the potential to become a major steppingstone for the development of hydrogen value chains in both countries.

Im Oktober 2020 hat Russland eine Roadmap für die Wasserstoffentwicklung verabschiedet, ein umfassendes Konzept wird in Kürze erwartet. Auch wenn Russland dem vielgepriesenen Wasserstoff (H2) nach wie vor skeptisch gegenübersteht, will es seinen Erdgasreichtum nutzen, um ein führender Exporteur auch von H2 zu werden. Dabei sieht es Deutschland als wichtigen potentiellen Partner. Da Russland bisher keine ambitionierte Dekarbonisierungsagenda hat, ist die große Herausforderung, die Wasserstoffproduktion in erster Linie für den Export und ohne nennenswerte Binnennachfrage zu stimulieren. Obwohl sich Russlands politische Beziehungen zum Westen stetig verschlechtern, bleibt die Kooperation bei erneuerbaren Energien und bei H2 einer der wenigen vielversprechenden Bereiche. Diese Zusammenarbeit könnte signi­fikant zur Entwicklung der H2-Wertschöpfungsketten in beiden Ländern beitragen.

Washington und Berlin haben ihre Differenzen über Nord Stream 2 beigelegt. Damit ist zunächst einmal die Negativspirale eines Energie-Sicherheitsdilemmas angehalten, in die das Projekt geraten war. Während die Biden-Administration ein klares Signal setzt, dass ihr konstruktive Beziehungen zu Deutschland wichtig sind, ist die Bundes­regierung nun gefragt, die vereinbarten Punkte umzusetzen. Die Gaspipeline durch die Ostsee bleibt jedenfalls ein Politikum. Kiew und Warschau haben bereits deutlich gemacht, dass sie die deutsch-amerikanische Übereinkunft ablehnen. Ein 'Grand Bargain' über Nord Stream 2, der nicht nur bilateral abgestimmt ist, sondern auch die Ukraine einbindet und Russland verpflichtet, ist noch nicht erreicht.

Washington and Berlin have settled their differences over the gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea. For the time being, this has halted the spiralling energy security dilemma. While Washington is sending a clear signal that constructive relations with Berlin are important, the German government is now called upon to implement a variety of measures. Still, the project remains a political issue. Kyiv and Warsaw have already signalled their opposition. A grand bargain that is not only bilaterally agreed upon but also involves Ukraine and commits Russia has not yet been achieved.

An effective and efficient governance is key for the global energy transformation. We argue that the process under the Paris Agreement, its 'rulebook' and the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) will have to be accompanied by focused and tailored governance mechanisms in the energy realm. The energy sector itself is key to limiting global warming to two degrees centigrade compared to the preindustrial level, because it is responsible for over two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, neither the energy transition nor energy governance start from scratch. Energy governance is already happening on many levels: the local, the national, the regional and the global. These multi-level governance structures are necessary to enable, facilitate, and accelerate the energy transition(s) on the ground. They have to be adapted, however, to the changing and transforming energy world as we argue in the conclusions. In a first step, we conceptualize the notion of 'energy transition' and relate it to the concept of 'energy transformation'. We argue that it is necessary to firstly move beyond the normative and target-driven idea(s) behind 'transition' and to secondly bring in the systemic aspects of energy transformation. Moreover, energy security, economic efficiency, sustainability and climate neutrality have emerged over time as the guiding paradigms, forming a strategic quadrangle, as opposed to a strategic triangle, traditionally used to define energy security. In a second step, we present an overview of the current international energy governance system where multilayered governance structures have developed over time. We argue that the existing architecture is stemming from the past and is neither fit for governing the energy transition, nor even reflecting the proccesses underway in todays' world. In a third step, we highlight that the energy transformation has and will have tremendous techno-economic, socio-technical and political (Cherp et al. 2018) effects that have both internal and external ...