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Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to highlight both the contribution and the present need to reconfigure the literature on "queue culture" as a precursor of the sociology of waiting.Design/methodology/approach– The study employs a legal-structural lens in comparing the initial conceptual treatment of the archetypal "waiting line" with the "line" modifying sociology of waiting that results in waiting rooms, number and telephone queues and in the experience of online waiting.Findings– The initial conception of the culture of the queue understates the importance of three factors: first, the role of third parties in the design, management and inculcation of rules binding those experiencing thick time; second the degree to which communication technology and its attachment to the "mobilities" paradigm has thinned the experience of thick time and lastly the degree to which the increasing commodification of the wait has resulted in the creation of waiting time as a form of pay as you go flexitime.Social implications– The social construction of waiting and the experience of thick time are shown to be increasingly part of the privatized market experience where queue management innovations not only are commercialized but have strong implications for the egalitarian social assumptions imbedded in the initial queue culture based sociology of waiting. Policy implications support the present pay for use philosophy increasingly applied in the transition from public to private management of space.Originality/value– The self-policing "fairness" of the waiting line is now open to scrutiny given the proliferation of the newly shaped distributional logics imbedded in the management, design and use of waiting spaces.

AbstractThis article draws attention to the origins, forms, and implications of "toxic discourse" as a genre central to the understanding of the public sphere in business in society.RachelCarson'sSilentSpringis used as a pivotal cultural document establishing "toxic discourse" as an ongoing form of moral narrative rooted in the rationality of counterpublics. Toxic discourse is framed within a center/periphery model in which toxic discourse gains salience in periods of economic dislocation and uncertainty. In these periods, toxic discourse draws together those on the periphery or counterpublics who otherwise would not unite in their opposition to the center. The article critically examines how stakeholder theory, despite making sense of the public sphere for agents of organizations, glosses counterpublics and relegates toxic discourse, as evident in the "Occupy Movement," to the ephemeral role of temporary, disruptive protest groups with very little of substance to communicate.

ABSTRACTThis article takes an interdisciplinary lens to the treatment of regulatory capture (RC). RC ensues when government bureaucrats, regulators, and public sector agencies receive adverse publicity for ceasing to serve the wider collective public interest. The work is divided into four sections. The first takes the point of view of each of the participants in the capture situation and provides an overview of the three variations on the RC story. Each subsequent section focuses on a version of the story. RC 1, the libertarian free market version celebrates capture as inevitable and desirable. RC 2, the regulators' communitarian take on capture places it in the context of a cycle story with regulators dutifully doing the public's shifting will. In the RC 3 version, the public finds it difficult to piece together a coherent version of the morally charged narrative. The article concludes with a discussion of the relevance of each of these three versions of RC in order to understand dominant–submissive relationships between business and government.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the manner in which advocates of crowdsourcing reconfigure the classical sociological treatment of the crowd.Design/methodology/approachThe approach taken conceives of the semantics of crowd theorizing in three phases, each of which makes sense of the power dynamics between the elite and the crowd. In phases one and two, the crowd is conceptualized as a problem generator; in phase three, the crowd is depicted as a problem solver and innovator.FindingsThis paper provides a critical look at phase three crowd theorizing. It explores how, by ignoring the disruptive power dynamic, crowdsourcing generates a credible image of the crowd as an innovator and problem solver. The work concludes with a discussion of the implications of phase three crowd theorizing for researchers in sociology.Practical implicationsAdvocates of the wisdom of crowds, if interested in the sociological implications of their position, must attend to both the disruptive and costly implications of third phase crowd theorizing.Originality/valueThis paper maps the crowdsourcing process and places it in context. It argues that the distance between the classical social scientific treatment of the crowd is not nearly as great as crowdsourcing advocates would have one believe. Nevertheless, phase three crowd theorizing opens up sociologically relevant questions regarding the future portrayal of collective intelligence as a form of virtual property.

