Washington und Berlin haben ihre Differenzen über Nord Stream 2 beigelegt. Damit ist zunächst einmal die Negativspirale eines Energie-Sicherheitsdilemmas angehalten, in die das Projekt geraten war. Während die Biden-Administration ein klares Signal setzt, dass ihr konstruktive Beziehungen zu Deutschland wichtig sind, ist die Bundesregierung nun gefragt, die vereinbarten Punkte umzusetzen. Die Gaspipeline durch die Ostsee bleibt jedenfalls ein Politikum. Kiew und Warschau haben bereits deutlich gemacht, dass sie die deutsch-amerikanische Übereinkunft ablehnen. Ein 'Grand Bargain' über Nord Stream 2, der nicht nur bilateral abgestimmt ist, sondern auch die Ukraine einbindet und Russland verpflichtet, ist noch nicht erreicht.
Washington and Berlin have settled their differences over the gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea. For the time being, this has halted the spiralling energy security dilemma. While Washington is sending a clear signal that constructive relations with Berlin are important, the German government is now called upon to implement a variety of measures. Still, the project remains a political issue. Kyiv and Warsaw have already signalled their opposition. A grand bargain that is not only bilaterally agreed upon but also involves Ukraine and commits Russia has not yet been achieved.
An effective and efficient governance is key for the global energy transformation. We argue that the process under the Paris Agreement, its 'rulebook' and the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) will have to be accompanied by focused and tailored governance mechanisms in the energy realm. The energy sector itself is key to limiting global warming to two degrees centigrade compared to the preindustrial level, because it is responsible for over two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, neither the energy transition nor energy governance start from scratch. Energy governance is already happening on many levels: the local, the national, the regional and the global. These multi-level governance structures are necessary to enable, facilitate, and accelerate the energy transition(s) on the ground. They have to be adapted, however, to the changing and transforming energy world as we argue in the conclusions. In a first step, we conceptualize the notion of 'energy transition' and relate it to the concept of 'energy transformation'. We argue that it is necessary to firstly move beyond the normative and target-driven idea(s) behind 'transition' and to secondly bring in the systemic aspects of energy transformation. Moreover, energy security, economic efficiency, sustainability and climate neutrality have emerged over time as the guiding paradigms, forming a strategic quadrangle, as opposed to a strategic triangle, traditionally used to define energy security. In a second step, we present an overview of the current international energy governance system where multilayered governance structures have developed over time. We argue that the existing architecture is stemming from the past and is neither fit for governing the energy transition, nor even reflecting the proccesses underway in todays' world. In a third step, we highlight that the energy transformation has and will have tremendous techno-economic, socio-technical and political (Cherp et al. 2018) effects that have both internal and external ...
Auf dem internationalen Ölmarkt nehmen (geo-)politisch motivierte Eingriffe zu. Dies zeigt sich gerade auch am Einsatz unilateraler US-Sanktionen, mit denen Washington erdölproduzierende Länder direkt unter Druck setzen kann. Grundlage dieser Politik sind die Dominanz des Dollars in der Weltwirtschaft und die prägende Rolle im Energiemarkt, welche die Vereinigten Staaten mittlerweile erlangt haben. Verdeutlichen lässt sich der US-amerikanische Kurs an drei aktuellen Beispielen. Im Fall des Iran dient der Einsatz unilateraler Sanktionen als vorrangiges Instrument einer sogenannten Strategie des maximalen Drucks. Mit Blick auf Venezuela soll mit diesem Mittel ein Regimewechsel befördert werden. Und in Bezug auf Russland könnten verschärfte US-Sanktionen bald gravierende Auswirkungen auf die europäische Energieversorgung entfalten. Offensichtliche geopolitische Risiken werden auf dem Ölmarkt derzeit kaum oder nur sehr kurzfristig eingepreist. Es überwiegt die Sorge, dass sich die weltweite Konjunktur angesichts der massiven Handelskonflikte abschwächen wird. Die US-Fracking-Industrie hat den Ölmarkt fundamental verändert und eigentlich für mehr Wettbewerb gesorgt. Gleichzeitig aber begünstigen Washingtons Sanktionen die Politisierung des Marktes und unterminieren den Primat des Ökonomischen. Auf der systemischen Ebene wird so die Fragmentierung des Ölmarkts in Großregionen vorangetrieben ("Multipolarisierung"). Durch die Neukartierung des Ölmarkts schwinden Möglichkeiten für multilaterales Handeln. Die Europäische Union droht langfristig an Marktmacht zu verlieren und in eine Zuschauerrolle gedrängt zu werden. Bestehende Instrumente bieten europäischen Unternehmen keinen ausreichenden Schutz vor unilateralen US-Sanktionen. Die deutsche und europäische Autonomie in der Energieversorgung könnte dadurch auf absehbare Zeit empfindlich beeinträchtigt werden.
