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One Step Forward From Agassi's Inquiries on Logic: A Fallibilist Logic for Critical Rationalism
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 52, Heft 6, S. 380-387
ISSN: 1552-7441
Critical rationalists cannot reconcile their falibilism with the demand of logic for universality. Popper tried, but failed, to achieve universality in logic without proof. Attempts to find a limited approach to logic as 'logics of' have failed to find a coherent critical rationalist alternative. Critical rationalists take Tarski's logic to be the best of logic today. But Tarski renders logic as close to justification, and thereby universality, as possible. A fallibilist version of Tarskian logic can yield a critical rationalist alternative: It provides rules for solving problems in linguistic contexts, but also discovers mistakes by discovering errors in logical inference.
The Roles that Otto Selz and Karl Popper Played in 20th-Century Psychology and Philosophy of Science
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 47, Heft 3, S. 255-279
ISSN: 1552-7441
The early research of Karl Popper both in psychology and in philosophy of science is described; its basis for his later breakthroughs in the philosophy of science is explained. His debt to Otto Selz's thought psychology is thereby detailed. Otto Selz's philosophy of science is then explained, and its conflict with Popper's early as well as his later views is portrayed. These studies of the conflicting views of Popper's early views and Selz's philosophy of science provide the basis for demonstrating the mistakes that Michel ter Hark has made in claiming that the alleged originality of Popper's views occurred only in the 1970s and are little more than a rehash of Selz's alleged evolutionary epistemology.
Book Review: What People Believe When They Say What People Believe by Todd Jones
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 45, Heft 3, S. 399-404
ISSN: 1552-7441
Critical rationalists much too narrow contribution to Der Positivismusstreit: Alternative political theories which conform to fallibilist, individualist methodologies were needed then and are needed today
In: Journal of classical sociology, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 102-114
ISSN: 1741-2897
The very dubious results of Der Positivismusstreit are explained as consequences of a methodological breakdown between two schools. But this debate is nevertheless relevant for today's discussions due to its historical role in setting today's framework. The methodological breakdown between the schools is overcome to a partial degree by presuming some overlap in methods. The misunderstandings of the past are set in today's context, where critical realists have abandoned much of their previous doctrines, and the failure of critical rationalists to acquire more influence than they have is explained as in large part due to their failure to avoid identification with conservative economic-cum-political theory, above all that of Hayek. This mistake is corrected by explaining how improved critical rationalist methods are consistent with a variety of political alternatives and may be used to critically examine them.
Beyond Methodological Individualism: Social Scientific Studies of Rational Practice
In: European journal of sociology: Archives européennes de sociologie = Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie, Band 53, Heft 1, S. 97-118
ISSN: 1474-0583
AbstractStandard versions of the sociology of rational practice assume justificationist theories of rationality: all rational beliefs are justified and rational individuals do not believe any non-justified statements. This theory appears to some to offer the possiblity of finding "deeper" insights into social behavior: some actions presented by actors as "rational" can, in fact, be explained as non-justified and, therefore, as mere consequences of prestige and/or power conflicts. When, however, it turns out that no theories can be justified, then all theories are irrational. This leads to relativism. The possibility, that we may profitably construct alternative theories of rationality is, in contrast, raised nearly uniquely by fallibilist theories of rationality. In order to take advantage of this, an alternative to the dominant methodological individualist theory of rational action is needed and possible. According to this alternative, rational action consists of problem-solving within institutional contexts without justification. Such a non-relativist sociology of rational practice can be enlightening and useful. Differing institutional contexts offer differing standards of rationality.
Reply to Tuomela's Reply to My Reply
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 42, Heft 1, S. 124-125
ISSN: 1552-7441
The Rationality of Extremists: A Talmonist Insight We Need to Respond to
In: Social epistemology: a journal of knowledge, culture and policy, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 31-53
ISSN: 1464-5297
Reply to Tuomela
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 40, Heft 3, S. 518-522
ISSN: 1552-7441
Raimo Tuomola has complained that my critical review of his The Philosophy of Sociality is superficial, that I have not presented, even that I have misrepresented his work, and that I have neglected its virtues, which others have praised. I reject his complaint about the content of my review as unwarranted in an open society, as he demands that I take his work on his own terms. I defend my view of the place of his work in the analytic tradition, my analysis of his work as essentialist and not explanatory, my argument that his analytic method is weak, and my appraisal that the framework he offers for current social scientific research is not needed and not very useful.
Book Review: Tuomela, Raimo. (2007). The Philosophy of Sociality. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 39, Heft 3, S. 531-534
ISSN: 1552-7441
Book Review: Brannigan, A. (2004). The Rise and Fall of Social Psychology: The Use and Misuse of Experimental Method. New York: Aldine de Gruyter
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 38, Heft 4, S. 551-560
ISSN: 1552-7441
Book Review: Manicas, P. T. (2006). A Realist Philosophy of Social Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 298-303
ISSN: 1552-7441
Popper's Theory of the Closed Society Conflicts with His Theory of Research
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 37, Heft 2, S. 185-209
ISSN: 1552-7441
Popper's theory of the attraction of closed societies conflicts with his theory of research: the former sees rational thought as contrary to man's nature, whereas the latter sees it as an innate psychological process. This conflict arose because Popper developed a theory of the movement from the closed society—Heimat—to civilized society, which sees civilized society as a burden, before he adapted Selz's view of directed thought processes as problem solving, which sees rationality as natural. Rejecting the earlier view and retaining the latter one opens up possibilities for better explanations of closed societies and better means of combating them.
Book Review: Karl R. Popper, Bibliographie 1925-2004
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 248-248
ISSN: 1552-7441
Searching for the Holy in the Ascent of Imre Lakatos
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 84-150
ISSN: 1552-7441
Bernard Lavor and John Kadvany argue that Lakatos's Hegelian approach to the philosophy of mathematics and science enabled him to overcome all competing philosophies. His use of the approach Hegel developed in his Phenomenology enabled him to show how mathematics and science develop, how they are open-ended, and that they are not subject to rules, even though their rationality may be understood after the fact. Hegel showed Lakatos how to falsify the past to make progress in the present. A critique based on normal standards of fairness and honesty finds this argument an attack on rationality. The similarity of the methods Lakatos used as a Stalinist politician and those he used as a philosopher are pointed out. The Hegelian interpretation of his philosophy is an excuse for his misdeeds.