ABSTRACTThis work explores financial edgework by professional speculative traders as an explanation for the persistence of rogue trading in financial markets. The article joins in the scholarly application of "edgework," the social psychological study of voluntary risk, to speculative trading. The discussion focuses on the origins and persistence of that subset of behavior wherein the trader knowingly creates the condition in which he or she endangers the brokerage house that employs them and even, at times, threatens the public's perception of the integrity of the securities industry. Going over the edge between risk taking and unauthorized rogue trading is explained by looking at five inducements to escalate risk taking provided in the securities industry. This examination of financial edgework demonstrates how and, to a lesser degree, why rogue trading is a result of the security industry's pursuit of and desire to capitalize upon yet not publicize an occupational culture stressing a "risk‐and‐win" ethos.

PurposeThis paper aims to explore how and why the emerging literature in clinical psychology on the "successful psychopath" precedes the escalating middle class framing of the contemporary corporation as a monster and points towards an increasingly credible version of systemic psychopathy.Design/methodology/approachDiscourse analysis is used to isolate three distinct but interrelated argument forms in which the basic assertion is that "the corporation is a psychopath". All three argument forms insist that the corporation lacks a conscience and point to a toxic schism on the boundary between the organization and its stakeholders or publics.FindingsIn Argument Form I, successful psychopaths enter and rise to prominence in the flexible, hypercompetitive context of the contemporary corporation. Once ensconced within the corporation, in Argument Form II, the psychopath creates the conditions for a scam which, when detected, gives rise to a flurry of breathless and very public corporate scandals. Argument Form III follows from II. In it the rogues and scoundrels – those increasingly caught in the high beams of a corporate scandal – once in positions of power and authority seek out allies, stifle those who would oppose them and begin to legitimize their scams as "business as usual." Systemic psychopathy emerges when the appeal to "business as usual" conceals scams and supports conscienceless behavior.Originality/valueThis paper explains why increasingly, members of the middle class, those who in the past stood behind the corporation, are less than shocked to hear it characterized as a psychopath. The paper concludes with the implications of the intensifying portrayal of the dark side of the corporation for researchers studying the changing relationship between society and business.

Organizational memory (OM) is a branch of collective memory studies tied to instrumental action which seeks to enhance the organization's intellectual capital by aiding organizations in using both routine practices and imbedded information to anticipate and solve problems. Within an intellectual capital perspective, OM involves the encoding of information via suitable representation and retrieval systems which are filtered through the three forms of intellectual capital – human, structural and relational. This paper explores how these three forms of intellectual capital, when put into mnemonic practice, generate four interrelated but distinct models of OM – the storage bin model, the narrative model, the innovative model, and the political resource model. Emphasis is placed on discussion of how each of these models of OM impacts efforts to effectively manage an organization's intellectual capital.

To those concerned with challenges and challengers to conventional wisdom, the entirely credible perception of ours as a planet in the midst of a deep environmental crisis offers fruitful grounds for analysis. Crises stimulate those who have, in the existence of the crisis, firm proof that the wisdom which girds the status quo is deficient and/or those who apply it are. This is particularly true when the crisis is perceived to be grave and dread‐laden. Skin cancer due to the depletion of the ozone layer is on the increase. Large, at times devastating, climate changes are loose upon the planet. Whether given quasi‐ scientific names like the "greenhouse effect" or lumped together in a melange of "acid rain", "toxic waste" and "industrial cancers", the result is the same. Rational citizens of the everyday‐person‐on‐the‐street sort feel threatened. The threat is given shape and substance by the mass media. The environmental crisis is a credible crisis. One need not list radical political activism as one's vocation to list the environmental crisis as one of one's fears as we enter the 1990's.

Grid‐group analysis is grounded in a humanistic conception of social science but, it is argued, it has flaws when applied to the analysis of the environmental movement. Environmentalism is not "border" country particularly as existing only in opposition to a "centre". Grid‐group analysis loses clarity when forced into a "border versus centre" format. And the grid‐group analysis of sub‐cultures is not sufficiently well developed; the lack of a clear holistic frame plays havoc with efforts to derive solid policy.