Triggered by Russia's annexation of Crimea and military intervention in Ukraine in early 2014, the governments of the United States (US) and the Russian Federation have since been locked in a geopolitical confrontation, which is largely playing out on the economic stage. In addition to unilateral economic sanctions, the US government is focussing on the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG). In doing so, it wants to reduce not only Russian state revenues, but also European dependence on Russian energy imports. In this context, the US policy is aimed squarely at the German federal government, which was described by President Donald J. Trump as a "prisoner of Russia". The more the European-Russian energy trade is drawn into the conflict between Washington and Moscow, the more serious the consequences are likely to be for European energy supply.
Seit Beginn der russischen Militärintervention in der Ukraine Anfang 2014 befinden sich die Regierungen der Vereinigten Staaten und der Russischen Föderation in einer geopolitischen Auseinandersetzung, die überwiegend mit wirtschaftlichen Mitteln ausgetragen wird. Neben unilateralen Wirtschaftssanktionen setzt die US-Regierung dabei auf den Export von verflüssigtem Erdgas (liquified natural gas, LNG). Damit will sie neben den russischen Staatseinnahmen auch die europäische Abhängigkeit von russischen Energieimporten verringern. Ins Fadenkreuz gerät in diesem Kontext vor allem die deutsche Bundesregierung, die von Präsident Donald J. Trump als 'Gefangener Russlands' bezeichnet worden ist. Je stärker der europäisch-russische Energiehandel in den Konflikt zwischen Washington und Moskau hineingezogen wird, desto schwerwiegender dürften die Folgen für die europäische Energieversorgung sein.
In der Eurasischen Wirtschaftsunion (EAWU) entsteht ein gemeinsamer Energiemarkt. Dieser Prozess macht Fortschritte, seit wesentliche Streitpunkte im Verhältnis zwischen Russland und Belarus beigelegt sind. Die Neugestaltung des Energieraums wird Auswirkungen auf die EU haben. Denn mit Russland und Kasachstan umfasst er wichtige Lieferanten, und große Pipelines haben dort ihren Ausgangsort. Gleichzeitig aber manifestieren sich Trennlinien zwischen der EU, der europäischen Energiegemeinschaft und dem Energiemarkt der EAWU - und das über bestehende physische Netzverbindungen hinweg. Außerdem überlappen sich die Integrationsblöcke in sensitiven Regionen wie dem Kaukasus, der Schwarzmeerregion und dem Baltikum.
The process of establishing a common energy market in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is moving forward after Russia and Belarus succeeded in resolving important differences. This reorganisation of the energy space will also affect the European Union, because Russia and Kazakhstan are major oil and gas suppliers, and important export pipelines originate there. At the same time regulatory and technical fault lines are becoming apparent between the EU/European Energy Community and the EAWU - also affecting transnational physical infrastructure. Furthermore, the integration blocs overlap in sensitive regions like the Caucasus, the Black Sea region and the Baltic states.
Following the Paris Agreement, the energy landscape is changing more than ever. While these changes bring opportunity, they also come with risks, requiring traditional concepts of energy security to be reconsidered. These changes in the energy landscape are mirrored by shifting political balances as the world becomes increasingly multipolar, raising questions of which rules will govern energy systems, trade, markets and investment. As geopolitical turmoil comes closer to the EU's borders, energy systems are becoming increasingly cross-border and regional in nature, intertwining interest in energy security. Cross-border initiatives in energy are proliferating across Eurasia, driven in part by the rise of China, with the potential to create new energy regions, corridors and geographies. These developments can lead to new geographies along infrastructure lines and could result in competitive regionalism and regulatory fault lines. This paper reflects an initial step to identify potential risks emerging in this new energy landscape and assess the ability of existing institutions and tools of governance to address them. The study aims to describe the risk landscape and governance shortcomings and identify actions the EU can take to both improve its existing external energy governance and empower existing institutions to address these risks. Ultimately, for the EU and Germany, the challenge will be to turn the potential risks of connectivity into opportunities and to help establish a level playing field that ensures competitiveness through common rules. (SWP Research Paper)
The Arctic region has been an area of low tension since the end of the Cold War. This observation is important because the run on hydrocarbons in the Arctic has not resulted in increased rivalries as expected. The outcomes have been international joint ventures in oil and gas project on the economic side and a strengthening of Arctic governance in the political realm. Since 2014, the situation has changed rapidly. Economic interests in hydrocarbon development are increasingly diverging between the five Arctic coastal states. The geopolitical situation between Russia and the West after the annexation of Crimea and military conflict in Ukraine affect the Arctic. There is the danger of falling back to old times when the Arctic was a highly strategic and militarised zone. The sanctions on Russian offshore oil development in the Arctic add to that. Potential long-lead effects of the sanctions, coinciding with relatively low oil prices, can seriously harm the long-term development of oil and gas fields in the Arctic. Joint energy projects had been a stabilising factor in the past. The paper discusses the increasing levels of instability in both economics and politics in the Arctic and the mutually reinforcing effects on international politics. We come to the conclusion that a "loss of a cooperative spirit" can be observed. We argue that these dynamics challenge stable and predictable relations, which work against a sustainable Arctic development that takes the global commons, the environment and the climate into consideration. From a German and EU perspective, there are far-reaching future implications for the security of energy supply, as two of its major suppliers, Norway and Russia, have their resource bases in the Arctic. ; QC 20160516
The Arctic region has been an area of low tension since the end of the Cold War. This observation is important because the run on hydrocarbons in the Arctic has not resulted in increased rivalries as expected. The outcomes have been international joint ventures in oil and gas project on the economic side and a strengthening of Arctic governance in the political realm. Since 2014, the situation has changed rapidly. Economic interests in hydrocarbon development are increasingly diverging between the five Arctic coastal states. The geopolitical situation between Russia and the West after the annexation of Crimea and military conflict in Ukraine affect the Arctic. There is the danger of falling back to old times when the Arctic was a highly strategic and militarised zone. The sanctions on Russian offshore oil development in the Arctic add to that. Potential long-lead effects of the sanctions, coinciding with relatively low oil prices, can seriously harm the long-term development of oil and gas fields in the Arctic. Joint energy projects had been a stabilising factor in the past. The paper discusses the increasing levels of instability in both economics and politics in the Arctic and the mutually reinforcing effects on international politics. We come to the conclusion that a 'loss of a cooperative spirit' can be observed. We argue that these dynamics challenge stable and predictable relations, which work against a sustainable Arctic development that takes the global commons, the environment and the climate into consideration. From a German and EU perspective, there are far-reaching future implications for the security of energy supply, as two of its major suppliers, Norway and Russia, have their resource bases in the Arctic. (SWP Research Paper)
After its relations with the West deteriorated massively in the course of the Ukraine crisis, Russia has been aligning itself increasingly towards China. This shift is most obvious in the strategic spheres of military and energy cooperation. Even if the immediate impacts on Germany and the European Union - caused by the dynamics in the relationship between these two major neighbours in the East - are limited, the development is of great relevance for international relations and the global order. It would therefore be wrong to underestimate the long-term ramifications. Germany and the European Union should counterbalance these nascent tectonic shifts with inclusive and multilateral cooperation and dialogue initiatives in the Euro-Asian region. Regional and global cooperation should be shaped by economic exchange, infrastructure expansion and the search for solutions to global problems. (SWP Comments)
To the east of the European Union a regional energy market is taking shape under the auspices of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Even if the interests of the participating states diverge and the ultimate shape of the market remains unclear, the development is likely to be substantial. On the one hand, it threatens to deepen the fragmentation of energy markets in Europe and Asia, on the other the process could generate new opportunities for cooperation and larger spheres of integration. It is thus worth exploring at this early stage the extent to which the emerging energy market is compatible with the European Union and the European Energy Community. It is especially important to track the effects in the common neighbourhood, above all Ukraine, in order to avoid renewed geopolitical disruption. (SWP Comments)
Im Osten der EU formiert sich unter dem Dach der Eurasischen Wirtschaftsunion (EWU) ein regionaler Energiemarkt. Diese Entwicklung dürfte folgenreich sein, auch wenn die Interessen der beteiligten Staaten divergieren und die weitere Ausgestaltung des Marktes noch offen ist. Einerseits droht sich die Fragmentierung der Energiemärkte in Europa und Asien zu vertiefen, andererseits könnten aus dem Prozess auch neue Kooperationsmöglichkeiten und größere Integrationsräume erwachsen. Insofern gilt es, frühzeitig auszuloten, inwiefern der entstehende Energiemarkt mit der EU und der europäischen Energiegemeinschaft kompatibel ist. Besonders wichtig ist es, die Auswirkungen auf die gemeinsame Nachbarschaft und vor allem die Ukraine im Blick zu haben, damit sich neue geopolitische Verwerfungen vermeiden lassen. (SWP-Aktuell)
Seitdem sich die Beziehungen zum Westen im Zuge der Krise um die Ukraine massiv verschlechtert haben, orientiert sich Russland verstärkt Richtung China. Diese Annäherung ist vor allem in den strategischen Bereichen Militär- und Energiekooperation zu beobachten. Auch wenn die unmittelbaren Auswirkungen auf Deutschland und die EU begrenzt sind, hat die Dynamik im Verhältnis der beiden großen Nachbarn im Osten globale und ordnungspolitische Relevanz. Deswegen darf ihre langfristige Tragweite nicht unterschätzt werden. Deutschland und die EU sollten diese sich abzeichnenden tektonischen Verschiebungen mit Hilfe inklusiver und multilateraler Kooperations- und Dialogansätze im euro-asiatischen Raum austarieren. Als Leitlinien für eine regionale und globale Zusammenarbeit müssten wirtschaftlicher Austausch, der Ausbau von Infrastruktur und die Bearbeitung globaler Probleme dienen. (SWP-Aktuell)
